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Executive summary
This is the Finnish National Report, in accordance with the provisions of Article 32 of 
the Joint Convention, for the Fifth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties in May 
2015. The fulfilment of the obligations of the Convention and the developments of waste 
management after the Fourth Review Meeting, during the reporting period 2011–2013, 
are assessed in this report. It presents the recent developments and describes the waste 
management facilities and practices in Finland, to be reviewed and discussed by the 
contracting parties.
As spent nuclear fuel is defined in the Finnish legislation as radioactive waste, the nuclear 
power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto are the main generators of radioactive waste. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy operates two VVER units at the Loviisa site and Teollisuuden Voima 
Oyj two BWR units at Olkiluoto. The Loviisa units 1 and 2 were commissioned in 1977 and 
1981, and the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 1978 and 1980, respectively. In addition, a new 
nuclear power plant unit is being constructed at the Olkiluoto site. As to the future, the 
Decision-in-Principle, the first step in the licensing process, was made by the Government 
for two new reactors in 2010, one for Teollisuuden Voima Oyj at the Olkiluoto site and one 
for Fennovoima Oy, for which Pyhäjoki was chosen as the site in 2011. At the Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa sites there are interim storages for spent fuel as well as repositories for low 
and intermediate level radioactive wastes. Furthermore, a Triga Mark II research reactor 
is operated in Espoo by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. However, in 2012 VTT 
decided to start planning of the decommissioning and eventual shut-down of the research 
reactor, due to economical reasons.
The four Finnish NPP units operated during the reporting period safely with high capacity 
factors and generated spent fuel accordingly. The generation of low and intermediate level 
radioactive waste was kept low. Activities and programmes related to waste management 
continued in accordance with the national strategy, milestones and timetable. The licensees 
and Posiva Oy, the spent fuel disposal implementer, showed good safety performance 
and safety management practices in carrying out their responsibilities in spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management.
The main focus of activities during the reporting period was the spent nuclear fuel disposal 
project. The construction licence application including the safety documentation for the 
spent nuclear fuel encapsulation and disposal facilities was submitted to the authorities at 
the end of 2012. Posiva Oy is aiming to start disposal operations around 2022. During the 
reporting period, the highlights in Finland were as follows:
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Spent nuclear fuel disposal project progressed as planned
•	 The	disposal	project	reached	the	construction	licence	application	stage.	At	the	end	of	
2012 Posiva submitted the construction licence application and its supporting safety 
documentation to the authorities. MEE started the licensing process and STUK the safety 
review and assessment in the beginning of 2013. The preparation of the application has 
required an extensive effort, from both the regulator and the implementer, in research, 
technical development and competence development of organisations. The safety review 
and assessment is currently going on and some preliminary results are elaborated in this 
report. The licence application review and STUK’s regulatory approach are described 
in Annex L.1. Posiva’s programme for spent fuel disposal is presented in Annex L.2.
•	 The	construction	of	the	underground	rock	characterization	facility,	ONKALO,	which	
started in July 2004, progressed to disposal depth. Most of the excavation work was 
completed by early 2013. The access tunnel reached the length (chainage) of 4987 m and 
the depth of 455 m. The main characterisation level is located at the depth of  420 m, but 
some of the auxiliary rooms are deeper down at the depth of  437 m. Regulatory control 
procedures for ONKALO were established during the previous reporting period and 
continued to be implemented with the depth and detail that would allow the use of the 
facility as a part of the disposal facility. The procedures are described in Annex L.1.
Progress was made in spent fuel management
•	 In	the	Loviisa	NPP	spent	fuel	storage,	the	installation	of	dense	fuel	racks	was	started	in	
2007 and is continuing. The allowable total amount of spent fuel, according to the renewed 
operating licence issued in 2007, with additional high density racks, is evaluated by 
FPH as adequate up to the end of the planned 50 years of operational life of the NPP.
•	 At	the	Olkiluoto	plant	TVO	started	the	construction	work	for	enlarging	the	interim	
storage in autumn 2010 and construction and installation work was completed in 
early 2014. The extension is carried out according to the updated safety requirements 
which require among other things that the design has to withstand a large 
airplane impact. The extension is scheduled to be commissioned during 2014.
•	 The	safety	of	the	spent	fuel	storages	(at	both	the	Loviisa	and	the	Olkiluoto	site)	
was	analyzed	as	part	of	the	EU	stress	tests	in	relation	to	the	Fukushima	accident,	
and the results were reported within the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
•	 Spent	fuel	of	the	research	reactor	FiR	1	is	stored	on	site.	VTT	has	decided	to	decommission	
FiR 1 due to insufficient funding for continued operation. VTT will prepare the EIA 
report during 2014 and after that VTT can apply for a licence amendment for the 
research reactor decommissioning. The first option for spent fuel management is to 
return the fuel to the United States as defined in the current contract. The second 
option is interim storage and later disposal to the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal 
facility, which would require a new licensing process for the disposal facility.
Management of LILW from nuclear facilities was improved
•	 Improved	facilities	for	LILW	operations	at	the	Loviisa	NPP	were	
commissioned in 2010. The LILW repository was enlarged with a new room 
for waste handling and a tunnel facilitating disposal operations.
•	 A	modified	licence	to	operate	the	Olkiluoto	LILW	repository,	granted	in	2012,	allows	
the disposal of Olkiluoto 3 low and intermediate level operational waste as well 
as most of the radioactive waste that the government is responsible to take care 
of. The application contained an updated safety assessment of the facility.
•	 During	the	reporting	period,	no	spent	fuel	or	radioactive	waste	
incidents in the Finnish NPPs were reported.
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The regulatory system was strengthened
STUK continued to increase its resources and activities in response to the expanding operations 
of Posiva in preparing and implementing the review of the disposal facility (encapsulation facility 
and repository) construction licence application.
•	 The	Finnish	nuclear	and	radiation	safety	legislation	and	regulatory	guidance	were	developed	
further. Legally binding EU directives as well as international guidance, such as IAEA 
safety standards and WENRA recommendations were taken into account in this work.
– The Nuclear Energy Act was revised and amended in 2011 (Council Directive 2009/71/
Euratom),	in	2012	(inspection	organizations	included),	and	in	2013	(Council	Directive	
2011/70/Euratom).
– The Radiation Act and Decree were revised in 2013 (Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom 
and for conformance with the European Community Radiation Protection Legislation).
– The Council Directive 2013/39/Euratom of 5 December 2013 will be implemented into the 
Finnish legislation during the next four years.
– Detailed safety requirements on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
waste resulting from the production of nuclear energy are provided in STUK’s regulatory 
guides, the YVL Guides. After amending the nuclear energy legislation in 2008, also the 
revision of the existing YVL guide system was commenced. Forty new YVL guides were 
issued on December first 2013.
– Detailed safety requirements on the management of radioactive waste, subject to the 
Radiation Act, are provided in STUK’s ST Guides. They have been updated in accordance 
with the changes in the respective legislation.
•	 In	2012,	the	Finnish	regulatory	framework	for	nuclear	and	radiation	safety	was	reviewed	
in the IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) peer review process. According to the 
IRRS recommendations, some amendments need to be considered for the legislation mainly 
concerning the independence of STUK. The amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act and the 
Radiation Act were under preparation in 2013. The follow-up IRRS review is in June 2015.
Technical support and competence were developed
•	 VTT	Technical	Research	Centre	of	Finland	continued	to	support	effectively	the	regulatory	
body in safety assessment work, providing safety analysis capabilities and tools e.g. via the 
regulatory research programmes, and performing reviews of safety analyses. In addition, 
several international experts have supported STUK’s review work of spent fuel encapsulation 
and disposal safety during pre-licence phase and in construction licence review.
•	 Competence	management,	especially	taking	into	account	the	retirement	of	large	post-war	
age groups, is a concern also in Finland. During 2010–2012, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy set up a committee to report on the availability of competence and 
resources in the nuclear energy sector. STUK was a participant in the committee. One of 
the recommendations was that the future needs and focus areas of the Finnish nuclear 
energy sector research must be accurately defined and a long-term strategy drawn 
up for research activities. One of the conclusions was also that there is a challenge in 
maintaining continuity of knowledge and also in attracting new competent personnel. 
Investments in research and the availability of high-standard education and training are 
crucial. At the end of January 2013 the Ministry of Employment and the Economy set 
up a working group to prepare a research and development strategy (see Article 22). 
•	 International	cooperation	and	transparency	belong	to	the	cornerstones	of	
the development of the national solutions for spent fuel and waste safety in 
Finland. In addition to active participation in international and bilateral 
forums (IAEA, EU, WENRA, OECD/NEA), foreign consultants continued to 
participate both in regulatory reviews and Posiva’s development work.
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Challenges for future work
•	 The	main	challenges	are	related	to	the	spent	fuel	disposal	project.	Finalizing	the	
construction licence application review for the Olkiluoto spent fuel encapsulation and 
disposal facility is a challenging task, as are both for Posiva and STUK the planning and 
preparation for the construction and for the commissioning phase. Posiva and STUK 
invest in their processes and resources to ensure that all safety related regulatory and 
implementation tasks can be performed with high quality and without undue delay.
•	 The	planned	Olkiluoto	disposal	facility	currently	covers	spent	fuel	from	the	four	reactors	
in operation, from the one under construction (Olkiluoto 3) and from the one under 
planning (Olkiluoto 4). As Fennovoima Oy is not an owner of Posiva, the plans of Posiva 
do not cover disposal of spent fuel from Fennovoima’s future NPP unit. According to the 
Decision-in-Principle Fennovoima must supplement its plan for the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel by 2016 by submitting to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy either 
an agreement with Posiva’s owners, i.e. TVO and FPH, on nuclear waste management in 
cooperation with Posiva as outlined in the application for a Decision-in-Principle, or an 
environmental impact assessment programme for a spent fuel disposal facility of its own.
•	 LILW	generated	from	the	operation	of	the	research	reactor	FiR	1	is	stored	at	the	reactor	
facility until decommissioning. VTT is negotiating with the Finnish NPP licensees (TVO 
and FPH) for possible interim storage and future disposal of decommissioning waste. The 
dismantling of the reactor is planned to start in late 2015 and to last about two years.
•	 The	European	Commission	promotes	worldwide	co-operation	to	further	develop	nuclear,	
radiation and waste safety through its INSC program and its predecessors. Finland 
has been and will be a supporter of this European development and involvement. The 
insufficiency of competent personnel for this work may adversely affect the co-operation.
•	 Communication	will	become	an	increasingly	important	success	factor	for	STUK,	Posiva,	and	
the power companies. The interest in radiation and nuclear safety topics will continue to 
increase. The media, including the social media, plays an important role in communication.
•	While	most	radioactive	waste	streams	have	a	disposal	solution,	a	small	quantity	of	the	
small user waste – consisting of nuclear material and a few high activity sources – cannot 
be disposed of in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility due to inventory restrictions. 
An alternative disposal route for these wastes is currently being negotiated.
From the 4th Review Meeting
The 4th Review Meeting in 2012 identified challenges and items for follow-up, and recorded 
some planned measures to improve safety of nuclear waste management in Finland. 
On request of the Review Meeting these issues are included and responded in this 5th 
National Report of Finland. The issues are listed here, with the related Articles given in 
brackets.
Finland – Challenges
•	Maintain	timely	progress	of	SNF	disposal	project.	(Articles	13–15,	Annexes	L.1	and	L.2)
•	 New	NPP	(Fennovoima):	further	define	plans	for	disposal	
of spent nuclear fuel, by 2016 (Article 32)
•	 Human	resources	(Regulator	&	Operators)	(Article	20,	Article	22,	Section	K):
– High rate of retirement
– Simultaneous implementation: SNF project + new NPPs
– Maintaining know-how and human resources in a changing funding environment 
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•	 Communication	is	an	increasing	success	factor	(Article	20)
•	 Safety	related	improvements	as	a	response	to	the	Fukushima	
accident (BDB accidents) (Article 32, Article 19, Section K)
Finland – Planned Measures to Improve Safety
•	 Extension	and	upgrade	(Article	32,	Section	K):
– Loviisa LILW repository
–	 Loviisa	&	Olkiluoto	spent	fuel	storage
•	 ONKALO	underground	laboratory	completed	in	2012	(Annex	L.2)
•	 IAEA	Peer	Review	(IRRS)	planned	for	2012	(Article	19,	Article	20,	Section	K)
•	 Enhanced	safety	features	and	expansion	of	Olkiluoto	SF	storage	
facility to be completed by 2014 (Article 32)
•	 Extraction	of	Uranium	from	waste	solutions	at	Ni	and	Zn	
mining company (Section A, Article 12, Section K)
•	 Recruitment,	education	&	training:	to	take	into	account	
retirements (Article 20, Article 22, Section K)
Conclusion
In conclusion, based on the information presented in the report Finland complies with the 
obligations	and	objectives	of	the	Joint	Convention.	Challenges	for	the	future	are	recognized,	
regularly reviewed and addressed. The required effort for continuous improvement is made.
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List of acronyms
AFR Away from reactor
BWR  Boiling water reactor
DiP Decision-in-Principle by the Government
EIA Environmental impact assessment
EPR	 European	pressurized	water	reactor
ETCS European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System
FPH Fortum Power and Heat Oy (NPP utility)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
ILW Intermediate level waste
LILW Low and intermediate level waste
LLW Low level waste
MEE*  Ministry of Employment and the Economy
MTI* Ministry of Trade and Industry
NORM  Naturally occurring radioactive materials
NPP Nuclear power plant
ONKALO	 Underground	rock	characterization	facility	for	spent	fuel	disposal	at	Olkiluoto
Posiva Posiva Oy (company for spent fuel disposal)
PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
PWR	 Pressurized	water	reactor
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel
ST Guide Safety regulation issued by STUK subject to radiation legislation
STUK Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (NPP utility)
URCF	 Underground	Rock	Characterization	Facility
VAL Guide National Protective Actions Guidelines in Case of Radiological or Nuclear Emergency
VLLW Very low level waste
VTT VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
YVL Guide Safety regulation issued by STUK subject to nuclear energy legislation
*) The Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE) was established in 2008 and the duties of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) were transferred to the MEE.
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The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management was adopted on 29 September 
1997 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. Finland 
signed the Convention on 2 October 1997 and de-
posited the tools of acceptance on 10 February 
2000. The Convention entered into force on 18 June 
2001. This report is the Finnish National Report 
for the Fifth Review Meeting in May 2015.
The fulfilment of the obligations of the 
Convention and the developments after the fourth 
Review Meeting during 2011–2013 are assessed in 
this report. The self-assessment is mainly based 
on the Finnish legislation and regulations, on the 
status of existing and projected spent fuel as well 
as other nuclear and radioactive waste manage-
ment facilities, and on the activities to develop and 
improve operational and long-term safety of the 
facilities. The plans for the decommissioning of nu-
clear facilities and the regulation and management 
of radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear 
fuel cycle are discussed as appropriate.
The main regulations in the field of spent nu-
clear fuel management as well as nuclear and 
other radioactive waste management are the 
Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the Radiation 
Act and Decree, the Government Decrees on nu-
clear safety and on the safety of disposal of nuclear 
waste and the regulatory guides (YVL Guides and 
ST Guides) issued by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK). The most essential safe-
ty regulations are listed in Annex L.5.
Chapter 2a of the Nuclear Energy Act gives 
general nuclear safety and security principles, 
including some principles to be followed in nuclear 
waste management. Nuclear waste shall be man-
aged so that after the disposal of the waste no ra-
diation exposure is caused which would exceed the 
level considered acceptable at the time the disposal 
SECTION A Introduction
is implemented. The disposal of nuclear waste in a 
manner intended as permanent shall be planned 
giving priority to safety and so that ensuring long-
term safety does not require surveillance of the 
disposal site.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 5) requires 
that the use of nuclear energy, taking into account 
its various impacts, has to be in line with the over-
all good of the society. It provides (Section 6) that 
the use of nuclear energy must be safe; it shall not 
cause harmful effects to humans or damage to the 
environment or property. Section 7 further requires 
that sufficient physical protection and emergency 
planning as well as other arrangements for lim-
iting nuclear damage and for protecting nuclear 
energy against illegal activities shall be the pre-
requisite for the use of nuclear energy.
The Radiation Act (Section 2) provides that the 
benefits accruing from the use of radiation and 
practices involving exposure to radiation shall 
exceed the detriment it causes; that the practice 
shall	be	organized	in	such	a	way	that	the	resulting	
exposure	to	radiation	hazardous	to	health	is	kept	
as low as reasonably achievable and that no per-
son’s exposure shall exceed the maximum values 
prescribed in the Radiation Decree.
These general safety principles, included in the 
Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act, apply 
to the management of spent nuclear fuel and of 
other nuclear waste arising from the use of nu-
clear energy and the associated nuclear fuel cycle. 
Radioactive waste produced in other activities is 
regulated solely by the Radiation Act.
Finland is a member state of the European 
Union and thus EU legislation is in force in 
Finland. EU decrees are directly applicable as such 
whereas EU directives have been implemented by 
national legislation. The most important EU legis-
lation related to the management of spent fuel and 
16
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radioactive waste is the Council Directive 2011/70/
Euratom (Nuclear Waste Directive).
There are two nuclear power plants operating 
in Finland: the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants. 
The Loviisa plant comprises two VVER-440 units 
(Russian type pressurised water reactors), oper-
ated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). The 
Olkiluoto plant comprises two BWR units (boiling 
water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima 
Oyj	(TVO).	In	addition,	a	third	PWR	(pressurized	
water reactor) unit is under construction at the 
Olkiluoto site.
In 2010, the Finnish Parliament endorsed the 
Government’s Decision-in-Principle (DiP) to build 
two more NPP units, one by TVO at the Olkiluoto 
site and the other by Fennovoima Oy at a new 
site, Pyhäjoki (Figure 1). In 2013 Fennovoima Oy 
submitted a new EIA programme since the chosen 
reactor type for the Pyhäjoki plant does not cor-
respond the reactor type given in the DiP. The up-
dated EIA report was completed in February 2014. 
The EIA report considers nuclear waste manage-
ment as a whole and describes the progress made 
since 2008.
Both NPPs in operation have storage facili-
ties for fresh and spent nuclear fuel and facilities 
for treatment and storage of low and intermedi-
ate level radioactive waste (LILW). The disposal 
facility for LILW was taken into operation at the 
Olkiluoto site in 1992 and for LLW at the Loviisa 
site in 1998. The Loviisa NPP has continued the 
commissioning of the liquid waste (ILW) solidifica-
tion facility. Due to modifications needed in plant 
equipment the project schedule has been updated. 
The disposal facility for the solidified liquid waste 
is under commissioning. According to the licensee’s 
plan the commissioning will be completed in 2015.
All spent fuel generated at the Olkiluoto plant 
is stored on-site. Previously the spent fuel of the 
Loviisa plant was transported to the Mayak facili-
ties in the Russian Federation, after interim stor-
age of a few years. An amendment to the Nuclear 
Energy Act was passed in 1994, stating that spent 
fuel and all other nuclear wastes generated by 
the Finnish NPPs have to be treated, stored and 
disposed of in Finland. Spent fuel shipments to 
Russia were terminated at the end of 1996, and 
since then the spent fuel generated at the Loviisa 
plant has been stored at the plant site. In 1995, a 
joint waste management company Posiva Oy was 
established by FPH and TVO for taking care of 
the disposal of the spent fuel of the nuclear power 
plants they operate.
The Finnish fuel cycle policy is based on the 
once-through option. In 1999 Posiva proposed, in 
a Decision-in-Principle (DiP) application, to site a 
Nuclear power in Finland
Hanhikivi NPP (Fennovoima)
• Decision in Principle for a new
Olkiluoto NPP (TVO)
• 2 operating units ‐ BWRs 880MWe             
NPP, AFR storage, LILW 
repository
(‐78, ‐80), AFR storage, LILW 
repository
• New reactor unit OL3 (EPR) under 
Loviisa NPP (Fortum)
• 2 operating units VVERs
construction
• Decision‐in‐Principle for a new 
reactor unit
     ‐  
496 MWe (‐77, ‐81), AFR storage, 
LILW repository
• Construction license application for 
SNF Encapsulation and Disposal 
Facility
Figure 1. The nuclear power plants in Finland.
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SECTION A Introduction
disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel (Figure 2) at 
Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, a couple of kilometres from 
the Olkiluoto NPP. This application was reviewed 
and approved from safety viewpoint by STUK 
and approved by the municipality of Eurajoki in 
January 2000. The Finnish Government made the 
DiP in December 2000 and the Parliament en-
dorsed it in May 2001.
Later, the Parliament has ratified two Decisions-
in-Principle on the extension of the disposal facil-
ity to provide capacity for the spent fuel from the 
new NPP units at Olkiluoto. The first ratification 
took place in 2002 and it concerned the Olkiluoto 3 
unit, and the second one concerning the Olkiluoto 
4 unit was made in 2010. Fennovoima Oy is not a 
co-owner of Posiva and consequently the extension 
plans do not cover spent fuel from Fennovoima 
Oy’s future NPP unit.
According to the Decision-in-Principle 
Fennovoima Oy must amend its plan for the dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel by the end of June 2016 
by submitting to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy either an agreement on nuclear 
waste management cooperation as outlined in the 
application for a Decision-in Principle, or an en-
vironmental impact assessment programme for a 
spent fuel disposal facility operated by Fennovoima 
Oy itself. In March 2012 the MEE appointed a 
committee to explore the disposal possibilities in 
view of a national solution by the end of year. The 
key recommendation was that the most expedient 
and cost-efficient method is to aim for an optimised 
solution in disposal, making use of the competence 
and experience accumulated during Posiva’s pro-
ject.
The	DiP	of	2001	authorized	Posiva	to	construct	
a	rock	characterization	facility	“ONKALO”	down	to	
the actual disposal depth. ONKALO is intended to 
be used as part of the repository and it is construct-
ed under pertinent regulatory control. The applica-
tion for the construction licence for the main parts 
of the repository and for the spent fuel encapsula-
tion plant was submitted to the authorities at the 
end of 2012. The safety review and assessment is 
currently going on and some preliminary results 
are elaborated in this report. The Government 
decision of the Construction Licence is expected in 
early 2015.
A research reactor FiR 1 (TRIGA Mark II, 
250  kW) has been operated by VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland in Espoo and it has 
been in use since 1962. In 2012, VTT decided to 
Figure 2. The access tunnel to the disposal facility of spent fuel under construction at Olkiluoto (POSIVA).
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shut it down and therefore the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) process for the decom-
missioning was started in 2013 and the EIA pro-
gramme was submitted to the contact author-
ity (MEE) at the end of 2013. The EIA report is 
planned to be completed by the end of 2014. VTT 
also has radiochemical laboratories and a hot-cell 
for studies of pressure vessel materials and other 
radioactive materials. In addition, radiochemical 
and particle accelerator laboratories are located at 
the universities of Helsinki, Turku and Jyväskylä.
In 2010, Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy submitted an 
application for the recovery of uranium with a 
volume of around 350–500 tonnes per year as a by-
product	in	nickel	and	zinc	mining.	The	Government	
made a positive decision in 2012. It was appealed 
to the Supreme Administrative Court which over-
ruled the decision in 2013. The application will 
be reassessed when the Government has updated 
information on the company’s financial situation. 
During the production processes uranium follows 
the other metals. Since uranium has not yet been 
recovered, it ends up in the gypsum waste water 
pond. In 2012, water from a gypsum waste water 
pond began to leak into the environment at the 
Talvivaara mine site after the bottom of a pond 
gave way. The leaking waste water caused ura-
nium contamination to the surroundings. This is 
described in more detail in Chapter H.12., as well 
as some past practices and disposal of waste due 
to accidental melting of radioactive sources in the 
Outokumpu Stainless Oy’s steel foundry in Tornio, 
Finland, 2010.
Structure of Report
This report has been structured in accordance with 
the Guidelines Regarding the Form and Structure 
of National Reports (INFCIRC 604/Rev  2). 
Emphasis has been put on Section K to reflect the 
revision of INFCIRC 604/Rev 3 (updated in May 
2014). This 5th National Report is aimed to be a 
stand-alone document and does not require famili-
arity with the earlier reports. The fulfilment of the 
obligations of the Convention and the latest devel-
opment during 2011–2013 are described in the fol-
lowing chapters. In Section B and Annex L.8, poli-
cies and practices of waste management in Finland 
are summarised as stipulated in Article 32, para-
graph 1. In section C, the scope of application, 
taking into account the Finnish circumstances is 
explained, as stipulated in Article 3. Section D pro-
vides information on spent fuel and waste manage-
ment facilities in Finland and on the inventories 
of spent fuel and radioactive waste, as stipulated 
in Article 32, paragraph 2. The implementation of 
each of the Articles from 4 to 28 of the Convention 
is separately evaluated in Sections E to J. Section 
K summarises general efforts to improve safety. 
Section L contains the annexes:
•	 Regulatory	approach	to	the	Olkiluoto	spent	fuel	
disposal project (L.1),
•	 Programme	for	spent	fuel	disposal	(L.2),
•	 List	 of	 spent	 fuel	 storages	 and	 inventory	 of	
spent fuel (L.3),
•	 List	of	radioactive	waste	management	facilities	
and inventory of radioactive waste (L.4),
•	 List	 of	 laws,	 regulations,	 safety	 guides	 and	
other relevant documents (L.5),
•	 	 References	 to	 official	 national	 and	 interna-
tional reports related to radiation and nuclear 
safety (L.6),
•	 References	 to	 reports	 of	 international	 review	
missions performed at the request of a Con-
tracting Party (L.7), and
•	 Spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste	management	
policy (L.8).
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Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 1
In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each 
Contracting Party shall submit a national report to 
each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This re-
port shall address the measures taken to implement 
each of the obligations of the Convention. For each 
Contracting Party the report shall also address its:
(a) spent fuel management policy;
(b) spent fuel management practices;
(c) radioactive waste management policy;
(d) radioactive waste management practices;
(e) criteria used to define and categorize radioac-
tive waste.
Criteria used to define and 
categorize radioactive waste
Nuclear waste is defined in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Section 3) as radioactive waste in the form of 
spent fuel or in some other form, generated in con-
nection with or as a result of the use of nuclear en-
ergy, and materials, objects and structures which, 
having become radioactive in connection with or 
as a result of the use of nuclear energy and having 
been removed from use, require special measures 
because of the danger arising from their radioac-
tivity.
Other radioactive waste than nuclear waste is 
regulated in the framework of the Radiation Act. 
According to the Act (Section 10), the term radio-
active waste denotes radioactive substances, and 
various items that have no use any more and have 
to be rendered harmless due to their radioactivity. 
The definition also includes equipment, goods and 
materials that are contaminated by radioactive 
materials. Radioactive substances and radiation 
appliances containing radioactive substances shall 
also be regarded as radioactive waste in case the 
owner of the substances or the appliances cannot 
be found.
The main sources of radioactive waste in Finland 
are nuclear wastes generated from the operation of 
the four power reactors and one small research 
reactor. Other radioactive wastes arise from a num-
ber of facilities using radioisotopes in medical, 
research and industrial applications. Consequently, 
the Finnish waste classification system includes 
two main categories: nuclear waste, and radioac-
tive waste not originating from the use of nuclear 
energy and the associated nuclear fuel cycle. Waste 
classification according to disposal route is illus-
trated in Figure 3.
Spent fuel from nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act defines spent fuel from 
the operation of nuclear reactors as nuclear waste, 
destined for disposal in a permanent manner. Due 
to its high activity and heat generation, spent fuel 
is regarded as high-level waste.
Low and intermediate level waste 
from nuclear facilities
The classification system for the purpose of the 
predisposal management of LILW from nuclear fa-
cilities, including NPPs, is based on activity con-
centrations, given in Guide YVL D.4. Solid and 
liquid wastes arising from the controlled area of 
a NPP contain almost exclusively short-lived beta 
and gamma emitters and are grouped into the fol-
lowing activity categories:
•	Low level waste contains so little radioactiv-
ity that it can be treated without any special 
radiation protection arrangements. The activity 
concentration in waste is then not more than 
1 MBq/kg, as a rule.
•	 Intermediate level waste contains radioac-
tivity to the extent that effective radiation 
protection arrangements are needed when they 
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are processed. The activity concentration in the 
waste is then from 1 MBq/kg to 10 GBq/kg, as a 
rule.
The classification for the disposal purpose is given 
in Government Decree 736/2008. It distinguishes 
short-lived and long-lived waste accordingly:
•	Short-lived waste shall refer to nuclear waste 
the activity concentration of which after 500 
years is below the level of 100 megabecquerels 
(MBq) per kilogram in each disposed waste 
package, and below an average value of 10 
MBq per kilogram of waste in one emplacement 
room;
•	Long-lived waste shall refer to nuclear waste, 
the activity concentration of which after 500 
years is above the level of 100 MBq per kilo-
gram in a disposed waste package, or above an 
average value of 10 MBq per kilogram of waste 
in one emplacement room;
Guide YVL D.4 provides for general and case-spe-
cific clearance of nuclear waste. Both clearance 
options are founded upon the criteria of trivial 
dose; the radiation protection requirement for both 
clearance procedures is that the annual dose to 
any member of the public or worker processing 
the material, shall not exceed 10 µSv and that also 
otherwise the radiation exposure arising from the 
cleared material is as low as reasonably achiev-
able.
Mass and surface concentration based activity 
constraints for general clearance are given in YVL 
D.4. One set of constraints is for unlimited amounts 
of material and the constraints are taken from 
IAEA Safety Guide RS-G-1.7. Another set of con-
straints are applied for limited waste quantities not 
exceeding 100 tonnes per year for one NPP or other 
nuclear installation. In case-specific clearance the 
activity concentrations are determined on a case-by-
case basis but care has to be taken that they do not 
exceed the exemption limits given e.g. in the Council 
Directive 96/29/Euratom and Guide ST 1.5.
Guide YVL D.4 also covers clearance of regulat-
ed buildings and sites in the context of decommis-
sioning of nuclear facilities. The radiation protec-
tion requirement for such clearances is that the an-
nual individual dose shall not exceed a constraint 
  
Nuclear Waste
(Subject to Nuclear Energy Act)
Spent Nuclear Fuel Low and Intermediate
Level Waste
if activity < 100 kBq/kg
Deep Repository Rock Caverns at 
Intermediate Depth
Near Surface Landﬁll 
or Rock Caverns
 
Other Radioactive Waste
(Subject to Radiation Act)
Conditioned
Solid Waste  
Liquid Waste Solid Waste Airborne 
Discharges
Central Storage and 
disposal 
(Olkiluoto VLJ cave)
Sewage Systems Landﬁll Air
Figure 3. Classification of radioactive waste for disposal purposes.
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between 10 µSv and 100 µSv, to be determined on 
the	basis	of	optimization.	The	relevant	IAEA	safety	
standards and guides have been used as reference 
for the guide.
Discharges from nuclear facilities
Some liquid and airborne discharges arise from the 
operation of nuclear facilities. The discharge lim-
its are specific to nuclides or nuclide groups and 
they are in conformity with the annual dose con-
straint to the most exposed individual of the popula-
tion. The dose constraint for NPPs is 0.1 mSv per 
year (Government Decree 717/2013) and 0.01 mSv 
per year for nuclear waste facilities (Government 
Decree 736/2008, YVL D.3 and YVL D.5).
Radioactive waste from medical 
use, research and industry
For small user waste, constraints for disposal in 
landfill or sewage system are provided in Guide 
ST 6.2. The criteria are based on the trivial dose 
as above in the case of clearance of nuclear waste.
According to Guide ST 6.2, liquid waste can be 
disposed of into a sewage system and solid waste 
can be delivered to a landfill site or an incinera-
tion plant, if the activities are below the nuclide 
specific limits based on the Annual Limit on Intake 
values. The upper level of radioactivity is 100 kBq 
for a sealed source eligible to be considered as 
solid waste and within these activity limits. Sealed 
sources with higher radionuclide content and other 
radioactive waste not eligible for disposal to land-
fill have to be delivered to a site approved by STUK 
for storage and disposal.
Spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management policy
The main regulations in the field of nuclear en-
ergy are the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the 
Radiation Act and Decree, the Government Decrees 
and the Decisions of the Government, as well as 
the Regulatory Guides (YVL Guides) issued by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). 
Besides that, the long-term objectives for spent 
fuel and nuclear waste management have been giv-
en in the earlier decisions by the Ministry of Trade 
an Industry. The most essential safety regulations 
and guides are listed in Annex L.5. The legislative 
and regulatory measures to fulfil the obligations 
of the Convention were discussed in detail in the 
previous national reports by Finland related to 
the Joint Convention. It was concluded that the 
Finnish regulatory framework fulfils the obliga-
tions of the Convention, and also the objectives 
of the Convention are complied with. Finland has 
implemented the requirements of the European 
Council directive (2011/70/Euratom), which also 
implies requirements for waste management policy 
and strategy. However no change in the Finnish 
policy and strategy were needed and the spent fuel 
and radioactive waste management policy hasn’t 
been changed during 2011–2013.
A summary of the spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management policies are given in Text Box 1 
and a more detailed text is reproduced in Annex L.8.
Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management practices and plans
The management practices for nuclear waste and 
other radioactive waste are described in detail be-
low. A concise overview of the management strate-
gies is given in Text Box 2.
The main producers of nuclear waste are the 
NPP utilities Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). They take care 
of interim storage of spent fuel, of conditioning and 
disposal of low and intermediate level waste and 
of planning and execution of future decommission-
ing of the NPPs, including also the disposal of the 
decommissioning waste of the NPPs.
TVO and FPH have formed a joint company, 
Posiva Oy, which is responsible for the prepara-
tions for and later implementation of their spent 
fuel disposal. The disposal project currently covers 
spent fuel from the four reactors in operation, from 
the one under construction (Olkiluoto 3) and from 
the one under planning (Olkiluoto 4).
The operator of the research reactor, VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, has fa-
cilities for storage of its spent fuel and radioactive 
waste. Producers of other radioactive waste per-
form some waste management operations, such as 
initial storage, clearance and disposal into landfill 
type sites. Small user waste that cannot be cleared, 
or, in the case of sealed sources, returned to the 
manufacturer, must be handed over to Suomen 
Nukliditekniikka against a fee that covers the in-
terim storage and later disposal of the waste.
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Spent fuel management
Spent nuclear fuel from NPPs is stored at the pow-
er plant sites until it will be disposed of. Initially, 
the fuel is cooled for one to five years in the storage 
pools inside the reactor buildings. The Loviisa NPP 
has, in addition to the storage pools in the reactor 
Text Box 1: Nuclear and 
other radioactive waste 
management policy
Legislative basis
Nuclear waste is regulated by the Nuclear Energy Act 
and is defined as radioactive waste, including spent 
fuel, arising from the use of nuclear energy. Other ra-
dioactive waste is subject to the Radiation Act.
Political decision-making 
and public consultation
Construction of a major nuclear waste facility shall be 
in line with the overall good of the society, as judged 
by the Government and the Parliament. Consent of 
the proposed host municipality is required for the 
construction of such a facility. An environmental im-
pact assessment procedure shall be conducted prior to 
the first authorization step of a major nuclear waste 
facility.
Responsibilities
Licensee of a nuclear waste management facility shall 
ensure its safe use including physical protection and 
emergency preparedness. Producer of nuclear waste 
is responsible for the implementation and expenses of 
the pertinent waste management and decommission-
ing activities, including the related planning, research 
and development work. The State is responsible for 
nuclear waste after its approved disposal and has 
the secondary responsibility in case the producer of 
nuclear waste is incapable to fulfil his management 
obligation.
User of radioactive substances shall render harm-
less the radioactive waste arising from operations 
in question, including those involved with natural 
radioactive substances. A financial security shall be 
furnished for a sealed source or other radioactive 
waste with substantial liability. The State has the 
secondary responsibility in case the producer of radio-
active waste is not capable to fulfil his management 
obligation.
Waste management and 
decommissioning principles
The Nuclear Energy Act states that nuclear waste 
generated in Finland with some exceptions shall 
be treated, stored and permanently disposed of in 
Finland. Nuclear waste generated elsewhere, shall 
not be handled, stored or permanently disposed of in 
Finland. A long-term overall schedule for the imple-
mentation of nuclear waste disposal in Finland was 
contained in the Policy Decision of the Government 
in 1983. Subsequently the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and later the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy (MEE) have issued decisions re-estab-
lishing and amending the schedule.
The preferable management option for disused 
sealed sources is to return them to the supplier/
manufacturer. If this is not feasible, a disused sealed 
source or other small user waste can be delivered to an 
installation licensed to receive condition and transfer 
radioactive waste to a central storage operated by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Means to reduce the amounts of nuclear waste 
arising from the decommissioning shall be consid-
ered already in the design of a nuclear facility. 
Decommissioning plans shall be regularly updated 
during the operation of the facility. Implementation of 
decommissioning shall not be unjustifiably postponed.
Safety principles and control
Safety of nuclear waste management facilities shall be 
kept as high as reasonably achievable and all actions 
justified by safety research and the progress in science 
and technology shall be taken into account to enhance 
safety. Nuclear waste shall be disposed of so that no 
radiation impact exceeding the currently acceptable 
level will occur in the future and so that ensuring 
long-term safety is based on passive safety functions.
MEE determines the principles on the basis of 
which the nuclear waste management obligation is to 
be implemented. STUK is responsible for the required 
safety assessment in authorization processes and for 
the control of the safe management of nuclear and 
other radioactive waste. The construction and operat-
ing licences for waste management facilities are pre-
pared by MEE and granted by the Government
STUK-B 180
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Text Box 2: Nuclear and 
other radioactive waste 
management strategy
Responsibilities
Current and future producers of nuclear waste (the 
NPP utilities TVO, FPH and FV) take care of interim 
storage of spent fuel, of conditioning and disposal of 
low and intermediate level waste and of planning for 
and implementation of the decommissioning of the 
NPPs. A company, Posiva Oy, jointly owned by FPH 
and TVO, is responsible for the preparations for and 
later implementation of spent fuel disposal. VTT, as 
an operator of the research reactor FiR 1, is respon-
sible for planning and implementation of the waste 
management and decommissioning of the facility, 
including the arrangements for disposal of the waste. 
Fennovoima Oy is responsible for its own spent fuel 
disposal as well as for other nuclear waste manage-
ment and decommissioning activities.
Producers of other radioactive waste manage their 
waste within the limits of their technical capability 
while ensuring safety and security. Small user waste 
that cannot be cleared, including spent sealed sources 
that cannot be returned to the manufacturer, must 
be handed over to an installation licensed to receive, 
condition and transfer radioactive waste to a central 
storage operated by STUK.
Waste management and 
decommissioning objectives
Such low and intermediate level nuclear waste that 
meets the acceptance criteria for the repositories at 
the NPP sites will be disposed of without unnecessary 
delays. Waste that cannot yet be disposed of is stored 
safely. Also other low and intermediate level waste, 
such as decommissioning waste and small user waste, 
is envisaged to be disposed of in the rock cavern re-
positories at the NPP sites.
Disposal of TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel is under 
preparation in accordance with a strategic plan, 
which is in line with the 1983 Government Policy 
Decision and the 2003 Decision of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. The goal for starting the disposal 
operations is approximately the year 2020. The spent 
fuel disposal programme is subject to continuous 
regulatory review and is now in the construction 
licence application review phase. The prospective nu-
clear utility Fennovoima Oy must by the end of June 
2016, either reach an agreement on co-operation on 
disposal of its spent fuel with the owners of Posiva Oy 
or present an Environmental Impact Programme for 
a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility of its own.
The implementation of decommissioning of the 
NPPs will be optimized taking into account the tech-
nical aspects, radiological impact, future use of the 
site, availability of competent workforce and the costs. 
The strategy takes advantage of options for clearance 
of very low level waste and structures of the plant and 
on-site disposal of decommissioning waste.
Financial liability system
A financing system for the costs of future waste man-
agement and decommissioning exists to ensure that 
the producers of nuclear waste bear their full finan-
cial liability on the coverage of those costs and that 
the costs can be covered even in case of insolvency 
of the waste generator. The pertinent licence-holders 
submit the technical plans and cost calculations, on 
which the liability estimates are based, for regula-
tory review at three year intervals. After confirmation 
of the financial liabilities, the licensees pay fees to a 
State controlled fund and provide securities for the 
liability not yet covered by the funded money.
buildings, a separate integrated pool type storage 
facility. The latest enlargement of the storage fa-
cility was commissioned in 2001. The installation 
of dense fuel racks was started in 2007 and will 
continue in the future. The allowable total amount 
arising of spent fuel, according to the renewed op-
erating licence issued in 2007, is 1100 tU and the 
storage capacity with additional high density racks 
should be adequate until the end of the planned 50 
years of operational life.
At the Olkiluoto plant the spent fuel is, after 
cooling in the pools at the reactor buildings, trans-
ferred to an on-site interim storage facility, commis-
sioned in 1987, with a capacity of about 1200  tU. 
The current capacity is estimated to be used up 
in 2014. TVO started the construction works for 
enlarging the Olkiluoto interim storage in autumn 
2010 and construction and installation works have 
been	finalized	 in	 early	 2014.	The	 extension	 of	 the	
storage capacity includes the construction of three 
24
STUK-B 180 SECTION B Policies and practices
Figure 4. Timetable for the management of spent fuel from the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto.
new storage pools and the extension has been car-
ried out according to the updated safety require-
ments (Government Decree 717/2013), which re-
quires among other things that the design has to 
withstand a large airplane impact. The extension 
has been included as part of the Olkiluoto NPP 
1&2	operating	 licence	and	has	been	authorized	as	
a plant modification. The extension is scheduled to 
be commissioned during 2014. The storage of spent 
fuel from the Olkiluoto 3 unit has been taken into 
account in the design of the extension of the in-
terim storage. The safety of the spent fuel storages 
(at	 both	 Loviisa	 and	Olkiluoto	 site)	 was	 analyzed	
as part of the EU stress tests in relation to the 
Fukushima accident.
The nuclear energy legislation provides for dis-
posal of nuclear waste into the Finnish bedrock. 
Posiva is implementing the spent fuel disposal 
programme on behalf of its owners in line with the 
Government Policy Decision of 1983 and a further 
decision by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
2003:
•	 Disposal	site	selection	in	2000.
•	 Start	 of	 construction	 of	 an	 underground	 rock	
characterization	 facility	 (ONKALO)	 in	 Olki-
luoto in 2004;
•	 A	 description	 in	 2009	 of	 the	 preparedness	 for	
the application of the Construction Licence in 
2012;
•	 Preparedness	 for	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Con-
struction Licence in 2012, which Posiva fulfilled 
by submitting the construction licence applica-
tion for Olkiluoto Encapsulation and Disposal 
Facility by the end of 2012;
•	 Readiness	 for	 starting	 the	 disposal	 operations	
in the early 2020’s.
The various steps from siting until closure sched-
uled for the Olkiluoto disposal facility are illus-
trated in Figure 4. The construction of the under-
ground	 rock	 characterization	 facility	 (ONKALO)	
started in July 2004. Posiva completed the excava-
tion works for access tunnel and technical rooms 
in 2012. The length (chainage) of tunnels reached 
4987 m in length and 455 m in depth. Posiva has 
excavated four short demonstration tunnels, which 
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are used for testing the emplacement technology. 
Posiva’s programme for spent fuel disposal is de-
scribed in Annex L.2., and STUK’s regulatory con-
trol of the spent fuel disposal project in Annex L.1.
The current total amount of spent fuel having 
Decisions-in-Principle for disposal in Olkiluoto is 
9000 tonnes of uranium, which is further divided 
in estimated reservations: 1050 tU from Loviisa 
1 and 2, 2950 tU from Olkiluoto 1 and 2, 5000 tU 
from Olkiluoto 3 and 4. The estimates are based on 
the expectation that the units Loviisa 1 and 2 have 
total operational lifetimes of 50 years (until 2027 
and 2030), respectively, Olkiluoto 1 and 2 lifetimes 
of 60 years (until 2038 and 2040), and Olkiluoto 3 
and 4 lifetimes of 60 years (Figure 4).
Before disposal, spent fuel of TVO and FPH will 
be stored in water pools in practice for 30 to 50 
years and thereafter transferred to the encapsula-
tion and disposal facilities which will be located at 
Olkiluoto. The minimum cooling time before encap-
sulation is set for 20 years. Spent fuel is planned 
to be encapsulated in copper-iron canisters. The 
canister design consists of a cast iron insert as a 
load-bearing element and an outer container of 
copper to provide a shield against corrosion. The 
canisters will be emplaced in an underground facil-
ity that consists of technical rooms and a network 
of tunnels, which will be constructed at the depth 
of 400 to 455 m in crystalline bedrock.
The annulus between the canister and the 
disposal hole wall will be filled with a compacted 
bentonite buffer material. A schematic layout of 
the underground disposal facility and the network 
of disposal tunnels at Olkiluoto is illustrated in 
Figure 5 and an individual disposal tunnel with 
two canister emplacement variants in Figure 6.
The preliminary designs of the encapsulation 
and disposal facilities, operational and post-closure 
safety assessments and summaries of site charac-
terization	 were	 included	 in	 Posiva’s	 Decision-in-
Principle application and in the supporting docu-
ments. STUK’s preliminary safety assessment of 
the application was published in January 2000 and 
the Parliament ratified the Decision-in-principle 
in 2001. A further DiP regarding the expansion 
of the encapsulation and disposal facility for the 
needs of the Olkiluoto 3 reactor was ratified by the 
Parliament in May 2002. The Decision-in-Principle 
to extend the capacity of the disposal facility to 
include the spent fuel from one further reactor 
Figure 5. A schematic presentation of the layout of the underground rock characterization facility and the network 
of disposal tunnels (KBS3-V option).
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Figure 6. Disposal tunnel and canisters with both the vertical and horizontal disposal options depicted.
unit, Olkiluoto 4, was ratified by the Parliament 
in July 2010. Posiva submitted a description of its 
preparedness for the construction licence applica-
tion, along with the current drafts of construction 
licence application documentation, in 2009. STUK 
reviewed this preliminary licence application ma-
terial and gave a statement to MEE on Posiva’s 
preparedness in September 2010 and a more de-
tailed safety review to Posiva in June 2011. Posiva 
submitted the construction licence application and 
its supporting safety documentation to the authori-
ties at the end of 2012. MEE started the licensing 
process and STUK the safety review and assess-
ment in the beginning of 2013. The licence applica-
tion review and STUK’s regulatory approach is de-
scribed in Annex L.1. Posiva’s programme for spent 
fuel disposal is presented in Annex L.2.
Posiva Oy, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy published in September 2012 
the triennial overview of the status and plans for 
R&D	and	 technical	 design	 in	 the	 field	 of	 nuclear	
waste management required in Sections 74 and 75 
of the Nuclear Energy Decree. The programme is 
focused on the years 2013–2015 and describes the 
years 2016-2018 in a more general manner. STUK 
reviewed the programme and submitted a state-
ment to MEE in January 2013. MEE submitted its 
statement to the licensees in April 2013.
Spent fuel of the research reactor FiR 1 is 
stored on site. VTT has decided to decommission 
FiR 1 due to insufficient funding for continued 
operation. VTT submitted the EIA programme 
for decommissioning and dismantling in autumn 
2013 to MEE, which gave a statement of the EIA 
programme adequacy in February 2014. VTT will 
prepare the EIA report during 2014 and after that 
VTT can apply for a licence for the research reac-
tor decommissioning. The first option for spent fuel 
management is to return the fuel to the United 
States. Another option is interim storage and later 
disposal into the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal 
facility, but this would require a new Decision-in-
Principle and licensing of the Olkiluoto disposal 
facility for research reactor spent fuel. The total 
amount of spent nuclear fuel is about 340 kg (ca. 
25 kgU). The shipment of the research reactor fuel 
could take place in early 2016. The current cost 
estimate for the decommissioning and the manage-
ment of spent fuel and other wastes of the research 
reactor is 8.5 million €. The shipment of the spent 
fuel of FiR 1 to the USA has to be arranged so that 
the fuel needs to be removed from the reactor be-
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Figure 7.  The Loviisa repository. a) Cross-sectional 
view of the repository for LILW and the planned exten-
sion for decommissioning waste, b) Drums of LLW 
from reactor operation waste in the repository tunnel 
and c) An empty repository tunnel for solidified waste.
fore 12 May 2016 and the fuel has been received in 
the USA by 12 May 2019 at the latest.
Management of LILW from nuclear facilities
The predisposal management of LILW takes place 
at the NPPs under their operating licences and 
other provisions. The wastes are segregated, treat-
ed, conditioned, packaged, monitored and stored, 
as appropriate, before they are transferred to the 
disposal facilities.
At Loviisa, wet LILW (radioactive concentrates, 
such as spent ion exchange resins, evaporator de-
posits and corrosion sludge) is for the time being 
stored in tanks at the NPP. The plant uses an in-
novative selective ion exchange method to reduce 
the volume of liquid radioactive waste. The com-
missioning of a solidification facility was expected 
in early 2014, but is postponed due to problems 
encountered in waste packages used for pre-opera-
tional tests. The construction and system commis-
sioning tests are otherwise finalised and STUK is 
expecting to receive an application for operation 
authorization	 after	FPH	has	 addressed	 the	 prob-
lems with the waste packages. At Olkiluoto, wet 
LILW	 is	 immobilized	 in	 bitumen	 before	 transfer	
to the disposal facility. Sludge, radioactive concen-
trates and spent ion exchange resins from liquid 
waste treatment in Olkiluoto 3 are planned to be 
dried in drums.
At both currently operating NPPs, solid LLW 
is transferred after conditioning to the disposal 
facility. Options for the management of waste be-
low clearance level are either general clearance or 
case-specific clearance. Such waste can be reused, 
recycled or disposed at landfills. The Olkiluoto NPP 
has a landfill on site while the Loviisa NPP has 
an agreement with a regional landfill to dispose of 
cleared waste.
Activated metal waste consists of irradiated 
components and devices that have been removed 
from inside of the reactor vessel. So far this kind 
of highly activated waste has not been conditioned 
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but is stored at the NPPs and is expected to be 
conditioned and disposed of together with decom-
missioning waste of similar type.
According to the strategy adopted by the 
Finnish nuclear operators, low and intermediate 
level wastes from reactor operations are disposed 
of in the bedrock at the power plant sites. The con-
struction of the repository at the Olkiluoto site be-
gan in 1988 and the operation in 1992. At Loviisa, 
the construction of the repository was started in 
1993 and the operation of the first phase of the 
disposal facility was started in 1998. The disposal 
facilities are operated by the nuclear power plant 
operators, FPH at Loviisa and TVO at Olkiluoto.
The Loviisa repository is located at the depth 
of approximately 110 m in granite bedrock. The re-
pository consists of two tunnels for solid LLW and 
a cavern for immobilised ILW (Figure 7). Inside the 
cavern for ILW, the waste packages are emplaced 
in a pool-shaped structure made of reinforced con-
crete. A new tunnel was constructed during 2010 
to 2013 and it is initially licensed only for such 
storage that also facilitates the sorting of waste, 
allowing clearance from regulatory control of some 
of the waste. The tunnel is planned to be licensed 
later even for the disposal of operational or decom-
missioning waste.
The Olkiluoto repository consists of two silos 
at the depth of 60 to 95 m in tonalite bedrock, one 
for	 solid	LLW	and	 the	other	 for	bituminized	 ILW	
(Figure 8). The silo for solid LLW is a shotcreted 
rock	silo,	while	the	silo	for	bituminized	waste	con-
sists of a thick walled concrete silo inside a rock 
silo where concrete boxes containing drums of bitu-
minised waste will be emplaced in. The LILW from 
Olkiluoto 3 will be disposed of in the same reposi-
tory. The repository will be extended in the future, 
to be able to receive all the LILW from Olkiluoto 1, 
2 and 3 reactor units during the planned 60 years 
of operation of the units.
LILW generated from the operation of the re-
search reactor FiR 1 is stored at the reactor facility 
until decommissioning. VTT is negotiating with the 
Finnish NPP licensees (TVO and FPH) for possible 
interim storage and future disposal of decommis-
sioning waste. The estimated total amount of de-
commissioning waste is 28 tons with an activity of 
30 TBq. The dismantling of the reactor is planned to 
be started in late 2015 and to last about two years.
Based on Fennovoima Oy’s plans LILW will be 
collected, stored, handled and disposed of at the 
power plant site. Fennovoima Oy has made an early 
estimate on amounts of different LILW types based 
on information given by the plant supplier for the 
chosen reactor type (AES-2006). The plans include 
waste handling methods for dry, wet, liquid and 
metallic waste. LILW will be disposed of in a facil-
ity which will be constructed at a depth of several 
tens of meters in the bedrock. Fennovoima Oy also 
considers a surface based facility as an option for 
     
Figure 8. The Olkiluoto LILW repository. LLW drums in the disposal silo (left) and cross-sectional view of the re-
pository lay-out (right).
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the disposal of very low level waste (VLLW). All the 
LILW and VLLW management plans are currently 
presented only on a principal level and they will be 
developed further within the next licensing phases.
Management of other radioactive waste
An applicant for a licence for the use of sealed 
sources is required to present a plan for the man-
agement of the disused sources. The two available 
options are either return to the supplier/manu-
facturer of the source or delivery to the national 
long-term storage operated by STUK’s Department 
of Environmental Radiation Surveillance. This role 
in operating the storage is defined in Radiation 
Decree, Section 24 b. A private entrepreneur, 
Suomen Nukliditekniikka, takes care of the condi-
tioning, packaging and transfer of the spent sealed 
sources and other small user radioactive waste 
and they are stored in an interim storage cavern 
attached to the LILW repository at Olkiluoto, un-
der the regulatory control of STUK’s Department 
of Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation. 
The Department of Environmental Radiation 
Surveillance of STUK takes care of the waste con-
taining nuclear material and stores it at STUK. 
The organisational structure of STUK clearly sepa-
rates its duties in operating the centralised storage 
facility from its functions as the regulatory author-
ity for the uses of radiation. The disposal of sealed 
sources and other small user radioactive waste 
is included in the renewed operating licence for 
Olkiluoto LILW repository, which was granted by 
the Government in 2012. The disposal operations 
for these radioactive wastes have not been started 
and the more detailed planning for sorting, packag-
ing and emplacement operations is ongoing.
A licensee can be exempted from preparing a 
waste management plan if the operations are ar-
ranged in such a manner that the activity limits 
regarding gaseous or liquid discharges or solid-
waste disposal, established in Guide ST 6.2, are not 
exceeded. However, even in this case STUK may or-
der monitoring of discharges and reporting thereof, 
if this is considered necessary due to environmental 
considerations, nature of the work and the nature 
and amount of radioactive substances in use. In 
addition to being below the limits, all discharges 
to the environment shall be as low as reasonably 
achievable.
In practice, most of the wastes from the use 
of unsealed sources in Finland arise in such low 
activity concentrations or amounts that it is not 
necessary to arrange the disposal of the generated 
waste in the same way as e.g. for the sealed sources. 
A common practice is that radionuclide laborato-
ries store their short lived radioactive wastes at 
their premises until they have decayed below the 
limits set for discharges in Guide ST 6.2. However, 
some wastes resulting from radiochemical research 
at VTT have been sent to STUK for storage in 
Olkiluoto. In addition, the waste resulting from 
studies conducted by VTT e.g. on the reactor pres-
sure vessel material behaviour for the Loviisa NPP 
are returned back for disposal in the Loviisa LILW 
repository.
All radionuclide laboratories are inspected by 
STUK regularly, every 1–5 years, depending on the 
type	and	size	of	the	practice,	with	storage	and	other	
activities related to waste management as a stand-
ard item in the inspection agenda.
A specific waste issue arises from disused smoke 
detectors. There are currently over 3 million de-
tectors in use, each containing about 40 kBq of 
Am-241. The disposal of an individual detector into 
normal municipal waste was earlier considered, 
from the radiological point of view, as the optimum 
waste management option. However, the Council 
Directive 2002/96/EC of 27 January 2003 defines 
disused smoke detectors as waste electronic equip-
ment subject to recycling requirements. Nowadays, 
a private entrepreneur takes care of removing the 
radiation sources from recycled smoke detectors 
and hands them over to an installation licensed to 
receive, condition and transfer radioactive waste 
to a central storage operated by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Decommissioning plans for nuclear facilities
No nuclear power plants are currently being de-
commissioned and neither are such decommis-
sioning projects foreseen in the near future. VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland has decided 
to decommission its research reactor (FiR 1) due to 
insufficient funding for continued operation. VTT 
submitted the EIA programme for decommission-
ing and dismantling to MEE in autumn 2013. MEE 
gave a statement of the EIA programme adequacy 
in February 2014. VTT will prepare an EIA re-
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port during 2014 and after that VTT can apply 
for a change of the operating licence for the re-
search reactor decommissioning. Decommissioning 
is licensed as a change of the operating licence and 
granted by the Government. VTT has planned to 
apply for a renewed licence at the end of 2014. The 
dismantling is scheduled to start at the end of 2015 
and to last about two years. The dismantling will 
be regulated by STUK concerning the radiation 
and nuclear safety aspects. VTT updated its plan 
for the research reactor nuclear waste manage-
ment and submitted the plan for MEE in June 
2013 as required. MEE requested statements from 
stakeholders, including STUK, and based on these 
statements required that VTT further develops 
and clarifies options and methods for waste man-
agement and also includes these adjustments in 
the cost estimates. MEE required VTT to submit a 
cost estimate to MEE in July 2014 and an updated 
waste management plan in September 2014.
The utilities have updated the decommission-
ing plans of NPPs for regulatory review every six 
years (the Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 7g and 28). 
FPH submitted an updated plan for the decommis-
sioning of the Loviisa NPP for regulatory review in 
2012 and TVO’s latest plan for the Olkiluoto NPP 
decommissioning was submitted in 2008. By the 
end of 2014 TVO will submit an updated decommis-
sioning plan for the review by the authorities. The 
decommissioning plan for the Loviisa NPP is based 
on immediate dismantling, within eight years from 
shutdown while for the Olkiluoto NPP, a safe stor-
age period of about 30 years prior to dismantling 
is envisaged. The postponed dismantling is based 
on a main circuit activity decrease and availability 
of nuclear site infrastructure, since the Olkiluoto 3 
unit will be operational while the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
units are being dismantled. The disposal plans for 
wastes from the decommissioning of the NPPs are 
based on the extension of the on-site repositories for 
LILW. Besides the dismantling waste, also activated 
metal components accumulated during the opera-
tion of the reactors could be disposed of in those 
repositories. The engineered barriers will be se-
lected taking into account the radiological and other 
safety related characteristics of each waste type. A 
special feature of the decommissioning plans is the 
emplacement of large components, such as pressure 
vessels and steam generators, in the disposal rooms 
as whole entities, without cutting them in pieces.
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Article 3 Scope of Application
This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent 
fuel management when the spent fuel results from 
the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel 
held at reprocessing facilities as part of a repro-
cessing activity is not covered in the scope of this 
Convention unless the Contracting Party declares 
reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.
This Convention shall also apply to the safety 
of radioactive waste management when the ra-
dioactive waste results from civilian applications. 
However, this Convention shall not apply to waste 
that contains only naturally occurring radioac-
tive materials and that does not originate from 
the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a dis-
used sealed source or it is declared as radioactive 
waste for the purposes of this Convention by the 
Contracting Party.
This Convention shall not apply to the safety 
of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste 
within military or defence programmes, unless 
declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the 
purposes of this Convention by the Contracting 
Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the 
safety of management of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste from military or defence programmes if and 
when such materials are transferred permanently 
to and managed within exclusively civilian pro-
grammes.
This Convention shall also apply to discharges 
as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.
Finland has adopted the once-through nuclear fuel 
cycle. Thus, all spent nuclear fuel, after it has been 
permanently removed from the reactor, is in the 
scope of the Convention.
Airborne and liquid discharges from nuclear 
and radioactive waste management facilities, nota-
bly from the NPPs, are included in the scope of this 
Convention.
No spent nuclear fuel of military or defence ori-
gin exists in Finland.
Waste outside the nuclear fuel cycle, containing 
only naturally occurring materials (NORM-waste), 
except sealed radium sources, is not declared as ra-
dioactive waste for the purposes of the Convention. 
However, some experience with the current prac-
tice for managing NORM waste is reported in sec-
tion H.
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Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 2
This report shall (also) include:
(a) a list of the spent fuel management facilities 
subject to this convention, their location, main 
purpose and essential features;
(b) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this 
Convention and that is being held in storage 
and of that which has been disposed of. This 
inventory shall contain the description of the 
material and if available, give information on 
its mass and its total activity;
(c) a list of radioactive waste management facili-
ties subject to this Convention, their location, 
main purpose and essential features;
(d) an inventory of radioactive waste that is sub-
ject to this Convention that:
•	 is	being	held	in	storage	of	radioactive	waste	
management and nuclear fuel cycle facili-
ties;
•	 has	been	disposed	of;	or
•	 has	resulted	from	past	practices;
 this inventory shall contain the description of 
the material and other appropriate informa-
tion available, such as volume or mass, activity 
and specific radionuclides;
(e) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of be-
ing decommissioned and the status of decom-
missioning activities at those facilities.
Table 1. Spent fuel storage in Finland.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Capacity: 620 tHM ¹ (effective²)
Inventory (end of 2013): 560 tHM (4657 assemblies, maximum burnup 55 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Pool storages inside both reactor buildings 
Basket type pool storage in the NPP auxiliary building 
Rack type pool storage in the NPP auxiliary building
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Capacity: 15762 tHM¹ (effective²)
Inventory (end of 2013): 1374 tHM (8096 assemblies, maximum burnup 53 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Pool storages inside both reactor buildings 
Pool storage in a separate facility at the NPP site
FiR 1 research reactor
Operator: VTT
Location: Otaniemi, town of Espoo, Southern Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Inventory (end of 2013): 4.45 kgU (24 elements, maximum burnup 33 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Wet storage for cooling. After several years’ cooling time the elements are transferred to 
the well type dry storage.
¹ tHM means spent fuel inventory is presented in tonnes of heavy metals. 
² The reserve capacity for exceptional unloading of the entire reactor core to storage pool, for storage pool repairs and space for dummy elements are excluded.
Spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities
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Table 2. Predisposal management of radioactive waste in Finland.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Treatment, conditioning and interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2013): 1613 m³
Essential features: Pretreatment, compaction and packaging of solid LLW 
Pretreatment of liquid LILW 
Eight tanks, 300 m³ each, for storage of liquid LILW 
Solidification plant for liquid LILW 
Two storage rooms inside the NPP for packed LLW 
(Dry) storage well and pool storage for unconditioned activated waste 
On-site light built storage hall for waste candidate for clearance
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2013): 437 m³
Essential features: Pretreatment, compaction and packaging of solid LLW 
Pretreatment and bituminisation of liquid LILW 
Four buffer storage rooms for conditioned LILW 
Pools storage of unconditioned activated waste 
Treatment and storage buildings at the site for unconditioned LLW
FiR 1 research reactor
Operator: VTT
Location: Otaniemi, town of Espoo, Southern Finland
Purpose: Treatment, packaging and interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2010): 6 m³
Essential features: Storage room in the basement of a laboratory building
Storage for state owned waste (recognised installation)
Owner: Suomen Nukliditekniikka
Location: Roihupelto, city of Helsinki, Southern Finland
Purpose: Buffer interim storage of radioactive waste for example from industry and hospitals
Inventory (end of 2013): 2 m³ (3.8 TBq)
Essential features: Buffer interim storage is for packing and conditioning radioactive wastes from industry and 
hospitals (e.g. spent sources). The waste is packed in form suitable for disposal. This material does 
not contain nuclear material.
Storage for small user waste containing nuclear material
Owner: STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
Location: Roihupelto, city of Helsinki, Southern Finland
Purpose: Buffer interim storage of small user radioactive waste containing nuclear material
Inventory (end of 2013): HEU: 0.8 g, LEU: 536 g, UNat: 574 g, DU: 369 kg, Th: 199 g
Essential features: Buffer interim storage is for packing and conditioning radioactive wastes from industry and 
hospitals. The waste is packed in form suitable for disposal.
Storage for state owned waste
Owner: TVO/Ministry of Social Affairs and Health³
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Long-term interim storage of sealed sources and other small user waste
Inventory (end of 2013): 56 m³ (50.14 TBq, prominent nuclides: ³H, 137Cs, 85Kr, 241Am, 238Pu, not including Th-232 (2.5 kg) and 
depleted uranium (1270 kg)
Essential features: Rock cavern attached to the Olkiluoto disposal facility
³ By an agreement made in 1996 between TVO and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the waste is stored in a separate rock cavern in TVO’s Olkiluoto LILW 
disposal facility. The waste is owned by the State, with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health as the responsible organisation.
Small user waste
The licensing database maintained by STUK in-
cludes source-specific information on each sealed 
source in the licensee’s possession. This informa-
tion is updated continuously according to the licen-
sees' notifications and to observations made during 
the inspections. Small users of radioisotopes have 
in their premises some radiation sources which are 
no longer in use but have not yet been declared 
as radioactive waste. The number of such sources 
is relatively limited whereas according to Guide 
ST 5.1 it is prohibited to store unnecessarily sourc-
es for which no use is foreseen.
Waste from past practices
There are no significant amounts of waste from 
past practices requiring further management (see 
also Section H).
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Table 3. Disposal of radioactive waste in Finland.
Loviisa disposal facility
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Disposal of LILW
Inventory (end of 2013): 1886 m³ (0.45 TBq, dominant nuclides Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137)
Essential features: Rock tunnels for LLW 
Vault for solidifed ILW
Olkiluoto disposal facility
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, Municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Disposal of LILW
Inventory (end of 2013): 5681 m³ (52.0 TBq, dominant nuclides Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137, Sr-90, C-14)
Essential features: Rock silo for conditioned packed ILW 
Rock silo for conditioned/packed LLW
Decommissioning
No significant facilities subject to nuclear energy 
or radiation protection legislation are being decom-
missioned. In 2002, the decommissioning of a steri-
lisation plant was completed in Ilomantsi, Eastern 
Finland. The highly active Co-60 source was trans-
ported abroad for reuse. There was no contamina-
tion in the facility.
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Article 18 Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the 
framework of its national law, the legislative, regu-
latory and administrative measures and other steps 
necessary for implementing its obligations under 
this Convention.
The necessary legislative, regulatory and other 
measures to fulfil the obligations of the Convention 
have been taken and are discussed in this report.
Article 19 Legislative and 
regulatory framework
Each Contracting Party shall establish and main-
tain a legislative and regulatory framework to gov-
ern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management.
This legislative and regulatory framework shall 
provide for:
(a) the establishment of applicable national safety 
requirements and regulations for radiation 
safety;
(b)  a system of licensing of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management activities;
(c) a system of prohibition of the operation of a 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility without a licence;
(d) a system of appropriate institutional control, 
regulatory inspection and documentation and 
reporting; the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of the licences;
(e) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bod-
ies involved in the different steps of spent fuel 
and of radioactive waste management.
When considering whether to regulate radioactive 
materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties 
shall take due account of the objectives of this 
Convention.
Safety requirements and regulations
In Finland, the legislation for the use of nuclear en-
ergy and for radiation protection was established 
in 1957. Since then, several amendments and new 
regulations have been issued.
Nuclear legislation and regulations
The current Finnish nuclear energy legislation is 
based on the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, to-
gether with a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree 
from 1988.
The scope of this legislation covers e.g.
•	 The	construction	and	operation	of	nuclear	facili-
ties; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for pro-
ducing nuclear energy, including research reac-
tors, facilities performing extensive disposal of 
nuclear waste, and facilities used for extensive 
manufacturing, production, use, handling or 
storage of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes;
•	Mining	and	milling	operations	aimed	at	produc-
ing uranium or thorium;
•	 The	possession,	manufacture,	production,	trans-
fer, handling, use, storage, transport, import of 
nuclear material and nuclear waste, and export 
of nuclear waste as well as the export and im-
port of ores and ore concentrates containing 
uranium or thorium.
A significant amendment to the Nuclear Energy 
Act was passed in 1994, to reflect a new policy 
which emphasises the national responsibility to 
manage nuclear waste generated in Finland. In 
general, the export and import of nuclear waste, 
including spent fuel, is prohibited in the revised 
Act. A notable exception is allowed for the FiR 1 
research reactor. Thus, according to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Section 6a) the above provisions shall 
not apply to nuclear waste that has been generated 
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in connection with or as a result of the operation of 
a research reactor in Finland.
The nuclear energy legislation was updated 
and reformed in 2008 to correspond to the current 
level of safety requirements and the new Finnish 
Constitution which came into force in 2000. This 
was demanded by the new Constitution requiring 
that the general principles for the protection of the 
citizens	shall	be	given	on	the	level	of	Acts.
In 2011 two revisions were made in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. The first one was due to the Nuclear 
Safety Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/
Euratom) and the second one includes provisions 
on mining and milling operations aimed at produc-
ing uranium or thorium. The licensee’s obligation 
to assure safe use of nuclear energy was already 
stipulated in the Act, but by the first amendment 
the requirement that the obligation cannot be 
delegated or transferred to another party was 
included. The licensee’s obligation to arrange nec-
essary training for nuclear safety personnel and 
the responsibility of Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy to arrange the self assessment and 
international peer reviews to evaluate the national 
framework were also included in the Act.
In 2012, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
to make some minor clarifications and to extend 
the use of inspection organisations.
Finland was active in the process of developing 
a proposal for a European Council Directive on the 
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 
In 2013, the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation 
Act were amended to implement the Directive 
2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a 
Community framework for the responsible and 
safe management of spent fuel and other nuclear 
and radioactive waste. The principles of graded 
approach and to keep the generation of radioactive 
waste to the minimum which is reasonably prac-
ticable were included in both Acts. In the Nuclear 
Energy Act the provisions of self-assessment and 
peer review were updated to cover also waste man-
agement.
In 2012, the Finnish regulatory framework for 
nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed in the 
IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) peer 
review process. According to the IRRS recommen-
dations, some amendments need to be considered 
for the legislation mainly concerning the independ-
ence of STUK. The amendments to the Nuclear 
Energy Act and the Radiation Act were under 
preparation in 2013.
A new proposal for the Nuclear Safety Directive 
is in the preparation process in the EU Atomic 
Question Group and will most probably be imple-
mented in the Finnish legislation during the next 
reporting period.
By definition, the provisions for the use of 
nuclear energy in the Nuclear Energy Act also 
address spent fuel and nuclear waste manage-
ment. The Nuclear Energy Act sets forth the spe-
cific requirements on nuclear waste management 
(Sections 27a-34) and for the financial provisions of 
nuclear waste management (Sections 35-53). These 
provisions also address spent fuel management.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, the 
Government issued in 2008 and 2013 the following 
regulations:
•	 Government	 Decree	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	
Power Plants (733/2008), updated by a new De-
cree 717/2013
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	Security	in	the	Use	
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008), revised in 2013
•	 Government	 Decree	 on	 Emergency	 Response	
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008), updated by a new Decree 716/2013
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	Safety	of	Disposal	of	
Nuclear Waste (736/2008).
The Decrees 717/2013 and 716/2013 are applied to 
a nuclear power plant which is defined to be a nu-
clear facility equipped with a nuclear reactor and 
other related nuclear facilities located on the same 
plant site. The regulations are also applied to other 
nuclear facilities to the extent applicable. Decree 
734/2008 is applied to all use of nuclear energy, i.e., 
it covers all nuclear facilities and activities.
The Decree on the Security in the Use of Nuclear 
Energy was updated on 1 May 2012. The Decrees 
on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plant (733/2008) 
and on Emergency Response Arrangements at 
Nuclear Power Plants (735/2008) were amended 
in 2013 mainly due to tightening of safety require-
ments after the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent and new WENRA Safety Objectives. The new 
Decrees 717/2013 and 716/2013 came into force on 
25 October 2013. A new Government Decree on the 
safety of mining and milling operations aimed at 
producing uranium or thorium was under prepara-
tion	in	2013	and	will	be	finalized	in	the	future.
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Some other minor amendments were also made 
in nuclear and radiation legislation to reflect 
changes of other legislation (labor safety, criminal 
code). Amendments in other national legislation 
have not caused essential changes to the regula-
tory control of waste management nor to the safety 
requirements set for them.
As described above, the nuclear legislation 
has been amended several times.The Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy has started an 
evaluation of the possible need of a comprehensive 
reform of the legislation.
Nuclear Regulatory Guidance
Detailed safety requirements on the management 
of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste result-
ing from the production of nuclear energy are pro-
vided in the YVL Guides. The YVL Guides also pro-
vide administrative procedures for the regulation. 
The YVL Guides are issued by STUK, as stipulated 
in the Nuclear Energy Act. The YVL Guides are 
rules an individual licensee or any other organisa-
tions concerned shall comply with, unless some 
other acceptable procedure or solution has been 
presented to STUK by which the level of safety 
stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and the YVL Guides is achieved.
The procedure to apply new guides to existing 
nuclear facilities is such that the publication of 
an YVL Guide does not, as such, alter any previ-
ous decisions made by STUK. After having heard 
those concerned, STUK makes a separate decision 
on how a new or revised YVL Guide applies to 
a nuclear facility in operation, or to those under 
construction, and to the licensee’s operational ac-
tivities as well as to other nuclear facilities related 
to nuclear waste management and disposal and to 
the research reactor. To new nuclear facilities, how-
ever, the guides apply as such.
Nowadays the most important references con-
sidered in rulemaking are the IAEA safety stand-
ards and WENRA (Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association) reference levels as well as 
WENRA’s recommendations on storage and decom-
missioning of waste and WENRA’s latest statement 
on Safety Objectives of New NPPs. Other sources 
of safety information are worldwide co-operation 
with other countries using nuclear energy, e.g. with 
the member countries of OECD/NEA. The Finnish 
policy is to participate in the international discus-
sion on developing safety standards and to adopt 
or adapt the new safety requirements into national 
regulations.
STUK used to have a set of about 70 YVL guides 
in force, which have been continuously re-evaluat-
ed for updating. After amending the nuclear energy 
legislation in 2008, also the revision of the existing 
YVL guide system was commenced. The main ob-
jectives of this effort were the following:
•	 to	update	the	contents	of	the	regulatory	guides,	
especially with the IAEA and WENRA require-
ments and with the lessons learnt from the 
Olkiluoto unit 3 project,
•	 to	restructure	the	guide	system	better	to	reflect	
the various areas of safety; at the same time to 
limit the total number of guides and the need 
for cross-referencing between the guides
•	 to	 compile	 requirements	 concerning	 related	
safety issues to the same guide making it easier 
to use by the licensees and other stakeholders; 
also they will be coupled to the stage of licens-
ing process
•	 to	 rewrite	 the	 separate	 requirements	 in	 such	
a way that each requirement will have its own 
number, be short and clearly stating who-what-
when shall be doing something; requirements 
are expressed in shall-format, descriptive text 
is provided only when necessary
•	 to	limit	unnecessary	prescriptiveness	when	con-
sidering the requirements.
Considering the WENRA Safety Reference Levels 
published in 2007 and 2008, the Finnish policy 
is to include all of them in the revised regulatory 
guide system. This was confirmed already during 
the updating work of regulatory guides through 
a systematic approach to record all the Reference 
Levels in certain guides.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
it was decided to include lessons learnt from the 
accident into the revised guides, which has delayed 
the completion of the new guides. The most im-
portant changes included in the new YVL Guides 
due to the accident deal with the design of NPPs 
and spent fuel storages, with the consideration of 
severe	external	hazards	and	with	the	requirements	
concerning on-site emergency preparedness includ-
ing multi-unit accidents.
Director General of STUK approved 40 new YVL 
guides and they were issued on 1 December 2013. 
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The re-structured system of YVL Guides is pre-
sented in Figure 9. In the area of waste manage-
ment the most important changes are that the 
requirements concerning spent fuel storages were 
updated to take account of the lessons from the 
Fukushima accident, and that the requirements 
concerning the decommissioning of nuclear fa-
cilities were included in the YVL guidance. Four 
guides will be issued later because some more 
changes are needed in the legislation prior to the 
publication of these guides.
Legislation and regulations for 
the use of radiation sources
The Radiation Act and Decree were revised in 1991 
to take into account the ICRP Publication 60 (1990 
Recommendations of the International Commission 
on Radiological Protection). The Radiation Act and 
Decree were further amended in 1998, 2005, 2008 
and 2013 to be in conformance with the European 
Community Radiation Protection Legislation, in-
cluding:
•	 the	Council	Directive	96/29/Euratom	of	13	May	
1996, on the Protection of the Health of Workers 
and General Public Against the Dangers Aris-
ing	from	Ionizing	Radiation,
•	 the	 Council	 Directive	 2003/122/Euratom	 of	
22  December 2003, on the Control of High-
Activity Sealed Radiation Sources and Orphan 
Sources, as well as,
•	 the	 Council	 Directive	 2006/117/Euratom	 of	
20 November 2006, on the supervision and con-
trol of shipments of radioactive waste and spent 
fuel, and
•	 the	 Council	 Directive	 2011/70/Euratom	 of	
19 July 2011, establishing a Community frame-
work for the responsible and safe management 
of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Structure of the new YVL-guides
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a nuclear facility
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Collected definitions of YVL-guides: same data is shown both as the collection and within the guides.
Figure 9. The re-structured system of the YVL Guides.
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Detailed safety requirements on the manage-
ment of radioactive waste, subject to the Radiation 
Act, are provided in STUK’s ST Guides. The re-
sponsible party running a radiation practice is 
obliged to ensure that the level of safety specified 
in the ST Guides is attained and maintained.
The Council Directive 2013/39/Euratom of 
5  December 2013, laying down basic safety stan-
dards for protection against the danger arising 
from exposure to ionising radiation, and repeal-
ing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 
96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Eur-
atom, will be implemented into the Finnish legisla-
tion during the next four years.
Licensing
The licensing process is defined in the legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facility 
is not allowed without a licence. The licences are 
prepared by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy and granted by the Government. For a 
NPP, a spent nuclear fuel storage, a nuclear waste 
disposal facility or another significant nuclear fa-
cility the process consists of three steps:
•	 Decision-in-Principle	 –	 made	 by	 the	 Govern-
ment and ratified by the Parliament
•	 Construction	Licence	–	granted	by	the	Govern-
ment
•	 Operating	 Licence	 –	 granted	 by	 the	 Govern-
ment.
The conditions for granting a licence are prescribed 
in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 18–20). The 
operating licences of a nuclear facility are granted 
for a limited period of time, generally for 10–20 
years. In case the operating licence is granted for 
a longer period than 10 years, a periodic safety 
review is required to be presented to STUK. The 
periodic re-licensing or review has allowed good 
opportunities for a comprehensive safety review.
Before a Construction Licence for a NPP, spent 
fuel storage, nuclear waste disposal facility or 
other significant nuclear facility can be applied 
for, a Decision-in-Principle by the Government 
and a subsequent ratification of the DiP by the 
Parliament are required. An Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure has to be 
conducted prior to the application of the DiP and 
the EIA report has to be annexed to the DiP ap-
plication. A condition for granting the Decision-
in-Principle is that the construction of the facility 
in question is in line with the overall good of the 
society. Further conditions are as follows:
•	 The	 municipality	 of	 the	 intended	 site	 of	 the	
nuclear facility is in favour of constructing the 
facility;
•	 No	 factors	 have	 appeared	which	 indicate	 that	
the proposed facility could not be constructed 
and operated in a safe manner.
The entry into force of the Government’s Decision-
in-Principle further requires ratification by the 
Parliament. The Parliament cannot make any 
changes to the Decision; it can only approve or 
reject	 it	 as	 such.	 The	 authorization	 process	 of	 a	
nuclear facility is described in Figure 10. In the 
construction and operating licence phases the ac-
ceptance of the Parliament and the host municipal-
ity are no more needed.
To a nuclear waste management facility the 
authorization	procedure	was	implemented	for	the	
first time during the period November 1999 – May 
2001 when Posiva Oy applied for a Decision-in-
Principle for the disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel originating from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants. The Government made the 
DiP in December 2000 and the Parliament ratified 
the decision in May 2001. The same DiP procedure 
was repeated in 2002 and 2010 for the extension 
of the capacity of the spent fuel disposal facility to 
include the spent fuel from the new reactor units 
Olkiluoto 3 and Olkiluoto 4.
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 112) re-
quires that if the licensee intends to carry out 
such modifications to the nuclear facility sys-
tems, structures, nuclear fuel or the way the facil-
ity is operated, which influence safety and involve 
changes in the plans or documents approved by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), 
the licensee shall obtain approval from STUK for 
such modifications before they are carried out. 
Correspondingly, STUK shall approve measures 
related to the decommissioning of a nuclear facil-
ity. The licensee shall ensure that the documents 
mentioned in Sections 35 and 36 are revised ac-
cordingly.
The licensing system was assessed in the IRRS 
mission conducted in Finland in October 2012. 
The IRRS team gave a recommendation that the 
Finnish Government should seek to modify the 
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Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly and un-
ambiguously stipulates STUK’s legal authorities in 
the	authorization	process	for	safety.	In	particular,	
the amendments should ensure that STUK has 
the legal authority to specify any licence conditions 
necessary for safety.
On the basis of the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
16), minor licences for spent fuel and nuclear waste 
management activities (export, import, transfer 
and transport licence and licences for operations) 
are granted by STUK.
The licensing system for practises under the 
Radiation Act is described in Sections 16 and 17 
of the Act. The use of radiation requires a safety 
licence, which can be granted by STUK upon ap-
plication. A safety licence can be subject to extra 
conditions needed to ensure safety. In addition, 
the cases not requiring a licence are identified, e.g. 
when the use of radiation or a device is exempted.
Prohibition of operation without licence
The use of nuclear energy without a licence pro-
vided by the Nuclear Energy Act is prohibited.
Control and enforcement
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55), 
STUK is responsible for the regulatory control of 
the safety of the use of nuclear energy. The rights 
and responsibilities of STUK are provided in the 
Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 55 and 63). The regu-
latory	activities	include	authorization,	review	and	
assessment, inspection and enforcement, develop-
ment of regulations and guides, national registers 
and inventories, information and public communi-
cation.
The most important documents of the licensee, 
which shall comply with the regulations and other 
safety requirements and are reviewed by STUK, 
are the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis 
Reports (PSAR and FSAR), technical specifica-
tions, the operational manual and for disposal fa-
cilities also the post-closure Safety Case documen-
tation in support of PSAR and FSAR. STUK’s on-
site inspections aim at e.g. verifying that the actual 
operations at the nuclear facilities comply with the 
regulations and the documents of the licensee.
The Radiation Act (Section 6) provides that 
adherence to the Act and regulations issued in ac-
cordance with it shall be regulated by STUK. The 
supervisory rights of STUK are described in the 
Act (Sections 53–58).
The Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act 
define the enforcement system and rules for sus-
pension, modification or revocation of a licence. The 
enforcement system includes provisions for execu-
tive assistance if needed and for sanctions in case 
the law is violated.
Parliament:
Confirms Decision in Principle
Government:
Makes licensing decisions
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy:
Conducts preparations
Three step 
licensing:
• Decision in Principle
• Construction Licence
• Operating Licence
Public, other authorities, 
and expert organisations
STUK 
(regulatory body)
Municipality
of plant site
Expert 
organisations
Applicant
Suppliers
nuclear industry
Nuclear safety  
advisory commission
Safety documents
Regulatory 
review and 
oversight
Application
Advice
Statement on safety 
Agreement on site in
Decision in Principle 
(veto right)
Opinions, statements
Figure 10. Authorization of nuclear facilities in Finland.
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Clear allocation of responsibilities
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9), 
a licensee, whose operation generates or has gen-
erated nuclear waste, shall be responsible for all 
nuclear waste management measures and their 
appropriate preparation, and the utilities are also 
responsible for the arising expenses. This obliga-
tion cannot be delegated or transferred to another 
party.
The NPP utilities FPH and TVO themselves 
take care of the interim storage of spent fuel, of 
the management of LILW including disposal, and 
of the planning for and implementation of the de-
commissioning of the NPPs. Their jointly owned 
company, Posiva, is taking care of the preparation 
for and later implementation of spent fuel encap-
sulation and disposal. The DiP of a NPP granted to 
Fennovoima Oy requires the presentation of waste 
management plans for spent fuel by the end of 
2016 at the latest.
The Radiation Act (Section 50) provides for 
the management of radioactive waste from non-
nuclear applications. The responsible party (i.e. 
the	licensee	or	any	company	or	organization	which	
uses radiation sources in its practices) is required 
to take all measures needed to render the radioac-
tive waste arising from its operation harmless. In 
case where the practice produces or may produce 
radioactive waste that cannot be rendered harm-
less without considerable expenses, a financial se-
curity shall be furnished to ensure that these costs 
and those arising in performing any necessary 
environmental decontamination measures are met.
The state has the secondary responsibility in 
case a producer of nuclear waste (the Nuclear 
Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32) or other radioac-
tive waste (the Radiation Act, Section 51) is in-
capable of fulfilling its management obligation. 
STUK operates an interim storage of radioactive 
waste, where limited amounts of spent sealed 
sources and other radioactive waste are received 
upon compensation covering their further manage-
ment costs.
The regulatory responsibilities are discussed 
under Article 20.
Article 20 Regulatory body
Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate 
a regulatory body entrusted with the implementa-
tion of the legislative and regulatory framework re-
ferred to in Article 19, and provided with adequate 
authority, competence and financial and human 
resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its 
legislative and regulatory framework, shall take 
the appropriate steps to ensure the effective inde-
pendence of the regulatory functions from other 
functions where organizations are involved in both 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in 
their regulation.
Supreme authorities
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 54), 
the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy 
is the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
which has the responsibility of formulating the 
national energy policy. The Act (Section 28) states 
that the Ministry shall decide, having consulted, 
when necessary, the Ministry of the Environment 
in the matter, the principles on the basis of which 
the waste management obligation is to be imple-
mented. The Ministry prepares matters concerning 
nuclear energy, including the nuclear waste man-
agement, for the Government for decision-making.
As stipulated in the Radiation Act (Section 5), 
which covers radioactive, non-nuclear waste man-
agement, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
(MSAH) is the supreme authority on the supervi-
sion of practices involving exposure to radiation.
Regulatory authority for radiation 
and nuclear safety
STUK is an independent governmental organisa-
tion for the regulatory control of radiation and 
nuclear	 safety.	 The	 mission	 of	 STUK	 is	 “to	 pro-
tect people, society, environment, and future gen-
erations	 from	 harmful	 effects	 of	 radiation”.	 The	
current Act on STUK was given in 1983 and the 
Decree in 1997. The Decree has been revised sev-
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eral	 times	due	 to	 the	organizational	 changes,	but	
the basic duties of STUK are still the following:
•	 Regulatory	 control	 of	 safety	 of	 the	 use	 of	 nu-
clear energy, emergency preparedness, physical 
protection and nuclear safeguards,
•	 Regulatory	 control	 of	 the	use	 of	 radiation	and	
other radiation practices,
•	Monitoring	 the	 radiation	 situation	 in	Finland,	
and maintaining preparedness for abnormal 
radiation situations,
•	Maintaining	 national	 metrological	 standards	
for radiological measurements,
•	 Research	and	development	work	for	enhancing	
radiation and nuclear safety,
•	 Providing	 information	 and	 publishing	 reports	
on radiation and nuclear safety issues, and par-
ticipating in training activities in the field,
•	 Producing	expert	services	in	the	field,
•	Making	proposals	for	developing	the	legislation	
and preparing the decrees and decisions of the 
Government in the radiation and nuclear safety 
fields, and issuing general guides in these fields, 
and
•	 Participating	in	international	co-operation	and	
taking care of international control, contact or 
reporting activities as enacted or defined.
STUK is administratively under the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Connections to various 
ministries and governmental organisations are de-
scribed in Figure 11.
It is emphasised that the regulatory control 
of the safe use of nuclear energy and radiation 
is independently carried out by STUK and other 
governmental bodies cannot take for their decision 
a matter that has been delegated by law to STUK. 
STUK has no responsibilities or duties which 
would be in conflict with regulatory control.
STUK’s Advisory Board was established in 
March 2008. The Advisory Board helps STUK to 
develop its functions as a regulatory, research and 
expert organisation in such a way that the activi-
ties are in balance with the society’s expectations 
and	the	needs	of	the	citizens.	The	Advisory	Board	
can also make assessments of STUK’s actions and 
give recommendations to STUK.
STUK’s regulatory rights, 
competence and resources
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regu-
latory activities. The responsibilities and rights 
of STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of 
nuclear energy and the respective waste manage-
ment, are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
Decree. STUK’s responsibilities and rights include 
the	following	main	regulatory	activities:	authoriza-
tion, review and assessment, inspection and en-
forcement, development of regulations and guides, 
national registers and inventories, information and 
public communication. STUK’s responsibilities in-
clude nuclear safety, nuclear safeguards and nu-
STUK – Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority
Independent  regulatory and expert organisation.
Ministry of 
Social Affairs and 
Health
Administrative authority for 
the use of radiation.
Ministry of the Interior
Rescue and protection duties in 
emergency conditions.
Security and physical protection.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Nuclear safety in neighbour countries.
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Ministry of 
Employment and 
the Economy
Administrative authority for
the use of nuclear energy. 
Advisory 
Board
Expert advice and
service
Budget and supervision
Figure 11. Co-operation between STUK and Ministries and other governmental organisations.
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clear security. The regulatory control is described 
in detail in Guide YVL A.1.
STUK does not grant construction or operating 
licences for nuclear facilities. However, no such li-
cence can de facto be issued without STUK’s safety 
review and decision on the fulfilment of the safety 
regulations.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 16), 
STUK grants safety licences for the use of radia-
tion. The regulatory rights of STUK are described 
in the Act (Sections 53–58).
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its re-
sponsibilities. The total number of the personnel 
(at the end of 2013) was 347, of which 137 are di-
rectly involved with radiation and nuclear safety 
as well as nuclear safeguards and security related 
regulatory activities. In recent years the number of 
experts in the area of nuclear waste management 
has been about 20 persons. In addition, STUK has 
its	own	R&D	programme	(see	Section	E)	support-
ing its regulatory needs related to nuclear waste 
safety,	 and	 has	 organized	 international	 expert	
support groups for the safety issues of the disposal 
site, technology and safety assessment. During 
2013 the main emphasis of the expert groups has 
been supporting the regulatory review of the con-
struction licence application for spent nuclear fuel 
encapsulation and disposal facility.
The	 organizational	 structure	 of	 STUK	 was	
slightly modified in 2013. The structure and the 
responsibilities within STUK are provided in the 
Quality Manuals of STUK. Also procedures for 
regulatory control and other activities of STUK are 
presented	in	the	manuals.	The	new	organization	of	
STUK is described in Figure 12.
In order to ensure quality of its programme, to 
improve safety and to promote international co-op-
eration and transparency, STUK organised an in-
ternational peer review on its regulatory approach 
and activities related to the spent fuel disposal 
project in 2009 (http://www.stuk.fi/stuk/en_GB/
palveluksessasi/ -->link International evaluations).
In October 2012, an IRRS mission (IAEA’s 
Integrated Regulatory Review Team) was carried 
out. The main conclusion based on the IRRS results 
was that there exists no urgent need for additional 
improvements to upgrade the safety of the Finnish 
radioactive waste and nuclear waste management. 
The scope of the mission was nuclear facilities, 
except the research reactor FiR 1 (preparations for 
environmental impact assessment for the decom-
missioning of this reactor were commenced earlier 
in 2012), radiation sources and transport. In its 
preparations to this mission, STUK carried out a 
comprehensive self-assessment and developed a 
preliminary action plan for improvement.
As a result of the IRRS mission, the review 
team recognised several strengths and good prac-
tices such as effective safety assessment of new nu-
clear power plants, STUK’s organisation and con-
duction of emergency exercises and STUK’s active 
contribution to the global improvement of radia-
tion and nuclear safety. They also identified areas 
for improvement, such as a need to strengthen the 
legislative framework by embedding in the law the 
separation of STUK from entities having respon-
sibilities or interests that could unduly influence 
STUK’s decisions, enhancing the effectiveness of 
STUK’s inspection activities and implementing of 
an independent monitoring programme for the en-
vironment of NPPs. The Nuclear Energy Act is cur-
rently under revision, and therein STUK’s position 
in the governmental system is addressed, as well 
as STUK’s mandate to give binding safety regula-
tions corresponding to current governmental de-
crees and its mandate to define licence conditions.
The results as well as the action plan with 
timetable for each suggestion and recommenda-
tion based on the IRRS mission results and the 
self-assessment are published on STUK’s website 
(http://www.stuk.fi/stuk/en_GB/irrs-2012). These 
actions have been incorporated in the operating 
programmes and annual plans. A follow-up mission 
is planned to take place in 2015.
STUK’s public communication is proactive, 
open, timely and understandable. Communication 
is a privilege and duty of all employees. Good 
cooperation	 with	 the	 media	 is	 emphasized	 in	 all	
communication. A prerequisite for successful com-
munication is that STUK is known among media 
and general public and the information given by 
STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication is 
always based on the best available information. 
Even sensitive matters are openly communicated.
STUK’s own web site is a very important tool 
in communication. STUK is also active in using 
channels of social media and is able to adapt to the 
changes in the field. Currently STUK is active in 
using Twitter, Facebook, Youtube and Flikr.
STUK publishes printed information materials 
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Figure 12. The organisation of STUK at the end of 2013.
and has published for example a series of books 
on radiation and nuclear safety. The books are in-
tended to be used as handbooks for those who work 
in the field and for students.
STUK participates actively in European and 
international co-operation in the field of nuclear 
waste and radiation safety. STUK’s experts par-
ticipate in the OECD/NEA, IAEA, IRPA, ICRP and 
European Commission expert groups. STUK is 
also involved in the work of European Commission 
through European Nuclear Safety Regulators 
Group (ENSREG) and its waste management sub-
group, Atomic Questions Group, as well as through 
Western European Nuclear Regulators Association 
WENRA. In addition, there is regulatory co-op-
eration with neighbouring Nordic countries and 
Russia. Regarding Russia, cooperation is conduct-
ed both bilaterally and through the multinational 
Contact Expert Group (CEG) under IAEA auspices.
In the area of regulatory control of waste man-
agement, STUK receives about 10% of its financial 
resources through the Government budget. Per 
legislation, the licence holders pay the regulatory 
expenses to STUK. In 2013 the costs of the regula-
tory control of nuclear safety were 18.3 million €. 
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation were 
19.7 million €. Thus the share of activities subject 
to a charge was 92.9%.
Regulatory support organisations and 
technical and scientific programmes
STUK uses technical support organisations and 
independent experts to support its decision mak-
ing process for the spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management and disposal. The expert work in 
spent	 fuel	 disposal	 is	 categorized	 into	 three	 ar-
eas: Site evaluation, engineered barrier system 
and safety assessment. STUK has established 15 
framework contracts to cover these three areas. 
The main national technical support organisation 
of STUK in the field of nuclear energy is VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland. In VTT and 
other Governmental or University institutes, tens 
of experts are working in the area of safety of nu-
clear power plants as well as spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste management.
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The	main	R&D	programmes	on	nuclear	waste	
management in Finland are the following:
•	 The	 programme	 of	 Posiva	Oy;	 the	 programme	
is mainly aimed at planning and implementing 
the disposal of spent nuclear fuel from TVO and 
FPH;
•	 The	programme	of	STUK;	aimed	at	supporting	
the regulatory decision making of STUK when 
regulating Posiva and the power companies;
•	 The	 KYT	 programme	 (KYT	 2014,	 http://
kyt2014.vtt.fi/eng/index.htm), administrated by 
the MEE; is aimed at supporting the further 
development and maintenance of the overall 
national competence and the sufficient and 
comprehensive expertise needed for regulatory 
purposes, and at assessing alternative solutions 
for the long-term management of spent fuel.
•	 The	NPP	utilities	FPH	and	TVO	have	their	own	
R&D	programmes	for	low	and	intermediate	lev-
el wastes (treatment, conditioning/solidification, 
storage, and disposal) and decommissioning of 
nuclear power plants.
The framework programme (in Finnish and in 
English) for KYT2014 can be found at the website 
http://www.tem.fi/files/28692/TEM_72_2010_net-
ti.pdf. An international peer review of the KYT 
Programme was organised by the MEE in 2012. 
The results of the peer review are published at 
website http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/eng/index.htm
Reports on the regulatory control of nuclear and 
radiation safety, including radioactive waste man-
agement, are published annually.
STUK’s Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Safety has been established by a separate Decree 
(164/1988). This Commission gives advice to STUK 
on important safety issues and regulations. The 
Commission also gives its statements on licence 
applications. It has two international Committees, 
one for nuclear waste safety (NWSC) and one for 
reactor safety (RSC). In addition, an Advisory 
Commission on Radiation Safety has been es-
tablished for advising the Ministry for Health 
and Social Affairs. The members of the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety and the Advisory 
Commission on Radiation Safety are nominated by 
the Government.
To assist STUK’s work in nuclear security, an 
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was es-
tablished in 2009. The members of the committee 
come from the various Finnish authorities, and the 
nuclear licensees also have their representatives. 
The duties of the committee include the assess-
ment of the threats in the nuclear field as well as 
consultation to STUK in important security issues. 
The committee also aims to follow and promote 
both the international and internal co-operation in 
the field of nuclear security.
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Article 21 Responsibility of the 
licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime 
responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radio-
active waste management rests with the holder of 
the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets 
its responsibility.
If there is no such licence holder or other re-
sponsible party, the responsibility rests with the 
Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the 
spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
The responsibility for safety rests with the licensee 
as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. According 
to the Act (Section 9) each licensee, whose opera-
tions generate or have generated nuclear waste 
is responsible for all nuclear waste management 
measures and their appropriate preparation, and 
is responsible for their costs. If the licence holder is 
found not to be capable for carrying out the waste 
management completely or partly, the Government 
shall order that such nuclear waste be transferred 
to the responsibility of the State. The waste man-
agement obligation of the licensee will expire when 
the disposal of nuclear waste has been completed 
and STUK has confirmed that the nuclear waste 
is permanently disposed of in an approved manner 
(Sections 31–34 of the Nuclear Energy Act).
Furthermore, the licensee is responsible for 
physical protection and emergency preparedness 
arrangements and other necessary arrangements 
for limitation of nuclear damages. The authorities 
regulate these arrangements, but the responsi-
bilities belong to the licensees. To ensure that the 
financial liability for the future management and 
disposal of nuclear wastes and for the decommis-
sioning of nuclear facilities is covered, the licensees 
under a waste management obligation shall fulfil 
the financial provision obligation by payments into 
the National Nuclear Waste Management Fund, 
and shall furnish the State with securities as a 
precaution against insolvency. The Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund is independent of the State 
budget, but it is controlled and administered by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
As a precondition for granting a safety licence 
for the use of radiation the Radiation Act requires 
(Section 16) that the applicant presents valid proof 
on the safe management of any radioactive waste 
which may be generated. Further, the Radiation 
Act (Section 50) provides that the responsible 
party	shall	organize	 the	practice	so	 that	 it	meets	
all radiation safety requirements prescribed in 
the Act and shall take all the measures needed to 
render radioactive waste arising from its operation 
harmless. The Act also provides for the responsibil-
ity of decontamination of the environment, if the 
radioactive material is released in such an extent 
that	the	resulting	health	or	environmental	hazards	
require action. According to the Act (Section 50), in 
utilization	of	natural	resources	containing	radioac-
tive materials, the responsible party shall ensure 
that radioactive wastes do not pose any health 
or	 environmental	 hazards	 during	 the	 operations,	
including measures taken while stopping these 
activities.
The Radiation Act (Section 51) provides that if 
the responsible party does not meet the require-
ments set for radioactive waste management, the 
State has the secondary obligation in managing 
the radioactive waste or residues. The same applies 
if the origin of the waste is unknown, or no primary 
responsible party can be found.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to 
verify that the licensees fulfil their responsibilities 
set in the regulations. This verification is carried out 
through safety reviews and assessments as well as 
inspection programmes established by STUK.
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Article 22 Human and financial 
resources
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) qualified staff are available as needed for 
safety-related activities during the operating 
lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste 
management facility;
(b) adequate financial resources are available to 
support the safety of facilities for spent fuel 
and radioactive waste management during 
their operating lifetime and for decommission-
ing;
(c) financial provision is made which will en-
able the appropriate institutional controls and 
monitoring arrangements to be continued for 
the period deemed necessary following the clo-
sure of a disposal facility.
Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for en-
suring that its employees are qualified and author-
ised for their jobs. According to the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Section 19), a necessary condition for granting 
a construction licence of a nuclear facility is the 
availability of the necessary expertise. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), an operat-
ing licence of a nuclear facility can be granted if 
the applicant has the necessary expertise available 
and, in particular, if the operating organisation and 
the competence of the operating staff are appropri-
ate. Furthermore, a nuclear facility must have a 
responsible manager and his/her deputy approved 
by STUK (Section 7k § of the Nuclear Energy Act).
According to the Government Decree 717/2013 
the NPP personnel shall be well suited for its du-
ties, competent and well trained. Initial, comple-
mentary and refresher training programmes shall 
be established for the personnel. For ensuring safe-
ty in all situations, competent personnel shall be 
available in a sufficient number. The Government 
Decree 736/2008 on the safety of the disposal 
of nuclear waste includes similar requirements. 
Accordingly, NPP utilities and Posiva have special 
training programmes including waste manage-
ment for their personnel. Staff training at Posiva 
is based on personal training and development 
plans and company-level plans which are updated 
annually.
In addition, Posiva is co-operating with other 
European	 waste	 management	 organizations	 in	
the framework of the Technology Platform for 
Implementing Geological Disposal of Radioactive 
Waste (IGD-TP). In addition, Posiva has bilateral 
agreements or understandings on international 
cooperation with several research and implement-
ing	 organizations	 acting	 in	 the	 area	 of	 nuclear	
waste management. Posiva also participates in 
the 7th Framework programme of the European 
Commission and in various projects of the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the OECD.
In activities related to the use of radiation 
other than in nuclear facilities the Radiation Act 
(Section 14) prescribes that the responsible party 
is required to ensure that in safety related matters 
of the operations the expertise is available, taking 
into account the nature and the risks posed by the 
operation. The responsible party shall appoint a 
radiation safety officer. In a licence application the 
applicant shall provide information on the compe-
tence of the persons working with radiation.
STUK shall lay down the qualifications of the 
radiation safety officer and other persons, as ap-
plicable, and investigate that these qualification 
requirements are met (Section 18 of the Radiation 
Act). The licensee shall provide appropriate train-
ing for the employees. Guide ST 1.4 sets the 
requirements for the organisation for the use 
of radiation including the competences needed. 
Guide ST 1.8 further sets detailed requirements on 
radiation protection training for the radiation safe-
ty officers and qualified experts. The competence 
that has to be demonstrated by an exam includes 
a general part covering the basics of radiation 
protection and the appropriate legislation. Special 
requirements are attributed to different fields of 
applications of radiation.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Sec-
tion  55), STUK is responsible for controlling the 
necessary qualifications of the persons engaged 
in activities important to safety. Guide YVL A.4 
sets more specific requirements for safety critical 
positions, e.g. for the responsible manager and 
persons responsible for safeguards, emergency pre-
paredness and security. The Guide has also specific 
requirements on management and leadership com-
petence.
Accordingly, personnel and human resources 
related issues are included in STUK’s inspection 
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programmes for Posiva and for the nuclear power 
plants. During the years 2011–2013 STUK has 
paid	attention	especially	to	assessing	the	organiza-
tion and personnel planning of Posiva. Currently, 
STUK	 is	 reviewing	 Posiva’s	 organization,	 human	
resources and competence as part of the construc-
tion licence application for the spent nuclear fuel 
encapsulation and disposal facility.
The long time scales associated with the spent 
fuel disposal underline the importance of the avail-
ability of qualified domestic experts in the field 
also in the future. However, changes in energy 
markets and the fast development of technology 
will bring new challenges to the knowledge base, 
and this requires special effort by all the parties. 
Also a considerable share of Finnish nuclear ex-
perts, within the regulator, the operators as well 
as within research institutes and universities, is 
currently retiring and at the same time additional 
human resources are needed owing to the spent 
fuel disposal project and the new NPP projects. The 
challenges are tackled by training young experts in 
the nuclear safety field in two specific training re-
lated co-operation programmes of Finnish organi-
zations	active	in	the	nuclear	energy	field.
In 2010 the first course covering comprehen-
sively	 nuclear	 waste	 management	 (“National	
YJH	 course”)	 was	 launched.	The	 impetus	 for	 the	
course development resulted from an evaluation 
of the KYT2010 programme (Finnish Research 
Programme on Nuclear Waste Management) point-
ing out the need to address competence mainte-
nance also by the means of training, not only in 
research projects. The National YJH course cur-
riculum was designed based on earlier Finnish 
experiences in teaching the nuclear waste man-
agement subjects. The current course with a six 
day curriculum has been running since 2011 for 
around 20–25 students at a time and equalling 
2 ECTS credits (ECTS = European Credit Transfer 
and Accumulation System), with around 80 partici-
pants altogether by the end of 2013. The training 
content is produced also jointly by the participat-
ing	 organizations,	 which	 form	 also	 the	 planning	
group that is chaired by the Ministry of Economy 
and the Employment. The practical course coordi-
nation has been carried out by Aalto University. 
(More information can be found at http://www.
euronuclear.org/events/nestet/nestet2013/transac-
tions/nestet2013-needs.pdf).
In 2012, the three Universities Aalto, Helsinki 
University and Lappeenranta University of 
Technology set up a Doctoral programme YTERA 
(YTERA – Doctoral Programme for Nuclear 
Engineering and Radiochemistry), which is funded 
by the Academy of Finland, the universities and 
the industry (the NPP utilities and Posiva). The 
Doctoral Programme covers all fields of nuclear 
engineering and radiochemistry including nuclear 
waste management. The Programme has seven 
full-time doctoral students and around 25 associ-
ated doctoral students. The current programme 
period runs until the end of 2015 (http://physics.
aalto.fi/studies/ytera/).
In addition, during 2003–2013 several hun-
dreds of experts have been trained during the 5–6 
weeks	 training	 courses	 (“YK	 course”)	 emphasiz-
ing the safety of NPPs and including some basic 
features of nuclear waste management. The 11th 
training	course	is	organized	in	2013–2014	and	the	
12th course for 2014–2015 is started in autumn 
2014.
The intention is to continue with the train-
ing courses on an annual basis as long as there 
are enough participants who need the training. 
Training materials have been developed so that 
they	can	be	used	by	the	organizations	in	their	in-
ternal training programmes as appropriate.
During 2010–2012 a committee set up by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy worked 
on a report aiming at giving recommendations 
and steps to be taken until the 2020’s for ensuring 
competence and resources needed for the nuclear 
energy sector. The participants of the committee 
represented different organisations involved in 
the activities related to nuclear energy. One of 
the recommendations of the committee was that 
the future needs and focus areas of the Finnish 
nuclear energy sector research must be accurately 
defined and a long-term strategy drawn up for 
further development of research activities. This 
calls for a separate joint project among research 
organisations and other stakeholders in the field. 
The Report of the Committee for Nuclear Energy 
Competence in Finland (in English) can be found 
on (http://www.tem.fi/files/33099/TEMjul_14_2012_
web.pdf). The report has been published both in 
Finnish and English.
At the end of January 2013 the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy set up a working 
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group to prepare a research and development 
strategy. The objectives of the working group in-
cluded the following tasks:
(1) definition of main development lines for the 
Finnish research activities in the area of nuclear 
energy (vision until 2030, road maps, nuclear en-
ergy research in general, nuclear safety research, 
research on advanced nuclear reactor concepts, 
research on nuclear fusion technology),
(2) identification of priority areas for nuclear 
energy research taking into account future re-
search needs and the required knowledge base,
(3) definition of the needs for the development 
of research infrastructure covering the needs of dif-
ferent actors in the nuclear energy sector,
(4)	optimization	of	the	management	of	national	
research programmes as well as the provision of 
funding to the research programmes and
(5) enable Finland to participate in the inter-
national research activities in the nuclear energy 
sector in a more significant manner than presently.
The working group was chaired by a representative 
of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
who also provided secretariat to the working 
group. The nominated members of the working 
group included experts from STUK, VTT, Finnish 
Academy, Aalto University, Technical University of 
Lappeenranta, University of Helsinki, FPH, TVO 
and Posiva. The divisions of the working group 
were the following: 1) Nuclear safety, 2) Nuclear 
waste management, 3) Researcher training in the 
nuclear energy field, 4) Future nuclear energy 
technologies and basic physics, 5) Nuclear energy 
research in social sciences and 6) From research to 
business in nuclear energy field. Results of the re-
search and development strategy work have been 
published (in Finnish) at the end of April 2014.
The recommendations of the working group 
are the following: 1) The areas of focus in nuclear 
energy research must be compiled into wide-rang-
ing national programmes. 2) The scientific level 
of Finnish nuclear energy research needs to be 
raised. 3) Active participation is needed on inter-
national research that is important for Finland 
through broad-based national multidisciplinary 
collaboration. 4) To secure the quality and quantity 
of researcher education, a broad and comprehen-
sive doctoral programme network needs to be es-
tablished for the nuclear energy field. 5) Building, 
maintaining, and utilising infrastructure requires 
coordination at the national level. Financing needs 
to be considered strategically and the roles of na-
tional financiers need to be clarified. 6) In research 
activities input is needed into the development of 
innovations. The growth of business operations 
and internationalisation are supported by bringing 
the players together under Team Finland. 7) It is 
proposed that an advisory committee be set up in 
connection with the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy (MEE) linked with nuclear energy 
research and co-operation as a permanent expert 
body to support decision-making in national ques-
tions related to the nuclear energy.
Implementation of these recommendations will 
require concrete actions concerning funding of the 
national	nuclear	safety	R&D	programmes,	includ-
ing nuclear waste safety.
Financial resources
The Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 35 to 53) pro-
vides detailed regulations for the financial ar-
rangements for nuclear waste management 
and the Decree on the State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund further specifies the financing 
system. The financial provisions are described in 
greater detail in the Decision of the Government 
on Financial Provisions for the Cost of Nuclear 
Waste Management (168/1988). The producers of 
nuclear waste are obliged to present every three 
years justified estimates of the future cost of man-
aging their existing waste, including spent nuclear 
fuel disposal and decommissioning of facilities. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(MEE) confirms annually the assessed liability 
and the proportion of liability the Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund has to reach (the fund target). 
The tasks of the Nuclear Waste Management Fund 
are described in detail in the Government Decree 
on the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund 
(161/2004). The waste generators pay annually the 
difference between the fund target and the amount 
already existing in the Fund, but can also be reim-
bursed if the funded amount exceeds the liabilities. 
The waste generators shall provide securities to 
MEE for the portion of financial liability that is not 
yet covered by the Fund.
In 2012, VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland which operates the research reactor 
(FiR 1) decided to shut down the reactor and the 
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Figure 13. The fund targets (for the operating reactors) in the Nuclear Waste Management Fund and liabilities 
covered by securities. After 2014 the data are illustrative and take into account both the use of the funds for the 
implementation and additional inputs until the closing of the reactors.
planning of the decommissioning phase started. 
VTT is responsible for following almost similar 
practices for funding as described above.
The current estimates, including costs from 
the management of existing waste quantities and 
from the decommissioning of current NPPs and the 
research reactor, arise to about 2385 million Euros 
with no discounting (Figure 13). The total cost was 
increased by about 12 % in the period 2010–2013 
from the last period 2007–2010. The increase is 
justified mainly with the increase of the general 
price level and modifications of the decommission-
ing and disposal plans.
Financial provisions for post-closure
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 32), 
a condition for the expiry of waste management 
obligation of a nuclear waste gene ator is that the 
waste has been permanently dispos d of in an ap-
proved manner and a lump sum to the State for 
the further control of the waste has been paid. 
Thereafter, the State is responsible for the nec-
essary waste management measures and the in-
curred costs.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 51), the 
responsible party and others who have taken part 
in producing or handling the radioactive materials 
or waste shall compensate the State for the costs 
incurred by the measures taken to render the 
waste harmless and to decontaminate the environ-
ment.
Article 23 Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary 
steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance 
programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management are established and 
implemented.
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 35) and Guide 
YVL A.3 require that a survey of quality assur-
ance for the construction phase as well as a quality 
management system manual of the applicant shall 
be submitted to STUK for approval when apply-
ing for a construction licence for a nuclear facility. 
The	applicant	shall	assess	how	organizations	par-
ticipating in the construction satisfy the Finnish 
safety and quality requirements. The assessment 
shall be included in the preliminary safety analysis 
report which shall be sent to STUK for approval. 
When applying for the operating licence the appli-
cant has to send the management system manual 
to STUK for approval as a part of the operating 
licence application.
According to the Government Decrees 717/2013 
and 736/2008, the organisations participating in 
the design, construction, operation, nuclear waste 
management and decommissioning of a nuclear 
facility are required to employ a management 
system. The management system shall aim at en-
suring that priority will always be given to safety 
and that the requirements for quality management 
are commensurate to the importance to safety 
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of the action. The management system shall be 
systematically assessed and developed. The qual-
ity management system requirements concerning 
nuclear facilities are provided in Guide YVL A.3 
reflecting the updating of the IAEA guidelines and 
the recent development in the quality management 
in industry.
The quality management system of the licen-
see/applicant is subject to approval by STUK. 
The licensee/applicant has to send also the qual-
ity management manuals of its main suppliers to 
STUK for review. Furthermore, quality assurance 
programmes have to be established by all other 
organisations participating in activities important 
to the safety of the use of nuclear energy. STUK 
verifies the implementation of quality manage-
ment systems and quality assurance programmes 
through reviews and inspections.
The licensees (FPH and TVO) and the nuclear 
waste management company Posiva have adopted 
certified quality management systems consistent 
with the ISO 9001 standard. TVO has developed 
and implemented a project specific ISO 9001 certi-
fied quality management system for the construc-
tion phase of the Olkiluoto 3 unit. The quality 
management system of VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland is also based on the quality 
standard ISO 9001. The management systems of 
the aforementioned organisations fulfil also the 
requirement set in Guide YVL A.3. Moreover, FPH, 
TVO and Posiva have adopted an environmental 
management system according to ISO 14001.
Posiva’s contractors supplying products im-
portant to safety shall have a quality manage-
ment system fulfilling the requirements of Guide 
YVL A.3. These organisations also have to prepare 
a supply specific quality assurance programme. 
STUK verifies with graded approach the imple-
mentation of the quality management systems and 
the quality assurance programmes through re-
views and inspections. Posiva submitted its quality 
management manual to STUK for approval in con-
nection with the construction licence application. 
STUK approved Posiva’s manual with conditions 
in 2013 and continues verifying the implementa-
tion of the management system with quality assur-
ance related inspections.
STUK itself has a Quality Management System 
which consists of the quality policy, quality manu-
als on different levels, evaluation and assessment 
procedures and follow-up of development projects. 
The quality manuals contain the quality policy, 
description	 of	 the	 quality	 system,	 organization	
and management, main and supporting working 
processes and the personnel policy. The results of 
systematic internal audits, self-assessments and 
external evaluations, including international eval-
uations (such as IRRS in 2012) as well as feedback 
from licensees, customers and other stakeholders, 
are used as inputs for the development and con-
tinuous improvement projects of STUK’s Quality 
Management System.
STUK also evaluates the service providers in 
the procurement process. STUK only uses audited 
or otherwise accepted service providers. Important 
issues in the evaluations are the service provider’s 
professional skills, independence, and impartiality.
STUK’s quality policy is under revision based 
on the updated STUK’s strategy for the years 
2013–17.
Article 24 Operational radiation 
protection
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime 
of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility:
(d) the radiation exposure of the workers and the 
public caused by the facility shall be kept as 
low as reasonably achievable, economic and 
social factors being taken into account;
(e) no individual shall be exposed, in normal 
situations, to radiation doses which exceed na-
tional prescriptions for dose limitation which 
have due regard to internationally endorsed 
standards on radiation protection; and
(f) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and 
uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials 
into the environment.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:
(g) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reason-
ably achievable, economic and social factors 
being taken into account; and
(h) so that no individual shall be exposed, in 
normal situations, to radiation doses which 
exceed national prescriptions for dose limita-
tion which have due regard to internationally 
endorsed standards on radiation protection.
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Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime 
of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an 
unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive 
materials into the environment occurs, appropriate 
corrective measures are implemented to control the 
release and mitigate its effects.
Basic radiation protection requirements
The basic requirements for the safe use of nu-
clear energy are given in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
The principles of justification, optimisation and 
dose limitation are included in the Radiation Act 
(Section 2). Occupational dose limits and dose 
limits for the general public are set forth in the 
Radiation Decree (Sections 3 to 6). These limits are 
in conformity with the ICRP 103 Recommendation 
(2007), ICRP 60 Recommendation (1990) and the 
Council Directive 96/29/Euratom.
According to the Radiation Decree (Section 3) 
the effective dose from occupational exposure shall 
not exceed 20 mSv per year as an average over five 
years or 50 mSv in any single year. Medical sur-
veillance of employees of NPPs and other working 
places where employees are engaged in radiation 
work is performed following the Radiation Act and 
subsequent legislation implementing the related 
provisions of the Council Directive 96/29/Euratom.
The Radiation Decree (Section 7) states that 
the detailed instructions on the application of the 
maximum values laid down for radiation exposure 
and on the calculation of radiation doses shall 
be issued by STUK. The Decree further states 
that notwithstanding the dose limits given in the 
Decree (Sections 3 to 6), e.g. the 1 mSv/a limit for 
the general public, STUK may, in individual cases, 
set constraints lower than the maximum values, 
if such constraints are needed to take account of 
the radiation exposure originating from different 
sources and to keep the exposure as low as reason-
ably achievable.
Dose constraints
Government Decree 717/2013 includes regulations 
for limiting the radiation exposure of the general 
public and the releases of radioactive substances 
into the environment, arising from the normal op-
eration of a NPP (including spent fuel storage and 
LILW treatment and storage facilities), as well as 
from anticipated operational transients and acci-
dents. The constraint for the annual dose of the 
most exposed individual among the population, 
arising from the normal operation or an anticipat-
ed operational transient of a NPP, is 0.1 mSv. The 
annual dose refers to the sum of the effective dose 
arising from external radiation within the period of 
one year, and of the committed effective dose from 
the intake of radioactive substances within the 
same period of time. The individual annual dose 
constraint as a result of postulated accidents is 
1 mSv, 5 mSv or 20 mSv depending on the type and 
likelihood of the accident. The dose constraints are 
defined to include all nuclear facilities on one site. 
Thus the future operation of Olkiluoto 3 will not 
increase the applied dose constraints at the site.
STUK has issued several new YVL Guides deal-
ing with radiation protection as regards the design 
and operation of NPPs (Guides YVL C.1, C.2, C.3 
and D.3). They cover also spent fuel storages and 
on-site waste management facilities, including the 
operational period of on-site disposal facilities for 
LILW. The Guides define the level of safety re-
quired and are the basis for regulatory review of 
the licence application as well as for review and 
inspection during commissioning and operation.
According to Government Decree 736/2008, a 
spent fuel encapsulation and disposal facility and 
its operation shall be designed so that as a con-
sequence of undisturbed operation of the facil-
ity, discharges of radioactive substances to the 
environment remain insignificantly low. The radio-
logical consequence of an anticipated operational 
transient as the annual dose to the most exposed 
members of the public shall remain below 0.1 mSv. 
The annual dose caused by postulated accidents 
shall remain below 1 mSv or 5 mSv depending on 
the type and likelihood of the accident.
The NPPs shall have a written programme 
(the ALARA action programme) to keep doses low. 
Based on the principle of continuous development, 
the programme shall include target limits for the 
highest individual annual dose and collective dose 
(manSv/GW net electric power) that shall not be 
exceeded. If the collective occupational dose at 
one NPP unit exceeds the collective dose limit as 
an average of two consecutive years, a report of 
the causes and the measures to improve radiation 
safety shall be drawn up and submitted to STUK 
for information. For the design of a new NPP a 
target of 0.5 manSv per 1000 MWe as an average 
STUK-B 180
53
SECTION F Other general safety provisions
over the whole lifetime of the plant is set in Guide 
YVL C.1.
In the YVL Guides, reporting requirements con-
cerning exceptional situations including exception-
al releases are given. Release rate limits are also 
given in the Guides, ensuring actions to be taken 
already before a release limit would be reached. 
The Guides also give requirements concerning 
monitoring release pathways and environmental 
surveillance during the operation of nuclear facili-
ties.
Operational experiences
Experience gained from operation of Finnish nucle-
ar facilities shows that the dose constraints have 
not been exceeded, and that the ALARA principle 
has been followed. The results of environmental 
surveillance programmes show that the amount 
of radioactive materials in the environment of the 
NPP sites, originating from the Finnish nuclear 
facilities, has been very low. Calculated radiation 
exposures to the most exposed persons in the en-
vironment of the NPPs are currently less than one 
per cent of the dose constraint (Figure 14). The 
new NPP unit, Olkiluoto 3, will have advanced 
liquid and gaseous effluent treatment systems and 
it is expected that the discharges from the entire 
Olkiluoto NPP will remain at the current low level 
after the commissioning of the new unit. It should 
also be noted that the dose constraints and actual 
doses discussed above apply to the entire operation 
of the NPP and the contributions due to spent fuel 
storage and waste management are insignificant 
fractions of the total exposure: the occupational 
collective doses resulting from waste management, 
decontamination and spent fuel management ac-
tivities at the both NPPs are of the order of some 
hundredths of manSv.
Article 25 Emergency preparedness
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before 
and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive 
waste management facility there are appropriate 
on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. 
Such emergency plans should be tested at an ap-
propriate frequency.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps for the preparation and testing of emer-
gency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to 
be affected in the event of a radiological emergency 
at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility in the vicinity of its territory.
On-site emergency preparedness
The emergency preparedness plans for spent nu-
clear fuel storages and radioactive waste man-
agement facilities are included in the plans and 
arrangement for NPPs. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Section 20), adequate on-site emer-
gency preparedness arrangements are required 
before starting the operation of a nuclear facility. 
The basic regulations for on-site emergency pre-
paredness for nuclear installations are given in 
the Government Decree 716/2013 and the detailed 
requirements by STUK in Guide YVL C.5.
The licensee is responsible for the on-site emer-
gency response arrangements. The Government 
Decree states e.g. that emergency planning shall 
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Figure 14. Committed doses (µSv/a) calculated by STUK to members of critical groups in the vicinity of the 
 Finnish NPPs due to annual discharges of radioactive substances. The dose constraint is 100 µSv/a.
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be based on the analysis of NPP behaviour in 
emergencies and on the analysis of the conse-
quences of emergencies. Actions in an emergency 
shall be planned taking into account controllability 
of events as well as severity of their consequences. 
Therefore, different categories of emergency situ-
ations are considered. The Decree also requires 
that appropriate training and exercises shall be 
arranged to maintain operational preparedness. 
Exercises shall be arranged in co-operation with 
the authorities concerned.
On-site emergency exercises are conducted an-
nually so that at least the licensee personnel, local 
off-site emergency management group and STUK 
participate in them. There are always observers 
from STUK and several other organisations as-
sessing the performance of the exercising teams. 
The scenarios have varied from severe reactor acci-
dents to alert-status events, which involve alerting 
nuclear	power	plant	emergency	organization	to	the	
extent necessary to ensure the safety level of the 
plant. Also exercises for other situations, such as 
security-related incidents are regularly conducted.
Concerning the small users, the Radiation 
Decree (Section 17) stipulates that STUK has to 
be notified immediately in case of any abnormal 
occurrence, connected with the use of radiation and 
substantially detrimental to safety, at the place 
where the radiation is used or in its environment. 
In addition, STUK has to be informed if a radiation 
source has disappeared, been stolen, lost or other-
wise ceased to be in the licensee’s possession.
Off-site emergency preparedness
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
are prepared by local authorities. The require-
ments for off-site plans and activities in a radia-
tion emergency are provided in the Rescue Act 
and the Rescue Decree (2011) and in the Decree 
on Emergency Planning and Public Information 
issued by the Ministry of the Interior (2011). Full 
scale off-site emergency exercises are conducted 
every third year at both Finnish NPPs. Smaller 
scale exercises are held annually at each site with 
participation of the staff of NPP, local authorities 
and STUK. In addition to exercises held with li-
censees, exercises with local, regional and national 
authorities are regularly organised.
During the recent years, three important docu-
ments concerning emergency preparedness and re-
sponse have been updated in Finland. Two of them 
are VAL Guides 1 and 2, which define the strategy, 
criteria, and operational intervention levels for dif-
ferent protective actions in early and intermediate 
phases. The guidelines form a unique set of docu-
ments that includes criteria for early protective 
measures, actions after contamination and lifting 
measures. They take into account both domestic 
nuclear or radiological emergencies and emergen-
cies in more distant locations, and cover both ac-
cidents and intentional acts. The guidelines are 
also a practical implementation of the new inter-
national radiation protection concept established 
for emergencies (ICRP 103). The VAL Guides were 
an	essential	basis	to	the	“Nordic	Flag	Book”,	which	
is a recently updated version of the document con-
taining the strategies and operational intervention 
levels for protective actions commonly agreed-upon 
by all Nordic countries (Protective Measures in 
Early and Intermediate Phases of a Nuclear or 
Radiological Emergency; Nordic Guidelines and 
Recommendations; 2014).
Early notification and communication
The on-site and off-site plans include provisions to 
inform the population in case of an accident. In ad-
dition, written information on radiation emergen-
cies, emergency planning and response arrange-
ments have been provided to the population. Such 
information can also be found in the telephone 
directories	of	Finland.	Citizens	living	near	nuclear	
facilities are regularly provided with more detailed 
written information on nuclear accidents and pro-
tective measures needed during emergencies.
STUK is the National Warning Point and the 
National Competent Authority in Finland for any 
kind of situation which might result in actual or 
potential deterioration of radiation safety of the 
population, environment or society. STUK has es-
tablished an Emergency Preparedness Manual for 
its own activities in the case of a nuclear accident 
or radiological emergency. STUK has an expert on 
duty for 24 hours a day, in order to be able to im-
mediately give advice to local, regional and govern-
mental authorities on needed emergency response 
actions. The expert on duty receives notifications 
on an exceptional event directly from the operat-
ing organisations of the facilities, or automatically 
from the environmental radiation monitoring net-
STUK-B 180
55
SECTION F Other general safety provisions
work covering the whole country, or from foreign 
authorities.
Finland is a Contracting Party to the 
International Convention on Early Notification of 
a Nuclear Accident, as well as to the Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 
or Radiological Emergency, both done in Vienna 
in 1986. Furthermore, as a Member State of the 
European Union, the Council Directives and 
Regulations and Decisions concerning accident sit-
uations apply in Finland. In addition, Finland has 
respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. 
Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed on 
to directly inform the competent authorities of 
these countries in the case of an accident. Similar 
arrangements ensure direct notification to the 
authorities of Estonia. The bilateral agreements 
also cover the exchange of relevant information on 
nuclear facilities.
Article 26 Decommissioning
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a 
nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:
(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resourc-
es are available;
(j) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to op-
erational radiation protection, discharges and 
unplanned and uncontrolled releases are ap-
plied;
(k) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to 
emergency preparedness are applied; and
(l) records of information important to decommis-
sioning are kept.
Regulatory provisions for decommissioning
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19) states that 
sufficient and appropriate methods for arranging 
the decommissioning of a nuclear facility have 
to be identified before the construction licence is 
granted. Guide YVL D.4 requires that provisions 
for the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities 
shall be made already during the design phase. 
During the design phase the licence applicant has 
to establish the decommissioning strategy. This 
strategy shall be regularly evaluated and if nec-
essary updated during the commissioning of the 
facility. The limitation of radioactive waste genera-
tion and of the radiation exposure of workers and 
the environment arising from decommissioning 
shall be considered.
The general provision for licensing and the 
waste management obligation is included in the 
current nuclear energy legislation. The first de-
commissioning project in Finland will be the de-
commissioning and dismantling of the research 
reactor FiR 1. The decommissioning is planned to 
take place during the next reporting period. Guide 
YVL D.4 has been published in December 2013. 
This Guide replaces the earlier Guide YVL 8.2 and 
includes more specific requirements for decommis-
sioning.
The licensees are responsible for the implemen-
tation of decommissioning. As described in Chapter 
“Financial	resources”,	assets	are	collected	into	the	
Nuclear Waste Management Fund. The Fund en-
sures that financial resources are available for the 
licensee to implement decommissioning. The state 
has the secondary responsibility if the licensee is 
incapable of implementing its responsibilities. In 
this case the costs are covered by assets collected 
in the Fund and by the securities provided by the 
licensees. The financing of the decommissioning 
and waste management actions for the research 
reactor (FiR 1) are also covered by assets in the 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund.
Also in cases of uses of radioactive sources sub-
ject to the Radiation Act, the licensee is responsible 
for decommissioning. The licensee shall provide 
evidence that all disused sources have been trans-
ferred from the site appropriately and, where 
appropriate, that there is no remaining contami-
nation. Sections 19 and 31f of the Radiation Act 
prescribe practices subject to a financial provision 
at the licensing phase to ensure the availability of 
sufficient funds to cover decommissioning costs.
Decommissioning plans
The four reactor units in Finland have been oper-
ated for 33 to 37 years. These units are planned to 
be operated further up to the total operation pe-
riod	of	50	yrs	(Lo	1	&	2)	and	60	yrs	(OL	1	&	2).	No	
nuclear power plants are currently being decom-
missioned and the first project of this kind will be 
the decommissioning of the research reactor which 
will take place in the near future. The current 
licence of the research reactor FiR 1 is valid until 
2023. Nevertheless, in July 2012 the operator VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland made the de-
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cision for the shutdown of the reactor and started 
a more detailed planning of the reactor decom-
missioning and dismantling. The first step in the 
decommissioning phase was the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) process which started in 
the autumn 2013. The EIA is going on and when 
the report has been prepared VTT will update the 
decommissioning plan for the reactor in more de-
tail.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
28) the licensees are obliged to prepare decommis-
sioning plans for regulatory review and to update 
them every six years. These plans aim at ensuring 
that decommissioning can be appropriately per-
formed when needed and the estimates for decom-
missioning costs are realistic. The latest update of 
the NPP decommissioning plan was issued at the 
end of 2012 by Fortum Power and Heat. The next 
update for Teollisuuden Voima Oyj’s (TVO) decom-
missioning plan will be submitted to the authori-
ties by the end of 2014, since the latest plan was 
issued at the end of 2008.
The decommissioning plans include assess-
ments of occupational and off-site radiological 
safety of the operations. The plans include rather 
detailed descriptions of the required dismantling 
and waste management operations, including the 
estimates of workforce and other resources needed. 
The plans are based on the actual designs of the 
facilities and they take into account the activity in-
ventories of the facilities. The contamination levels 
in the facilities are followed by means of specific 
monitoring and recording programmes.
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Article 4 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel man-
agement, individuals, society and the environment 
are adequately protected against radiological haz-
ards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual 
heat generated during spent fuel management 
are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste 
associated with spent fuel management is kept 
to the minimum practicable, consistent with 
the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the 
different steps in spent fuel management;
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, 
society and the environment, by applying at 
the national level suitable protective methods 
as approved by the regulatory body, in the 
framework of its national legislation which 
has due regard to internationally endorsed 
criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and 
other hazards that may be associated with 
spent fuel management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reason-
ably predictable impacts on future generations 
greater than those permitted for the current 
generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on fu-
ture generations.
Scope and principal regulations
Finland has adopted the direct disposal strategy 
for spent nuclear fuel management as described 
in Section B. Spent fuel is currently stored at the 
NPPs’ spent fuel storages. The operation of the 
disposal facility for the spent fuel of TVO and 
FPH is scheduled to commence in the beginning 
of the 2020’s. The discussion in this Section is lim-
ited to the interim storage of spent fuel whereas 
the disposal plans for spent fuel are discussed in 
Section H, Safety of radioactive waste manage-
ment. Fennovoima Oy will become a licensee under 
a waste management obligation after the approval 
of the operating licence for the NPP unit.
The general regulations for the safety of spent 
fuel storage are included in Government Decree 
(717/2013). More specific technical requirements 
are given in various YVL Guides such as YVL D.3.
Criticality and removal of residual heat
According to Government Decree 717/2013 the 
handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel, main-
tenance of subcritical conditions, integrity of fuel 
cladding, adequate heat removal and radiation 
shielding shall be ensured with high certainty. 
The Nuclear Energy Act, Guides YVL A.1 and 
YVL D.3 require that a NPP shall have sufficient 
space and systems for the safe handling, treat-
ment, storage and inspection of fresh and spent 
fuel. Sub criticality requirements are given in 
Guide YVL B.4. Subcriticality of the spent fuel dur-
ing interim storage shall be ensured primarily by 
the structural design solutions. The requirements 
concerning the handling and storing the spent fuel 
are given in Guide YVL D.3. The fuel damages in 
fuel storages and in fuel transfers are to be mini-
mized	by	design	solutions.
Spent fuel cooling must satisfy the single fail-
ure criterion. This requirement is given in Guide 
YVL B.1.
Waste minimization
Minimization	of	the	amount	of	nuclear	wastes	aris-
ing	in	spent	fuel	storages	is	related	to	minimizing	
the corrosion of the fuel assemblies and storage 
equipment and also limiting the leakage from the 
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damaged fuel bundles. The requirements concern-
ing these issues are stated in Guide YVL D.3. The 
coolant of spent fuel pools shall also be kept suf-
ficiently clear and clean to facilitate the fuel iden-
tification.
The Finnish NPPs have performed some meas-
ures	to	minimize	the	radioactive	waste	produced	in	
spent fuel storages. In the Olkiluoto NPP leaking 
fuel assemblies are closed in hermetically sealed 
capsules	 to	 minimize	 the	 Cs	 activity	 in	 the	 fuel	
pool cooling water clean-up system.
In Loviisa leaking fuel assemblies are stored in 
the spent fuel pools without specified capsules. Pool 
water samples are taken regularly and no signifi-
cant activity originating from the leaking fuel rods 
has been indentified. In Loviisa, the cobalt content 
of the shielding elements has been decreased to 
minimize	the	amount	of	activation	products	in	the	
cooling water.
Interdependencies
The Finnish direct disposal spent fuel manage-
ment scheme provides that the fuel is stored in 
spent fuel storage pools at power plant sites and 
is planned to be disposed of in deep bedrock. The 
spent fuel of TVO and FPH is planned to be dis-
posed of in Olkiluoto, in the vicinity of the largest 
present interim storage. The disposal plans includ-
ing spent fuel transport, encapsulation and dis-
posal have been adapted to all the fuel types in 
use in Olkiluoto reactor units 1 to 3 and in both 
Loviisa reactor units. Also the possible needs for 
modifications to take into account spent fuel from 
the Olkiluoto 4 unit have been identified.
Posiva, the implementing organisation for the 
spent fuel disposal of TVO and FPH is co-owned by 
these NPP utilities. Thus, the interdependencies 
between different steps are taken into account in 
practice. Fennovoima Oy is responsible for the dis-
posal of its own future spent fuel and is required 
to submit a more detailed plan for a disposal pro-
gramme within six years from the NPP DiP ratifi-
cation, i.e. by the year 2016.
Though the current policy is based on the direct 
disposal option, reprocessing of spent fuel would 
be technically feasible later on due to the long in-
terim storage period. The selected disposal concept 
would, to a great extent, be applicable to disposal 
of high level reprocessing waste as well. However, 
the present legislation requires that all manage-
ment of high level waste from the NPPs, such as 
spent fuel, needs to take place in Finland.
Protection of individuals, society 
and the environment
The operational radiation protection require-
ments for spent fuel storage are discussed under 
Article 24. Operating experiences as discussed un-
der Article 9 indicate that spent fuel storage has 
caused practically no releases and occupational ra-
diation exposures have been very low.
Biological, chemical and other hazards
The biological, chemical and other non-radiological 
hazards	 posed	 by	 the	 spent	 fuel	 storage	 are	 low	
compared	 to	 the	 potential	 radiological	 hazards.	
Such	hazards	are	regulated	by	 legislation	related	
to general occupational safety and to the manage-
ment	of	hazardous	substances.
Protection of future generations 
and avoidance of undue burdens 
on future generations
The interim storage of spent fuel is envisaged to 
last several decades. The current high level of safe-
ty can be maintained during that time by means of 
appropriate operational, maintenance and surveil-
lance procedures. The nuclear power plant licensee 
is responsible for storage safety, operations and 
costs. The assets collected in the State Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund cover future costs of 
storage, waste disposal and decommissioning in 
case the licensee is no more able to take care of its 
responsibilities. Thus the future generations are 
adequately protected and they will not be imposed 
to any other undue burdens.
Article 5 Existing facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to review the safety of any spent fuel manage-
ment facility existing at the time the Convention 
enters into force for that Contracting Party and to 
ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable 
improvements are made to upgrade the safety of 
such a facility.
Safety reviews
The latest comprehensive safety assessments of 
the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs, including 
the spent fuel storages, were carried out for the 
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Loviisa NPP in connection with re-licensing of the 
operation of the plant in 2006–2007 and for the 
Olkiluoto NPP in connection of the periodic safety 
review in 2009. A comprehensive safety assess-
ment for the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage was car-
ried out in 2009 and reviewed by STUK 2010 in 
connection with licensing the construction of the 
storage extension.
Following the accident at the Fukushima Daichi 
nuclear power plant, national safety assessments 
as well as EU level stress tests were initiated 
in Finland during 2011 and 2012. The safety of 
spent fuel storages were assessed as part of NPP 
safety assessments. STUK has reviewed the re-
sults and made licensee specific decisions in July 
2012. Based on the results, it is concluded that no 
such	hazards	or	deficiencies	have	been	found	that	
would require immediate actions at the Finnish 
NPPs. However, areas where safety can be further 
enhanced have been identified and there are plans 
on how to address these areas. 
The comprehensive safety assessments for ap-
plications for the renewal of licences are required 
to include the updates of e.g. the following safety 
relevant documents:
•	 Final	safety	analysis	reports
•	 Quality	assurance	programmes	for	operation
•	 Technical	specifications
•	 Programmes	for	periodic	inspections
•	 Plans	for	nuclear	waste	management,	including	
decommissioning and disposal
•	 Timetable	 of	 nuclear	 waste	 management	 and	
estimated costs
•	 Plans	for	physical	security	and	emergency	pre-
paredness
•	 Administrative	rules	for	the	facilities
•	 Programmes	 for	 radiation	 monitoring	 in	 the	
environment of the facilities
•	 Licensee	 assessments	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	
regulations, including assessment of the fulfil-
ment of YVL Guides’ requirements
•	 Licensee	assessments	of	how	an	adequate	safe-
ty level has been maintained.
The periodic safety review report shall include the 
same information, updated as appropriate.
The re-licensing safety reviews and statements 
of STUK given to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy concluded that, as regards ra-
diation and nuclear safety, the conditions at the 
Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs comply with the 
Finnish nuclear energy legislation and regulations. 
In addition to the review of the above mentioned 
documents, STUK has also performed independ-
ent safety assessments and has annually made a 
number of regular and topical inspections to the 
facilities.
The safety of the FiR 1 research reactor was 
reviewed in the context of the renewal of the oper-
ating licence in 2011. The present licence is valid 
until the end of 2023. However, in the summer of 
2012 VTT made the decision to end the operation. 
During the decommissioning phase the safety will 
be reviewed focused on the safety of the decommis-
sioning in particular. The first step in this phase 
has been the preparation of the programme for the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) during 
2013. The decommissioning of the research reactor 
is discussed in Section F.
Need for safety enhancement
The continuous safety assessment and enhance-
ment approach applied in Finland is based on the 
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7a) stating that the 
safety of the use of nuclear energy shall be as 
high as reasonable achievable. To further enhance 
safety, all actions justified by operational experi-
ences, safety research and the progress in science 
and technology shall be taken.
In conclusion, the safety review required by 
Article 5 of the Convention has already been car-
ried out. Safety improvements have been annu-
ally implemented at the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto 
plants including the facilities for spent nuclear fuel 
handling and interim storage since the commis-
sioning. At the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage recent 
safety improvements have been carried out in 
connection with the enlargement of the spent fuel 
storage. There exists no urgent need for additional 
improvements to upgrade the safety of these facili-
ties.
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Article 6 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed spent fuel management 
facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of such a facility dur-
ing its operating lifetime;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a 
facility on individuals, society and the environ-
ment;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a 
facility available to members of the public;
(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity 
of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to 
be affected by that facility, and provide them, 
upon their request, with general data relating 
to the facility to enable them to evaluate the 
likely safety impact of the facility upon their 
territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting 
Parties by being sited in accordance with the gen-
eral safety requirements of Article 4.
Siting process and site-related factors
The spent fuel management facilities are nuclear 
facilities, either as an integrated part of a nuclear 
power plant or as separate facilities. All the spent 
fuel management facilities in Finland are located 
on the NPP sites. According to the Nuclear Energy 
Act and the Nuclear Energy Decree the application 
for a Decision-in-Principle for a new nuclear facil-
ity has to include e.g.:
•	 An	outline	of	 the	ownership	and	occupation	of	
the site,
•	 A	description	of	settlement	and	other	activities	
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and its vicinity,
•	 An	evaluation	of	the	suitability	of	the	site	and	
the restrictions caused by the nuclear facility on 
the use of surrounding areas,
•	 An	 assessment	 report	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (468/1994) as well as a description 
of the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden to the environment. More 
detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment are provided in the Decree 
(713/2006) on the Environmental Impact As-
sessment Procedure.
In the design of a nuclear plant, including spent 
fuel management facilities on site, site-related 
external events have to be taken into account. 
Government Decree 717/2013 provides as follows: 
“The	 safety	 impact	 of	 local	 conditions,	 as	well	 as	
the physical protection and emergency prepared-
ness arrangements, shall be considered when se-
lecting the site of a nuclear power plant. The site 
shall be such that the impediments and threats 
posed by the plant to its environment remain ex-
tremely minor and heat removal from the plant 
to	the	environment	can	be	reliably	implemented.”	
In	2013	STUK	issued	Guide	YVL	A.2,	“Site	for	nu-
clear	facility”,	which	describes	generally	all	the	re-
quirements concerning the site and surroundings 
of a nuclear facility, gives requirements on safety 
factors affecting the site selection as well as covers 
the regulatory control. Specific provisions against 
earthquakes are provided in Guide YVL B.7.
Deterministic analyses are made to assess the 
impact of various natural phenomena and other 
external events. The probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) required as part of the safety review for 
construction and operating licences provides in-
formation on the estimated frequency of and con-
sequences brought about by internal and external 
events. The requirements on the PRA are given in 
Guide	YVL	A.7,	“Probabilistic	risk	assessment	and	
risk	management	of	a	nuclear	power	plant”	which	
was issued by STUK in 2013. Restrictions for the 
type and amount of human activities in the vicinity 
of the nuclear facility site are described in Guide 
YVL A.2.
Assessment of new nuclear power 
plants and candidate sites
The Construction Licence for the Olkiluoto 3 unit 
was granted by the Government in February 2005. 
The construction is in progress. Site-related fac-
tors were evaluated and reviewed in connection 
with the Construction Licence procedure. Further 
clarifications have been submitted by the licensee 
during construction.
During 2007–2010 new EIAs were carried out 
for the three NPP units planned. Two of these EIAs 
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were carried out by the existing NPP operators 
TVO and FPH on their NPP sites. The third one 
was carried out by a new nuclear power company 
Fennovoima Oy. In the beginning of the EIA pro-
cess they had four optional sites for the NPP but 
one of the sites was excluded during the EIA pro-
cess. The EIA procedure did not reveal any major 
nuclear or radiation safety issues as regards the 
proposed new NPP sites or new units on the exist-
ing sites.
Separate applications for the Government’s 
Decision-in-Principle for new NPP units were 
submitted in 2008 and 2009 by TVO, FPH and 
Fennovoima Oy. The relevant site-related factors 
potentially affecting the safety of the planned new 
NPP units and the related nuclear facilities dur-
ing their projected lifetime were again evaluated 
for the existing Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites and for 
the alternative new sites at Pyhäjoki, Simo and 
Ruotsinpyhtää proposed by Fennovoima Oy. In late 
2009, Fennovoima Oy removed the Ruotsinpyhtää 
site from its application for a Decision-in Principle. 
The evaluations were reviewed by STUK and other 
expert organisations in their respective fields. In 
addition to the Finnish regulations, IAEA Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides and WENRA re-
quirements were considered in the review.
The Government granted positive DiPs for TVO 
and Fennovoima Oy in May 2010. Those were 
ratified by the Parliament in July 2010. The DiP 
granted for Fennovoima Oy included two optional 
sites for the NPP. Fennovoima Oy announced in 
October 2011 that they had selected Pyhäjoki on 
the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia to be the site for 
the new nuclear power plant.
In December 2013 Fennovoima Oy signed a 
plant supply contract with Rosatom Overseas. 
Fennovoima Oy also started a new EIA process 
for the site since the Rosatom reactor type (AES-
2006) was not included in the previous EIA. They 
submitted the updated EIA programme for MEE 
in September 2013 and MEE gave its statement on 
the EIA report in early June 2014.
Safety impact
The safety impact of a spent fuel management 
facility is analysed either in the safety analysis 
reports presented as part of the construction and 
operating licence applications of NPPs regarding 
spent fuel storage or separately for the planned en-
capsulation and disposal facility for spent fuel. The 
operating licences for nuclear facilities are granted 
for a limited period of time. For the licence renewal 
and the Periodic Safety Review, a comprehensive 
re-assessment of safety, including the environmen-
tal safety of the nuclear facility and the effects of 
external events on the safety of the facility, shall be 
performed. STUK reviews the licence applications, 
including all site-specific safety reports.
Availability of information
The availability of information related to the sit-
ing process for a major nuclear facility is based 
on the Finnish legislation on the openness of in-
formation, notably on the Act on the Openness 
of Government Activities (621/1999). Further re-
quirements are based on the Act and Decree on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure and 
the Nuclear Energy Act. The first step of consulta-
tion with the general public is the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure. Public hear-
ings are arranged both in the programme phase 
of the EIA and during the actual assessment. The 
responsible contact authority for that procedure is 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The 
EIA report must be attached to the application for 
the Decision-in Principle.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 13) states 
that, before the Decision-in-Principle is made, the 
applicant shall make available to the public an 
overall description of the facility, of the environ-
mental effects it is expected to have and of its safe-
ty. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
shall provide residents and municipalities in the 
immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility as well as 
local authorities a chance to present their opinions 
in writing before the Decision-in-Principle is made. 
Furthermore, the Ministry shall arrange a public 
hearing in the municipality where the planned 
site of the facility is located and during this hear-
ing the public shall have the opportunity to give 
their opinions either orally or in writing. The 
presented opinions have to be made known to the 
Government. The Act (Section 14) further provides 
that a necessary prerequisite for the Decision-in-
Principle is that the planned host municipality for 
the nuclear facility is in favour of siting the facility 
in that municipality.
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Consulting of Contracting Parties
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Trans boundary 
Context, done in Espoo in 1991. The Finnish policy 
is (Act 468/1994) to provide full participation to all 
neighbouring countries which can be affected by 
the nuclear facilities in question.
Notable events during the review period 2011–
2013 are described below. Spent fuel management 
facilities (storages) are part of the nuclear reactor 
projects. However, the encapsulation and disposal 
facility for spent fuel is licensed separately.
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
procedure for the Rosatom AES-2006 nuclear 
power plant unit was started by Fennovoima 
Oy in September 2013. Public hearing on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Programmes 
was organised by the MEE as the liaison authority 
specified in the EIA Decree. Several organisations 
made statements on the EIA Programme. STUK 
gave its statement on the new EIA programme in 
October 2013. MEE issued a statement on the EIA 
programme in December 2013.
In the assessment procedure with respect 
to cross-border environmental impact, based 
on the Espoo Convention, the Ministry of the 
Environment notified the authorities of Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, Russia and Austria about the EIA 
Programme. Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Russia and Poland par-
ticipated in the international hearing on the EIA 
program. Lithuania did not participate at this 
stage but they requested to be involved in the EIA 
reporting and the construction licensing stages.
Article 7 Design and construction 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a spent fuel 
management facility provide for suitable meas-
ures to limit possible radiological impacts on 
individuals, society and the environment, in-
cluding those from discharges or uncontrolled 
releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as 
necessary, technical provisions for the decom-
missioning of a spent fuel management facility 
are taken into account;
(c) the technologies incorporated in the design 
and construction of a spent fuel management 
facility are supported by experience, testing or 
analysis.
Regulatory approach
The guiding requirements for spent nuclear fuel 
storage design and construction are described in 
Government Decree 717/2013 on Nuclear power 
plants. The general design of the nuclear facility 
and the technology used is assessed by STUK for 
the first time in the context of reviewing the ap-
plication for a Decision-in-Principle and perform-
ing a preliminary safety assessment of the facility 
(Ruokola, 2000). More detailed safety assessments 
are carried out by STUK when reviewing the appli-
cations for the construction licence and the operat-
ing licence. In the operating licence renewals and 
in the periodic safety reviews the facility design 
is reassessed against safety requirements and ad-
vancements in science and technology.
Limitation of radiological impacts
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19) 
the prerequisite for granting a construction licence 
is that the location of a nuclear facility is appropri-
ate with respect to safety of the planned operations 
and that environmental protection has been taken 
into account appropriately. The Nuclear Energy 
Decree (Section 32) requires that the construction 
licence application shall include a description of 
the effects of the nuclear facility on the environ-
ment and a description of the design criteria that 
will be observed by the applicant in order to avoid 
environmental damage and to restrict the bur-
den on the environment. More detailed require-
ments are given in Government Decree 717/2013 
and, regarding design and construction of nuclear 
facilities, in Guides YVL A.2, YVL A.5, YVL B.1, 
YVL B.3 and YVL D.3.
The limitation of radiological impact is dis-
cussed in more detail in Section F in the context of 
Article 24.
Provisions for decommissioning
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7g) states that 
provisions for decommissioning shall be included 
in the design of a nuclear facility. In the context 
of the licensing requirements, the Government 
Decree 717/2013 states that the design of an NPP 
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shall take into account decommissioning so as to 
limit waste volumes and radiation exposure both 
to workers and to the environment. The Nuclear 
Energy Decree (Section 32) lays down that the ap-
plication for a construction licence has to include a 
description of the applicant’s plans and available 
methods for arranging nuclear waste management, 
including the decommissioning of the nuclear facil-
ity and the disposal of nuclear wastes, and a de-
scription of the timetable of nuclear waste man-
agement and its estimated costs. More detailed 
requirements are given in Guides YVL A.1 and 
YVL  D.4. The requirements regarding decommis-
sioning plans are discussed in Section F.
Tested technology
The requirement to use carefully examined and 
tested high quality technologies that are proved 
by experience is stated in the design requirements 
provided in the Government Decree 717/2013. 
Detailed requirements on the design of spent fuel 
handling systems are given in Guides YVL B.1, 
YVL D.3 and YVL E.11. Spent fuel storage at the 
Finnish NPPs is based on water pool technology, of 
which extensive experience exists worldwide.
Implementation during the review period
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the first 
time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in Principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued 
when the Construction Licence application is re-
viewed. Finally, a detailed evaluation of systems, 
structures and components is carried out through 
the design approval process during construction or 
facility modification phase.
The design of the Olkiluoto spent fuel stor-
age and its extension was reviewed by STUK 
when licensing the construction of the extension 
part of the storage facility. The review included a 
preliminary safety analysis report and the other 
safety related documents. Protection against large 
airplane crash has been included in the design of 
the extension and it has also been improved for the 
existing part of the facility. Also the cooling water 
systems for the spent fuel pool have been improved 
to enable water feed from outside. The monitoring 
of the storage pool water level and temperature 
has been improved to take into account earthquake 
resistance and loss of the facility power supply to 
address lessons learned from the Fukushima ac-
cident.
Article 8 Assessment of safety 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a spent fuel management 
facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment appropriate to the 
hazard presented by the facility and covering 
its operating lifetime shall be carried out;
(b) before the operation of a spent fuel manage-
ment facility, updated and detailed versions of 
the safety assessment and of the environmental 
assessment shall be prepared when deemed 
necessary to complement the assessments re-
ferred to in paragraph (a).
Regulatory approach
The licence applications for a new licence or for the 
renewal of an existing licence include the documents 
required by the Nuclear Energy Decree: Preliminary 
or Final Safety Analysis Reports; Probabilistic Risk 
Analysis Reports; Quality Assurance Programmes 
for Construction and Operation; Safety Classification 
Document, Operational Limits and Conditions 
Document (Technical Specifications); Programmes 
for Periodic Inspections; Plans for Physical 
Protection and Emergency Preparedness; Manuals 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; 
Administrative Rules for the Facilities; Programmes 
for the radiological baseline survey or the results 
of the radiological baseline survey; Programmes for 
Radiation Monitoring in the Environment of the 
Facilities; Decommissioning plans.
The design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and 
in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The 
reports are submitted to STUK for approval in 
connection with, respectively, the applications for 
Construction and Operating Licences. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Decree, the FSAR has to be 
continuously updated.
The requirements of performing the initial safe-
ty assessment and environmental impact assess-
ment for nuclear facilities are discussed in the con-
text of Article 6. A description of the safety princi-
ples that will be observed needs to be included in 
the Decision-in-Principle application.
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Government Decree (717/2013) requires that 
the nuclear power plant safety and the technical 
solutions of its safety systems including systems 
for spent fuel interim storage shall be assessed and 
substantiated analytically and, if necessary, experi-
mentally. These include analyses of operational oc-
currences and accidents, strength analyses, failure 
mode and effect analyses, and probabilistic risk 
assessments. Analyses shall be maintained and 
revised if necessary, taking into account operating 
experience, the results of experimental research, 
plant modifications and the advancement of com-
putational methods.
The safety assessments are reviewed by STUK 
with support of independent safety analyses and/or 
by external experts. The licences and related safety 
documents of the on-site spent fuel storages are 
attached to those of the respective NPPs and also 
the renewal review processes take place simultane-
ously.
Implementation
As discussed under Article 7, an assessment of 
the design of the facility and related technologies 
is made by STUK for the first time when assess-
ing the application for a Decision-in Principle. 
Later on, the evaluation is continued when the 
Construction Licence application is reviewed. 
Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems, struc-
tures and components is carried out through their 
design approval process. The design of the Loviisa 
plant units was reassessed by STUK in connection 
with the re-licensing of the operation of the plant 
in 2006–2007. The design of the Olkiluoto plant 
units was reassessed by STUK in 2008–2009 in 
connection with the Periodic Safety Review.
The preliminary safety analysis report and the 
other safety related documents for the extension 
of the Olkiluoto spent fuel interim storage facility 
were reviewed in 2010. The extension is designed 
and the design of the existing part of storage is up-
dated to withstand a large aeroplane crash.
Article 9 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the licence to operate a spent fuel management 
facility is based upon appropriate assessments 
as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on 
the completion of a commissioning programme 
demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, 
is consistent with design and safety require-
ments;
(b) operational limits and conditions derived from 
tests, operational experience and the assess-
ments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and 
revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection 
and testing of a spent fuel management facility 
are conducted in accordance with established 
procedures;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safe-
ty-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a spent fuel management 
facility;
(e) incidents significant to safety are reported in 
a timely manner by the holder of the licence to 
the regulatory body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant 
operating experience are established and that 
the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel man-
agement facility are prepared and updated, as 
necessary, using information obtained during 
the operating lifetime of that facility, and are 
reviewed by the regulatory body.
Initial authorisation
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree 
(Section 36), a number of documents, including the 
Final Safety Analysis Report is required to be sub-
mitted to STUK when applying for an operating 
licence. More detailed requirements are given in 
Guides YVL A.1 and B.1. The requirements for 
safety assessment are discussed in detail under 
Article 8.
Requirements for the commissioning pro-
gramme for the NPPs and the associated spent fuel 
storages are set forth in Guide YVL A.5. According 
to the Guide, the purpose of the commissioning 
programme is to give evidence that the plant has 
been constructed and will function according to 
the design requirements. Through the programme 
possible deficiencies in design and construction can 
also be observed. The commissioning programme 
is described in the preliminary and final safety 
analysis reports, which are submitted to STUK for 
review and approval.
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Operational limits and conditions
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree 
(Section 36), the applicant for an operating licence 
has to provide STUK with the operational limits 
and conditions. They shall set out the technical 
and administrative requirements for ensuring the 
plant’s operation in compliance with the design 
bases and safety analyses. The operational limits 
and conditions include the requirements for en-
suring the operability of systems, structures and 
components important to safety; and also the limi-
tations that must be observed in the event of com-
ponent failure.
Government Decree (717/2013) requires the 
nuclear power plant to have a condition monitor-
ing and maintenance programme for ensuring 
the integrity and reliable operation of systems, 
structures and components. This programme shall 
define inspections, testing, maintenance, replace-
ments and other procedures for controlling oper-
ability and the impacts on the operating environ-
ment.
The operational limits and conditions are sub-
ject to the approval of STUK prior to the com-
missioning of a facility. Strict observance of the 
operational limits and conditions is verified by 
STUK through a regular inspection programme. 
Operational limits and conditions are updated 
based on operational experiences, tests, analyses 
and plant modifications.
Established procedures
According to Guide YVL A.3 on management sys-
tems for nuclear facilities, the document manage-
ment shall cover all procedures required in the 
operation of the facility. The document manage-
ment procedures shall be described as a part of 
the licensee’s management system. They include, 
among other things, the specification, preparation, 
drawing up, review, approval, implementation, 
revision, dissemination, archiving and disposal 
of documents. The responsibilities and adminis-
trative procedures indicating how to take care of 
these actions shall be described in the licensee’s 
management system. The procedures for the op-
eration shall be approved by the licensee itself, 
and procedures important for safety are required 
to be submitted to STUK for review. The detailed 
requirements are presented in the appropriate 
YVL Guides. STUK verifies by means of resident 
inspectors, inspections and reviews that approved 
procedures are in use and followed in the operation 
of the facility.
Engineering and technical support
The staffing, training and qualifications of the per-
sonnel	are	discussed	in	general	in	Chapter	“Human	
resources”	 of	 Section	F.	The	 licensee	 of	 a	 nuclear	
facility has the primary responsibility for ensur-
ing that the employees of the facility are qualified 
and authorised to their jobs and that the continu-
ity of the expertise is secured for the operational 
lifetime of the facility. Guide YVL A.4 specifies the 
expertise requirements for the positions important 
to safety.
Nuclear Competence Center/Technical Support 
of Fortum Power and Heat Oy is working as a 
technical	support	organization	for	the	Loviisa	NPP	
personnel also in waste management and nuclear 
fuel	 questions.	 TVO	 utilizes	 sections	 of	 Nuclear	
Engineering and Power Plant Engineering as its 
technical support. Fennovoima Oy has presented 
preliminary plans during the Decision-in-Principle 
process to form competence to cover all engineering 
tasks during the life-cycle of the plant including 
nuclear waste management.
Competence of the engineering and technical 
support is supervised by the licensee. In addition, 
STUK carries out inspections and audits by which 
also the competence of the support staff is evalu-
ated.
Operating experiences, incident 
reports and evaluation
Government Decree 717/2013 requires that opera-
tional experience feedback shall be collected and 
safety research results monitored, and both as-
sessed for the purpose of enhancing safety. Safety-
significant operational events shall be investigated 
for the purpose of identifying the root causes as 
well as defining and implementing the corrective 
measures. Improvements in technical safety, re-
sulting from safety research, shall be taken into 
account to the extent justified on the basis of the 
safety principles stated in the Nuclear Energy Act 
Section 7 a.
According to Guide YVL D.3, a spent fuel condi-
tion surveillance program, subject to STUK’s ap-
proval, shall be drawn up in order to monitor the 
effects of long-term storage on spent fuel.
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Guides YVL A.9 (under translation) and A.10 
provide in detail the reporting requirements on 
incidents, operational disturbances, and events 
which have to be reported to STUK. They also de-
fine requirements for the contents of the reports 
and the administrative procedures for reporting, 
including time limits for submitting various re-
ports.
STUK publishes the operational events in its 
quarterly reports on nuclear safety that are also 
available to the general public in Finnish. STUK’s 
Annual	 Report	 on	 nuclear	 safety	 summarizes	
events from the whole year and is available to the 
general public in Finnish and in English.
Operational events in spent fuel interim stor-
ages have been rare in recent years. Some minor 
events are being reported by the licensee to the 
regulatory body. These events have been for exam-
ple events that took place in the construction site 
of the enlargement of spent fuel interim storage. 
Other types of events have been those related to 
complying with the administrative instructions.
Decommissioning plans
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 28) describes the 
requirements for the preparation and updating of 
the decommissioning plans. Decommissioning is-
sues	 are	 discussed	 in	Chapter	“Decommission”	 of	
Section F.
Article 10 Disposal of spent fuel
If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory 
framework, a Contracting Party has designated 
spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent 
fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of 
Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive 
waste.
According to the Finnish waste management pol-
icy, spent fuel is regarded as waste and shall be 
permanently disposed of in Finland. Therefore, 
encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel are dis-
cussed in Section H, in the context of the safety of 
radioactive waste management.
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Article 11 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive 
waste management individuals, society and the 
environment are adequately protected against ra-
diological and other hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual 
heat generated during radioactive waste man-
agement are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste 
is kept to the minimum practicable;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the 
different steps in radioactive waste manage-
ment
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, 
society and the environment, by applying at 
the national level suitable protective methods 
as approved by the regulatory body, in the 
framework of its national legislation which 
has due regard to internationally endorsed 
criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and 
other hazards that may be associated with ra-
dioactive waste management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reason-
ably predictable impacts on future generations 
greater than those permitted for the current 
generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on fu-
ture generations.
Scope and general regulations
In this Section, the management of LILW from nu-
clear facilities, including disposal, management of 
other radioactive waste and the plans for spent fuel 
encapsulation and disposal are discussed. The rel-
evant general regulations are, besides the Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, the Government Decree 
(717/2013) on the general regulations for the safe 
handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and oth-
er nuclear waste in a nuclear facility attached to a 
nuclear power plant, and the Government Decree 
(736/2008) on the safety of the disposal of nuclear 
waste including the disposal of low and intermedi-
ate level operational and decommissioning waste 
and of spent nuclear fuel. More detailed techni-
cal requirements on management, including dis-
posal, of LILW and spent fuel are given in the YVL 
Guides. Radioactive waste subject to the Radiation 
Act is regulated by Guide ST 6.2.
Criticality and removal of residual heat
Government Decree (736/2008) requires that in the 
handling of spent nuclear fuel, the occurrence of a 
self-sustaining chain reaction of fissions shall be 
prevented to a high degree of certainty and that 
the disposal package containing spent nuclear fuel 
shall be designed so that no self-sustaining chain 
reaction of fissions can occur, even in the disposal 
conditions.
Guide YVL D.3 further specifies that transport 
casks, storage rooms and handling equipment as 
well as the waste canisters shall be designed so 
that no critical fuel concentrations may be formed 
in any operational situations, including anticipated 
operational occurrences and postulated accidents. 
In addition, Guide YVL D.5 requires that the can-
isters emplaced in the geological repository shall 
retain their subcriticality in the long term, when 
the internal structures of the canisters may have 
corroded and the canisters may be partly filled 
with groundwater.
The criticality safety of the copper/iron canis-
ters has been studied by Posiva since 1995 and the 
latest results are presented in the Construction 
Licence Application. Several combinations of en-
richment, burnup and cooling time have been stud-
ied in order to determine the reactivity maxima 
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between 5 years and 1 million years. The method-
ology used takes into account the reduction of the 
reactivity as a function of burnup (burnup credit).
The residual heat generation of spent fuel is 
also required to be taken into account in the de-
sign of the encapsulation and disposal facilities. 
Guide YVL D.5 prescribes that spent fuel disposal 
shall be implemented with due regard to long-term 
safety, and in doing so, one aspect to be considered 
is the reduction of the activity and decay heat prior 
to disposal. The requirements for the heat removal 
during the encapsulation are presented in Guide 
YVL D.3.
As for Posiva’s disposal canister, the canister-
bentonite clay interface temperature is required 
to be at maximum 100 °C. This temperature, with 
a safety margin of 10 °C, is used in the repository 
dimensioning calculations. The maximum temper-
ature of the disposal canister surface is reached 
within 10 to 15 years after the disposal.
Thermal dimensioning including the detailed 
heat transfer phenomena in the near field and op-
timisation of the repository has been studied. The 
canisters are planned to be emplaced in disposal 
holes in tunnels with a minimum separation be-
tween 7.5 and 10.5 metres depending on the fuel 
type inside the disposal canisters. The distance 
between parallel disposal tunnels is 25 m in the 
planned reference case.
Waste minimization
Waste	minimization	 is	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 nu-
clear power companies, as less waste to be disposed 
of implies smaller disposal costs. Guide YVL D.4 
underlines that generation of waste shall be de-
creased i.a. by proper planning of repair and main-
tenance and by means of decontamination, clear-
ance and volume reduction practices. The Guide 
also refers to sound working methods for waste 
minimization,	 e.g.	 by	 volume	 reduction	 of	 waste,	
by avoiding transfer of unnecessary objects and 
materials in the controlled areas and by adoption 
of working processes that either create only small 
amounts of waste or the created waste is easily 
manageable.
The release of very low level waste from regula-
tory control (clearance) is regulated by virtue of 
Guide YVL D.4. Both conditional and uncondition-
al clearances are effectively used for waste mini-
mization	 by	 the	 NPPs.	 Clearance	 criteria,	 levels	
and	procedures	are	discussed	in	chapter	“Criteria	
used	to	define	and	categorize	radioactive	waste”	of	
Section B.
The accumulation of LILW in the Loviisa and 
the Olkiluoto NPPs is depicted in Figure 15. The 
average annual accumulation of LILW to be dis-
posed of has been fairly low: about 85 m³ per plant 
(each having two operational reactor units). The 
accumulation of waste has in some years even 
turned	 to	 decline	 by	 effective	 waste	 minimiza-
tion and volume reduction measures, such as ra-
diochemical treatment of liquid waste, campaigns 
for removal of very low level waste from con-
trol, and compaction of maintenance waste. Some 
large metal components of NPP origin have been 
transported for treatment to Studsvik facility in 
Sweden. Activation products or external contami-
nation containing parts or components that have 
been separated from the metal are transported 
back to Finland for disposal.
In the 1990’s FPH developed, together with the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry of the University 
of Helsinki, sophisticated selective ion exchange 
methods for purification of liquid waste (especially 
the removal of Cs, Sr and Co). The benefits of these 
methods, now in use at the Loviisa NPP, can be 
seen in Figure 15 and also in the decrease of the 
doses to the most exposed persons in the vicinity of 
the Finnish NPPs shown in Figure 14.
TVO has made a modification in both plant 
units in the condensate polishing system in order 
to decrease the temperature and thus increase the 
lifetime of precoat resins. Consequently, the gen-
eration of spent ion exchange resins has decreased 
considerably. Low and intermediate level waste 
subject to long-term storage at the Olkiluoto plant 
mostly includes components removed from inside 
the reactor pressure vessels. These components are 
stored in the fuel pools.
Disposal containers can be filled more effec-
tively, when crushed metal is placed in the unused 
spaces of containers. Surface contaminated metal 
scrap is decontaminated in a new facility by blast-
ing with glass marbles. Decontaminated metals 
are released from regulatory control, if activity 
levels below those for clearance are reached. The 
average accumulation of low and medium level 
waste at the Olkiluoto NPP has been about 85 m³ 
per reactor year. 
At the new Olkiluoto 3 NPP unit an in-drum 
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drying facility is planned to be used for condition-
ing of liquid wastes. The facility is expected to 
provide an effective volume reduction. This new 
waste type is planned to be interim stored at the 
site before disposal into Olkiluoto LILW-repository. 
The repository extension for the needs of Olkuluoto 
3 reactor unit is expected in the 2030’s.
The laboratories using radioactive sources in 
medical and research applications usually store 
their short-lived radioactive waste at their prem-
ises until it has decayed below the limits set for 
discharges in Guide ST 6.2. Only small amounts of 
waste need to be conditioned for disposal.
Interdependencies
Guide YVL D.4 on treatment and storage of LILW 
from NPPs requires that waste is treated, e.g. seg-
regated, categorised and conditioned, in an appro-
priate way with regard to its further management. 
The Guide also provides for the consideration of 
the requirements of waste packages related to their 
disposal. These requirements may concern e.g. the 
structure of the waste packages, their physical and 
chemical composition, their resistance to external 
and internal loads and the amount and structural 
and chemical stability of radioactive substances in 
the waste packages.
Both operating nuclear power plants have their 
own LILW disposal facilities, thus the premises for 
considering interdependencies in the waste man-
agement chain are excellent. Interdependencies of 
the various steps in waste management are taken 
into account in the NPPs’ Operational Manuals. 
At the Loviisa NPP all the waste treatment, con-
ditioning, handling, storing, transport and disposal 
operations are carried out at the NPP site by the 
operators of the Loviisa NPP. Only the spent nu-
clear fuel will be transported for disposal from 
the Loviisa NPP site to the disposal facility at 
Olkiluoto. In case of the Olkiluoto NPP, all the 
steps of waste management take place at the site. 
The Decision in Principle concerning Fennovoima 
Oy includes also a LILW disposal facility on the 
NPP site. Fennovoima Oy has performed prelimi-
nary	site	characterizations	for	proposed	sites	and	
STUK has reviewed these results.
Interdependencies in the context of spent fuel 
management are discussed in Section G.
Protection of individuals, society 
and the environment
The operational radiation protection of radioactive 
waste management facilities is discussed under 
Article 24.
The Government Decree (736/2008) requires 
that a disposal facility for nuclear waste shall 
be designed so that as a consequence of normal 
operation of the facility, discharges of radioactive 
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Figure 15. Accumulation of LILW in Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs.
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substances to the environment would remain insig-
nificantly low, so that the annual effective dose to 
the most exposed members of the public as a con-
sequence of anticipated operational occurrences re-
mains below 0.1 mSv. As a consequence of a postu-
lated accident, the annual dose to the most exposed 
members of the public, other than workers of the 
facility, remains below the value of 1 mSv when the 
postulated accident can be assumed to occur with 
a frequency exceeding or equal to 10-3 per year. 
The annual dose to the most exposed members of 
the public has to remain below the value of 5 mSv 
when the postulated accident can be assumed to 
occur with a frequency of less than 10-3 per year.
Regarding the long-term radiation protec-
tion requirements for nuclear waste disposal, 
Government Decree (736/2008) requires that in 
the period of the first several thousands of years 
the annual effective dose to the most exposed 
members of the public shall remain below 0.1 mSv 
and the average annual effective doses to other 
members of the public shall remain insignificantly 
low. Beyond that period the average quantities 
of radioactive substances over long time periods, 
released from the disposed waste and migrating 
further to the environment, shall remain below 
the nuclide specific constraints defined by STUK. 
These constraints are given in Guide YVL D.5 as 
limits for annual activity releases to the environ-
ment. They are defined so that, at their maximum, 
the radiation impacts arising from disposal are 
comparable to those arising from natural radioac-
tive substances and, on a large scale, the radiation 
impacts remain insignificantly low.
In addition, Guide YVL D.5 gives due regard to 
the protection of the living nature requiring that 
the disposal of nuclear waste shall not detrimen-
tally affect any species of fauna or flora. This shall 
be demonstrated in the safety assessment by as-
sessing typical radiation exposures of terrestrial 
and aquatic populations in the disposal site envi-
ronment, assuming the present kind of living popu-
lations. These exposures shall remain clearly below 
the levels which, on the basis of the best available 
scientific knowledge, would cause decline in biodi-
versity or other significant detriment to any living 
population of fauna or flora.
Biological, chemical and other hazards
Other	hazards	 than	 those	posed	by	 radiation	are	
considered in the EIA reports in the same way 
as in the connection with other industrial activi-
ties but are not especially dealt with in the safety 
analysis of LILW repositories.
Disposed LILW consists of the NPP’s trash 
waste, scrap metal, filter elements and liquids and 
sludge. These materials and their immobilisation 
matrices are not harmful to the environment as 
such, but may contain harmful residues like heavy 
metals.
Some studies on radioactive nickel releases 
from the repository have been carried out in 
Finland. The results show that the potential an-
nual release is small. In the same way it can be 
argued that also the release rate of chromium and 
poorly soluble lead and cadmium will be small. 
The chemical effects of the Swedish LILW disposal 
facility (SFR) in Forsmark have been studied more 
thoroughly. SFR and the Finnish LILW facilities 
are similar regarding the structure and the type 
and content of disposed waste. Swedish studies in-
dicate that the increase of heavy metal concentra-
tion in seawater would be negligible, mostly owing 
to the release barriers in the repository.
In case the waste is isolated properly, the dis-
charges to the environment are small, when com-
pared with other forms of industry or other sources 
of	hazardous	wastes.	At	least	as	long	as	the	engi-
neered barriers are isolating the radioactive waste 
also the other harmful substances are effectively 
isolated from the environment. Furthermore, the 
LILW repositories are located in areas which do 
not presently contain exploitable groundwater re-
serves for communities.
Biological,	chemical	and	other	hazards	may	be	
related to some wastes arising from medical and 
research applications. The requirements of the rel-
evant non-radiation related regulations, including 
those related to general occupational health, are 
applied as appropriate.
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Protection of future generations 
and avoidance of undue burdens 
on future generations
The	 limitation	 of	 the	 potential	 hazard	 to	 future	
generations posed by the disposal of LILW or spent 
fuel is discussed under Sections G and H. Section 
7 h of the Nuclear Energy Act states that nuclear 
waste shall be managed so that no radiation expo-
sure will occur after disposal that would exceed the 
levels considered acceptable during the implemen-
tation of disposal.
The Finnish nuclear waste management policy 
is based on the ethical principle to avoid transfer-
ring undue burdens to future generations. Disposal 
facilities for LILW are operational at both NPP 
sites and are planned to host also decommissioning 
waste. In 2012 TVO was granted a renewed oper-
ating licence for the LILW repository. The licence 
includes also the disposal of radioactive wastes 
from small users of radiation in Finland. Active 
institutional controls are not needed to ensure the 
safety of these disposal facilities in the post-closure 
period. Preparations for spent fuel disposal have 
progressed in accordance with the objectives set 
by the Government Decision in 1983. The costs of 
the disposal of LILW and spent fuel, as well as of 
the decommissioning of the NPPs and the FiR 1 
research reactor, are covered by assets collected in 
the Nuclear Waste Management Fund. The obliga-
tion for financial provision starts when MEE or 
STUK grants a licence for operations that produce 
nuclear waste. For new NPPs the obligation to set 
assets in the Fund starts when the NPP has an 
operating licence and fuel is loaded in the reactor.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 h) requires 
that the disposal of nuclear waste in a permanent 
manner shall be planned with due regard to safety 
and that ensuring long-term safety does not depend 
on the surveillance of the disposal site. Section 10 
of Government Decree (736/2008) adds that the 
planning of the disposal of nuclear waste shall take 
account of the decrease of the activity by interim 
storage, and the utilisation of high quality technol-
ogy and scientific knowledge. Furthermore, Section 
9 of the Decree requires that the long-term perfor-
mance of barriers shall be confirmed by establishing 
an investigation and monitoring programme, to be 
implemented during the operational period of the 
disposal facility. However, the implementation of the 
disposal shall not be unnecessarily postponed.
Article 12 Existing facilities and 
past practices
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the 
appropriate steps to review:
(a) the safety of any radioactive waste manage-
ment facility existing at the time the Conven-
tion enters into force for that Contracting Party 
and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably 
practicable improvements are made to up-
grade the safety of such a facility;
(b) the results of past practices in order to de-
termine whether any intervention is needed 
for reasons of radiation protection bearing in 
mind that the reduction in detriment resulting 
from the reduction in dose should be sufficient 
to justify the harm and the costs, including the 
social costs, of the intervention..
Existing facilities
The predisposal management facilities for low and 
intermediate level radioactive waste in the Loviisa 
and the Olkiluoto NPPs and the FiR 1 research 
reactor are covered by the respective operating 
licences of the reactors. The LILW disposal facili-
ties have separate licences. The requirements for 
safety review are described in Section G and the 
conclusions drawn are valid for LILW management 
as well.
Thorough assessments of the safety of the facili-
ties were carried out by the licensees and reviewed 
by STUK in connection with the construction and 
operating licence applications. A periodic safety 
review of the LILW disposal facilities is made at 
15 year intervals. The Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility was taken into operation in 1992 and con-
sequently its safety assessment was submitted for 
review in 2007. In the same context the suitability 
of the waste packages from the new Olkiluoto 3 
NPP unit for disposal in the facility was evaluated. 
The operating licence admitted in 1992 covered 
the disposal of operational waste from Olkiluoto 
1 and 2. TVO submitted an application to the 
Government in September 2011 for an amendment 
of the operating licence of the VLJ repository to al-
low the disposal of the low and intermediate level 
nuclear waste from the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, and 
also of some radioactive wastes originating from 
the use of radiation in non-nuclear industry. The 
Government made a decision on the modification 
of the operating licence conditions of the Olkiluoto 
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VLJ repository in November 2012. The small user 
wastes are currently stored in underground fa-
cilities either in the connection of the VLJ reposi-
tory in Olkiluoto or in Roihupelto in Helsinki (see 
Table 2 in Section D).
The first stage of the Loviisa LILW disposal 
facility, the LLW disposal tunnel, was taken into 
operation in 1998. The construction of the second 
stage of the facility, the ILW disposal cavern, was 
completed in 2007 and the FSAR of the facility 
was accordingly updated and reviewed by STUK. 
Correspondingly, the safety related documentation 
for the construction of the third stage of the dispos-
al facility, the connecting tunnel and the third LLW 
disposal cavern, was reviewed by STUK in 2010. 
The third cavern will be used in the first place as 
LLW storage and will be licensed for disposal op-
erations in the future. FPH submitted its periodic 
safety review of the LILW facility to STUK in 2013.
In conclusion, the safety reviews regarding the 
predisposal management of LILW at NPPs and the 
research reactor required by Article 12 are carried 
out at the time of licensing, the safety analysis 
reports being continuously updated. In addition, 
periodical safety reviews are made. Safety im-
provements have been continuously implemented 
at the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants, including 
the facilities for waste management, since the com-
missioning of the NPPs.
Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy is a mine which pro-
duces	nickel	and	zinc.	During	the	production	pro-
cesses uranium follows the other metals. Since 
uranium has not yet been recovered, it ends up to 
the gypsum waste water pond. Now, the amount 
of uranium in the gypsum pond is estimated to be 
300–600 tonnes.
On November 4, 2012, water from a gypsum 
waste water pond began to leak at the Talvivaara 
mine after the bottom of pond gave way. The leak-
ing waste water was acidic and contained high 
concentrations of heavy metals. Normally, the ura-
nium concentration in the gypsum pond water is 
low, i.e., less than 50 microgram per liter. But due 
to a rainy autumn, extra water containing addi-
tional highly acidic substances had been conducted 
from the mining area to the gypsum ponds. For 
this reason, the pH of the water fell so low that 
the uranium started to dissolve from the gypsum 
into the water. The highest measured uranium 
concentration in the leakage water was about 6000 
micrograms per liter. Most of the leaking waste 
water was prevented from leaking outside the 
mining area but some of it had to be led to down-
stream waters. According to current estimates, 
about 0.1–0.6 ton of uranium was released into the 
environment. In the mining area, there are about 
30–40 tonnes uranium in different kinds of waters. 
Uranium has been removed from contaminated 
Figure 16. Uranium containing precipitation stored in geotubes in Talvivaara mine.
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water	 by	 lime	 precipitation	 (neutralization).	This	
precipitation containing uranium is temporarily 
stored in different basins in the mining area and in 
large geotubes (Figure 16).
Past practices
In 1958–1961, a company established by the 
Finnish industry carried out uranium mining 
and milling activities in a pilot scale facility in 
Paukkajavaara in the municipality of Eno in the 
Eastern part of Finland. About 31 000 tonnes of 
uranium ore was excavated from small open mines 
and an underground mine. After the termination 
of the activities the mines were left open and the 
mine and mill tailings were left at the site.
The restoration of the site was carried out in 
1992–1994 by the current owner of the area. The 
mine and mill tailings were covered with layers of 
clay and gravel and a soil layer on the top. Finally, 
trees were planted on top of the disposal site. 
Furthermore, the bottom sediment of a nearby lake 
was covered by an additional layer of soil and other 
material. STUK inspected the work and carried out 
environmental surveillance in the area. Five years 
after the completion of the restoration, STUK, 
having carried out further environmental studies, 
concluded that no radiation risk is posed to the 
human health by the disposed mining and milling 
waste and confirmed the waste to be permanently 
disposed of in accordance to the requirements of 
the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 32–34). However, 
as	an	extra	precaution	restrictions	for	utilization	of	
the site were imposed: any permanent occupancy, 
construction work or earthmoving is not allowed 
in the area.
Very small scale uranium mining and milling 
activities were carried out in 1956–1959 in Askola, 
Southern Finland; only about 1000 tonnes of ore 
was treated. The owner of the site did some resto-
ration work in the area in late 1980’s and reported 
to STUK in 1991. STUK’s inspection and later in-
vestigations made by STUK in 2007 concluded that 
the restoration was not yet satisfactory and the 
case is still open. Even so, the area does not pose 
any	immediate	hazard	to	the	nearby	population	or	
the environment.
Some wastes from non-uranium mining and ore 
processing contain elevated levels of uranium and 
thorium. In 1961–1972 lead was mined and pro-
cessed in Korsnäs, on the West Coast of Finland. 
The amount of waste is 760000 tons. The average 
uranium and thorium concentrations of the waste 
are both estimated at 60 ppm. Currently there is 
no foreseen use for the area and the area is sur-
rounded with a fence. Possible remedial action is 
considered when the current owner (Municipality 
of Korsnäs) decides on the possible future use 
of the area. Also about 36000 tons of milled ore 
remained at the mining area. It contains 120–
360 ppm of uranium and 250–370 ppm of thorium. 
In 1997, the heaps of ore were remedied by cover-
ing them with a one-meter thick layer of soil.
At	 the	 Vihanti	 Zinc	 mine,	 where	 mining	 ac-
tivities ended in 1992, the wastes contain uranium 
400 Bq/kg (30 ppm) on an average. The area has 
been covered with a thin layer of soil which, togeth-
er with the increasing vegetation, prevents dusting 
and reduces slightly external gamma radiation.
Several radioactive sources containing Am-241 
were accidentally melted in Outokumpu Stainless 
Oy’s steel foundry in Tornio, Finland during 2006–
2010. Radioactive waste due to this melt was dis-
posed in the vicinity of the foundry and covered in 
accordance with the approved plan in autumn 2010.
Article 13 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed radioactive waste man-
agement facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of such a facility dur-
ing its operating lifetime as well as that of a 
disposal facility after closure;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a 
facility on individuals, society and the environ-
ment, taking into account possible evolution of 
the site conditions of disposal facilities after 
closure;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a 
facility available to members of the public;
(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity 
of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to 
be affected by that facility, and provide them, 
upon their request, with general data relating 
to the facility to enable them to evaluate the 
likely safety impact of the facility upon their 
territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
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Table 4. Siting of the spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto.
Site characterisation phase 
1983–1999 Site investigations and regulatory reviews
•	 Countrywide	site	screening	1983–85
•	 Preliminary	site	investigations	at	five	areas	1987–1992
•	 Detailed	site	investigations	at	four	areas	1993–1999
•	 Regulatory	reviews	in	1986	and	1993
Environmental impact assessment procedure
1997
 
 
 
 
 
1998
EIA Programme
•	 20	scoping	workshops	organised	by	Posiva	in	four	municipalities
•	 EIA	programme	report,	February	1998
•	 Public	hearings	in	four	municipalities
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MTI*
•	 Judgement	by	MTI,	November	1998
1999 EIA Report
•	 Report,	May	1999
•	 Public	hearings	in	four	municipalities
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MTI
•	 Judgement	by	MTI,	November	1999
2008 EIA Programme on expanding the capacity of spent nuclear fuel repository
•	 EIA	Programme,	May	2008
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Judgement	by	MEE,	August	2008
EIA Report
•	 Report,	October	2008
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Judgement	by	MEE,	March	2009
* During the EIA procedure and the DiP processes for disposal of the spent fuel from the operating reactors and separately for the spent fuel 
from OL3, during 1997 to 2001 the statements were issued by the predecessor of MEE, i.e. the Ministry of Trade and Industry, MTI.
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting 
Parties by being sited in accordance with the gen-
eral safety requirements of Article 11.
In Finland, the siting decisions for the LILW re-
positories at the NPP sites were made in 1983. 
The Decision-in-Principle for Fennovoima Oy’s 
NPP in 2010 includes also an LILW repository 
at the NPP site. In the context of the Decision-
in-Principle process in 1999–2001 for TVO’s and 
FPH’s spent fuel disposal, Olkiluoto was selected 
as the site for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility. 
Posiva submitted at the end of 2012 a construction 
licence application for a spent fuel encapsulation 
and disposal facility. The licence application docu-
mentation addresses also the site related analysis 
concerning for example the design of facilities and 
the suitability of the disposal facility host rock. 
Concerning siting, design, construction and assess-
ment of safety, details of the regulatory approach 
to the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal project are de-
scribed in Annex L.1.
The DiP for Fennovoima Oy required that it 
should have an co-operation agreement with share-
holders of Posiva Oy for spent fuel disposal in the 
Olkiluoto disposal facility or alternatively an EIA 
programme for a separate repository within six 
years from the date of the DiP ratification (2010) 
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Decision-in-Principle process 
1999
2000
2001
Application for DiP
•	 DiP	application	submitted	to	the	Government,	May	1999
•	 EIA	report	annexed	to	the	application
Handling of application
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MTI
•	 Preliminary	safety	appraisal	by	STUK,	January	2000
•	 Consent	statement	by	Eurajoki	municipality,	January	2000
•	 DiP	by	the	Government,	December	2000
•	 Ratification	of	the	DiP	by	the	Parliament,	May	2001
2002 Ratification of the DiP to expand the capacity of the repository to include the spent fuel from the 5th reactor 
unit (Olkiluoto 3 reactor unit)
2004 Start of construction of the underground rock characterisation facility, ONKALO, with the aim of final 
confirmation licence of the site suitability
2008 Application for DiP on spent fuel from the Olkiluoto 4 unit
•	 DiP	application	submitted	to	the	Government,	April	2008
•	 EIA	report	1999	annexed	to	the	application
2009 Handling of application of Olkiluoto 4
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality,	October	2008
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Preliminary	safety	appraisal	by	STUK,	May	2009
•	 Consent	statement	by	Eurajoki	municipality,	December	2008
•	 DiP	by	the	Government,	May	2010
•	 Ratification	of	the	DiP	by	the	Parliament,	July	2010
Application for DiP on spent fuel from the Loviisa 3 unit
•	 DiP	application	submitted	to	the	Government,	March	2009
•	 EIA	report	2008	annexed	to	the	application
Handling of application of Loviisa 3
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality,	June	2009
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Preliminary	safety	appraisal	by	STUK,	October	2009
•	 Consent	statement	by	Eurajoki	municipality,	August	2009
•	 Unfavourable	DiP	by	the	Government,	May	2010
2010 Ratification of the DiP to expand the capacity of the repository to include the spent fuel from the 6th reactor 
unit (Olkiluoto 4 reactor unit)
2012 Submission of application for the construction licence of the spent fuel encapsulation and disposal facility 
28th December 2012
Table 4. (continues)
by the Parliament. The first possible step for sit-
ing a separate disposal facility for the spent fuel of 
Fennovoima Oy will be the EIA programme.
The description of siting procedures, provided 
under Article 6 (Section G.) for the NPPs (includ-
ing the spent fuel storages), is also applicable for 
facilities intended for the predisposal management 
of LILW at the NPPs and for the disposal of LILW 
or spent fuel, and is not repeated here.
Concerning the siting of a disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel, Government Decree (736/2008) 
states that the geological characteristics of the 
disposal site, as a whole, shall be favourable for 
the isolation of the disposed radioactive substances 
from the environment. An area having a feature 
that is substantially adverse to long-term safety 
shall not be selected as the disposal site. Guide 
YVL D.5 specifies the generic site suitability cri-
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teria. The siting requirements for waste and spent 
fuel management facilities are described in Guides 
YVL A.2, YVL D.3 and YVL D.4. Spent fuel dispos-
al facility site investigations at the Olkiluoto site 
have been going on since the early 1980's. These 
have included many kinds of investigations from 
the air and surface, boreholes at different depths, 
and finally they will include direct investigations 
at the disposal depth at the ONKALO facility to 
confirm the suitability of the site.
The various steps of the siting process concern-
ing the disposal of spent fuel in Olkiluoto are de-
tailed in Table 4.
Article 14 Design and construction 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a radioactive 
waste management facility provide for suit-
able measures to limit possible radiological 
impacts on individuals, society and the envi-
ronment, including those from discharges or 
uncontrolled releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as 
necessary, technical provisions for the decom-
missioning of a radioactive waste management 
facility other than a disposal facility are taken 
into account;
(c) at the design stage, technical provisions for the 
closure of a disposal facility are prepared; the 
technologies incorporated in the design and 
construction of a radioactive waste manage-
ment facility are supported by experience, test-
ing or analysis.
The discussion under Article 7 (Section G) is valid 
for predisposal management facilities for LILW, 
which are covered by the operating licences of the 
NPPs and Government Decree (717/2013).
Safety requirements for the spent fuel encap-
sulation facility, which is planned to be situated in 
connection with the spent fuel disposal facility, are 
described in Government Decree for nuclear waste 
disposal (736/2008). Guides YVL A.5, YVL B.1 and 
YVL D.3 give detailed safety requirements for the 
encapsulation facility design and construction.
The design requirements for LILW and spent 
fuel disposal facilities and the measures to limit 
radiological impacts from these facilities are dis-
cussed in Section G. An illustration for the reposi-
tory of spent fuel at Olkiluoto is shown in Figure 6. 
The design of Loviisa and Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facilities are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8, respec-
tively.
According to Government Decree (736/2008), 
the design, excavation, other construction works 
and closure of the underground facility shall be 
implemented in a manner that retains the char-
acteristics of the host rock important to long-term 
safety as far as possible. The depth of the waste 
emplacement rooms shall be selected appropriately 
with regard to the waste to be disposed of and the 
local geological features. The objective shall be that 
the impacts of above-ground events, actions and 
environmental changes on long-term safety will 
remain minor and inadvertent human intrusion 
to the repository will be difficult. More detailed 
requirements on the design principles are given in 
Guide YVL D.5.
Conceptual plans for the closure of the disposal 
facilities have been included in their initial designs 
(e.g. the PSAR designs of the LILW repositories 
and the construction licence application documen-
tation of the spent fuel repository in Olkiluoto). 
These closure plans will be reconsidered in the con-
text of later licensing stages or the periodic safety 
assessments.
Concerning siting, design, construction and as-
sessment of safety, a more detailed description of 
the regulatory approach to the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
disposal project is presented in Annex L.1.
Article 15 Assessment of safety 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a radioactive waste 
management facility, a systematic safety as-
sessment and an environmental assessment 
appropriate to the hazard presented by the fa-
cility and covering its operating lifetime shall 
be carried out;
(b) in addition, before construction of a disposal 
facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment for the period fol-
lowing closure shall be carried out and the re-
sults evaluated against the criteria established 
by the regulatory body;
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(c) before the operation of a radioactive waste 
management facility, updated and detailed 
versions of the safety assessment and of the 
environmental assessment shall be prepared 
when deemed necessary to complement the as-
sessments referred to in paragraph (a).
Regulatory approach
The discussion under Article 8 on the safety as-
sessment of spent fuel storage is valid for the pre-
disposal management of LILW from NPPs because 
both activities are covered by the operating licenc-
es of the reactor units at the present NPPs and by 
the Government Decree (717/2013).
The predisposal management of radioactive 
wastes subject to the Radiation Act involves gener-
ally operations which may not cause any extensive 
hazards:	 handling	 of	 sealed	 sources,	 segregation	
and packaging of small amounts of LLW. Thus no 
comprehensive safety or environmental impact 
assessments are needed but the safety of the re-
quired operations is evaluated in the context of the 
licensing processes.
Regarding the disposal of spent fuel, compli-
ance with long-term radiation protection objectives 
as well as the suitability of the disposal concept 
and site shall, according to Government Decree 
(736/2008), be justified by means of compliance 
with the long-term radiation protection objectives, 
equally the suitability of the disposal concept and 
site shall be justified through a safety case that ad-
dresses both the expected evolutions and unlikely 
disruptive events impairing long-term safety.
According to Guide YVL D.5 a safety analysis, 
or a safety case as in the Government Decree, shall 
include:
•	 a	 description	 of	 the	 disposal	 system	 and	 the	
definition of barriers and safety functions;
•	 a	 specification	 of	 performance	 targets	 for	 the	
safety functions;
•	 a	definition	of	the	scenarios	(scenario	analysis);
•	 a	functional	description	of	the	disposal	system	
and a description of the conditions prevailing 
in the disposal site by means of conceptual and 
mathematical modelling, and the determination 
of necessary model parameters;
•	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 quantities	 of	 radioactive	
substances that are released from the disposed 
waste, penetrate the barriers and enter the bio-
sphere, and an analysis of the resulting radia-
tion doses;
•	 whenever	possible,	an	estimation	of	the	proba-
bilities for activity releases and radiation doses 
arising from unlikely events impairing long-
term safety;
•	 uncertainty	and	 sensitivity	analyses	and	 com-
plementary qualitative considerations; and
•	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 analyses	
against the safety requirements.
The licensee shall carry out a periodic safety re-
view for the disposal of nuclear waste at least once 
in every 15 years, unless otherwise provided in 
the conditions of the operating licence. The peri-
odic safety review shall include assessments of the 
disposal facility’s safety status and the long-term 
safety of the disposal as well as potential develop-
ment targets in order to maintain and enhance 
safety. The safety analysis report and the safety 
case shall be updated to reflect the results of the 
safety review. The periodic safety review shall be 
conducted in compliance with the requirements 
of Guide YVL A.1, Regulatory control of the use of 
nuclear energy, where applicable.
Detailed requirements for the contents of the 
post-closure safety case are provided in Annex A of 
Guide YVL D.5. The post-closure safety case shall 
include a description of the disposal system: quan-
tities of radioactive substances; waste packages; 
buffer materials; backfill materials; structures for 
isolation and closure; excavated rooms; the geologi-
cal, hydrogeological, hydrochemical, thermal and 
rock mechanical characteristics of the host rock; 
and the natural environment at the disposal site. 
The post-closure safety case shall define the safety 
concept, barriers and safety functions with their 
performance targets.
The scenarios shall be systematically composed 
to cover any events and factors that may be of rele-
vance to long-term safety and that may arise from:
•	 external	 factors,	 such	as	 climate	 changes,	geo-
logical processes and events or human actions;
•	 radiological,	mechanical,	thermal,	hydrological,	
chemical, biological and radiation-related fac-
tors internal to the disposal system;
•	 quality	non-conformances	in	the	barriers;	and
•	 the	combined	effects	of	all	 the	aforementioned	
factors.
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The base scenario shall assume that the per-
formance targets defined for each safety function 
are met. The influence of declining performance of 
one or several safety functions shall be analysed 
by means of variant scenarios. Disturbance sce-
narios shall be constructed for the analysis of un-
likely events impairing long-term safety referred 
to in Guide YVL D.5. The argumentation for the 
assumed extent of the declining performance of a 
safety function shall be presented.
In order to analyse the release and migration of 
disposed radioactive substances, conceptual mod-
els shall be drawn up to describe the underlying 
events and processes. In addition to the models 
constructed to describe such release and migration 
processes, conceptual models shall also be con-
structed to describe the safety functions and the 
factors affecting them. The respective mathemati-
cal models are derived from the conceptual models, 
normally by way of simplification. The simplifica-
tion of the models and the determination of the 
required input data shall be based on the principle 
that the performance of a safety function will be 
neither overestimated nor overly underestimated.
The modelling and the determination of in-
put data shall be based on high-quality scientific 
knowledge and expert judgement obtained through 
empirical studies, such as laboratory analyses, 
site investigations and evidence from natural ana-
logues. The models and the input data shall be 
consistent with the scenario, the assessment period 
and the disposal system. Whenever the input data 
used in modelling involve random variations due 
to, for example, the heterogeneity of the bedrock, 
models that accommodate random variation shall 
be employed.
The selection of computational methods, per-
formance targets and input data shall be based on 
the principle that the actual radiation exposure 
and the actual quantities of released radioactive 
substances shall, with a high degree of certainty, be 
lower than those obtained through safety analyses.
The significance of the uncertainties involved 
in the safety case shall be assessed by means of 
appropriate methods. The safety case shall include 
an assessment of the confidence level with regard 
to compliance with the safety requirements and of 
the uncertainties with the greatest impact on the 
confidence level.
In the event that a scenario cannot be com-
prehensively and reasonably assessed by means 
of quantitative safety analyses, its significance 
shall be examined by means of complementary 
considerations, such as calculations by simpli-
fied methods, comparisons with natural analogues, 
or observations of the geological history of the 
disposal site. The significance of such considera-
tions grows as the assessment period increases, 
and safety evaluations extending beyond the time 
horizon	of	one	million	years	can	mainly	be	based	
on complementary considerations. Complementary 
considerations shall also be made parallel to the 
actual safety assessment to enhance the confidence 
in the results of the analysis or certain parts of it.
The safety case shall be carefully documented. 
The basic assumptions that underlie each part of 
the safety case along with the methods employed, 
the results obtained and the relation of the part 
to the case as a whole shall be easy to ascertain 
(clarity), and the rationale for the assumptions, 
input data and the models adopted shall be easy 
to find in the documentation (transparency and 
traceability).
The quality of the safety case shall be ascer-
tained through the management system related to 
the design, construction and operation of the dis-
posal facility. The party implementing the project 
shall have an expedient organisation, adequate 
competence and an appropriate information man-
agement system in place. The various stages of the 
preparation of the safety case shall be systemati-
cally planned, and the reliability of the results of 
crucial studies and analyses shall be ascertained 
by means of independent expert reviews or analy-
ses, for example.
Implementation
Concerning safety after closure, Posiva continued 
the safety assessment work after the Decision-in-
Principle with the goal to be ready to submit the 
construction licence application for the Olkiluoto 
encapsulation and disposal facilities in 2012. A 
framework for the development of the post-closure 
safety case was first reported in 2005 and updated 
in 2008. Posiva has developed the safety case port-
folio to meet the regulatory requirements and to 
show the safety assessment methodology. Posiva 
submitted the construction licence application at 
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the end of 2012. The TURVA-2012 Safety Case 
portfolio consists of the following main reports (ref-
erences to these reports are given in Annex L.2):
•	 The	 Synthesis report describes the overall 
methodology of analysis, bringing together all 
the lines of arguments for safety, and the state-
ment of confidence and the evaluation of com-
pliance with long-term safety constraints
•	 The	Design Basis report explains the perfor-
mance targets and target properties for the 
repository system
•	 The	Description of Disposal System report 
summarizes	 the	 initial	 state	 of	 the	 repository	
system and present state of the surface environ-
ment
•	 The	Features, Events and Processes report 
describes the features, events and processes af-
fecting the disposal system
•	 The	 Performance Assessment analyses the 
performance of the repository system and eval-
uates the fulfilment of performance targets and 
target properties
•	 The	Formulation of Radionuclide Release 
Scenarios report describes the climate evolu-
tion and defines release scenarios
•	 The	 Models and Data for the Repository 
System report presents models and data used 
in the performance assessment and in the anal-
ysis of the radionuclide release scenarios
•	 The	Biosphere Data Basis presents data used 
in the biosphere assessment and summary of 
models
•	 The	 Assessment of Radionuclide Release 
Scenarios and Biosphere Assessment re-
ports describes the analysis of releases and 
calculation of doses and activity fluxes
•	 The	 Complementary Considerations pro-
vides supporting evidence including natural 
and anthropogenic analogues
The safety case will rely heavily on a number of 
supporting reports, especially
•	 The	Site Description
•	 The	Biosphere Description
•	The Biosphere Assessment: Modelling re-
ports
•	 The	 Design and Production Line reports, 
which describe the design and the initial state 
of the repository after emplacement of the can-
isters.
In 2013 STUK carried out an overall assessment 
of the post-closure Safety Case submitted to STUK 
in connection with the filing of the application for 
a construction licence, establishing the sufficiency 
and adequacy of the information provided, and is-
suing a decision on accepting the document for 
a more detailed review process. STUK’s regula-
tory review of the construction licence application 
is on-going and to support the more detailed re-
view STUK also uses outside experts. The regula-
tory review process is described in more detail in 
Annex L.1.
An essential part of Posiva’s spent fuel disposal 
programme is the investigations that are carried 
out in the underground rock characterisation facil-
ity (ONKALO). The excavation of ONKALO has 
reached its final depth of 420 metres. Investigations 
aim at confirming the suitability of the bedrock for 
disposal and acquiring data on site characteristics 
for the design of the disposal facility and for its 
safety evaluation.
STUK has implemented a regulatory inspection 
programme for reviewing the development of the 
construction licence application and the supporting 
long-term safety case and for the ONKALO project. 
These activities are described in more detail in 
Annex L.1.
Article 16 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the licence to operate a radioactive waste man-
agement facility is based upon appropriate as-
sessments as specified in Article 15 and is con-
ditional on the completion of a commissioning 
programme demonstrating that the facility, 
as constructed, is consistent with design and 
safety requirements;
(b) operational limits and conditions, derived 
from tests, operational experience and the as-
sessments as specified in Article 15 are defined 
and revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection 
and testing of a radioactive waste manage-
ment facility are conducted in accordance with 
established procedures. For a disposal facility 
the results thus obtained shall be used to ver-
ify and to review the validity of assumptions 
made and to update the assessments as speci-
fied in Article 15 for the period after closure;
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(d) engineering and technical support in all safe-
ty-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a radioactive waste man-
agement facility;
(e) procedures for characterization and segrega-
tion of radioactive waste are applied; incidents 
significant to safety are reported in a timely 
manner by the holder of the licence to the regu-
latory body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant 
operating experience are established and that 
the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste 
management facility other than a disposal fa-
cility are prepared and updated, as necessary, 
using information obtained during the operat-
ing lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by 
the regulatory body;
(h) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are 
prepared and updated, as necessary, using 
information obtained during the operating 
lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the 
regulatory body.
The discussion on and references to nuclear energy 
legislation, general safety regulations and STUK’s 
guidance discussed under Article 9 are also valid 
for the predisposal management of LILW from the 
NPPs, for the operational period of a LILW dispos-
al facility, spent fuel encapsulation and spent fuel 
disposal. Therefore only some specific features re-
lated to the disposal of LILW or spent fuel, as well 
as those related to radioactive waste from small 
operators, are presented here.
Initial authorization
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 36) requires 
that a number of documents, including the Final 
Safety Analysis Report, shall be submitted to 
STUK when applying for an operating licence. 
More detailed requirements are given in Guide 
YVL A.1, including STUK’s review and inspection 
of the commissioning of a nuclear facility. The re-
quirements for the safety assessment are discussed 
in detail above under Article 15.
In the context of the commissioning of a nuclear 
waste facility, the licensee shall ensure that the 
systems, structures and components as well as the 
entire facility function as planned. The licensee 
shall	ensure	that	an	appropriate	organization,	ad-
equately skilled workforce and applicable instruc-
tions exist for the future operation of the facility.
Operational limits and conditions
The requirements concerning operational limits 
and conditions are discussed in Article 9 and they 
are valid also for LILW facilities, including dis-
posal, management of other radioactive waste and 
for spent fuel encapsulation and disposal.
Established procedures
According to Government Decree (736/2008) ap-
propriate instructions shall exist for the operation, 
maintenance, regular in-service inspections and 
periodic tests as well as for transient and accident 
conditions. The reliable functioning of systems and 
components shall be ensured by adequate main-
tenance and by regular in-service inspections and 
periodic tests. Detailed requirements are given in 
YVL A.3. This topic is discussed also in Section G.
Updated assessment for post closure period
For the LILW repositories, both in Loviisa and in 
Olkiluoto, there is an operating licence condition 
requiring a periodic update of the safety assess-
ment. Government Decree (736/2008), concerning 
nuclear waste disposal, requires that the safety 
case shall be updated every 15 years, if not other-
wise prescribed in the licence conditions. The safe-
ty case shall be updated prior to the final closure of 
the disposal facility.
Engineering and technical support
Government Decree (736/2008) requires that the 
licensee’s organisation shall have access to the 
professional expertise and technical knowledge re-
quired for the safe operation of the nuclear waste 
facility and for the long-term safety of the nuclear 
waste disposal. The LILW repositories operate un-
der	 the	 NPP	 organizations	 and	 the	 requirement	
for adequate engineering and technical support in 
Guide YVL A.4 applies.
Posiva's expertise on safe operation is based on 
the resources of its Department for Development 
and the Safety Unit. The owners of Posiva, i.e. TVO 
and FPH, share their technical support for Posiva. 
Technical support resources are also provided by 
external experts.
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Characterization and segregation 
of waste, incident reports
The guidance and requirements for LILW char-
acterization	and	segregation	is	provided	in	Guide	
YVL D.4. STUK reviews plant procedures, the 
FSAR, and performs inspections on waste manage-
ment at the NPPs and the repositories to ensure 
compliance with the requirements.
Guide YVL D.3 provides requirements concern-
ing	 the	 characterization	 of	 spent	 fuel	 to	 be	 dis-
posed	of	and	the	characterization	of	the	spent	fuel	
disposal canister. The properties that have a bear-
ing on operational or long-term safety of disposal 
have	to	be	defined	and	characterized.
Incident reporting requirements are given in 
Guide YVL A.10.
Decommissioning plans
The plans for the decommissioning of the facilities 
for LILW and spent fuel management, others than 
repositories, are part of the decommissioning plans 
of the NPPs. Decommissioning is discussed in more 
detail under Article 26.
Closure plans
In accordance with Government Decree (736/2008), 
a safety case for a disposal facility shall be includ-
ed in the application for a construction licence and 
for the operating licence. The safety case shall be 
updated every 15 years, if not otherwise prescribed 
in the licence conditions. The safety case shall be 
updated prior to the final closure of the disposal fa-
cility. An investigation and monitoring programme 
shall be implemented during the operational pe-
riod of the disposal facility to obtain confirming 
information on the long-term performance of the 
barriers.
Article 17 Institutional measures 
after closure
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facil-
ity:
(a) records of the location, design and inventory 
of that facility required by the regulatory body 
are preserved;
(b) active or passive institutional controls such as 
monitoring or access restrictions are carried 
out, if required; and
(c) if, during any period of active institutional 
control, an unplanned release of radioactive 
materials into the environment is detected, in-
tervention measures are implemented, if neces-
sary.
Records
According to Government Decree (736/2008), re-
cords shall be kept of the disposed waste which in-
cludes waste package specific information on waste 
type, radioactive substances, location in the waste 
emplacement rooms and other necessary data. 
STUK maintains a database where the nuclear 
waste data reported annually by the operators of 
the NPPs are stored. Guide YVL 1.5 gives general 
requirements for reporting to STUK and includes 
provisions for waste management reporting. More 
detailed requirements for waste management re-
cords are given in Guides YVL D.4 and YVL D.5. 
During the operational period the records referred 
to above shall be annually complemented and sub-
mitted to STUK. STUK shall organise the storing 
of the information on the disposal facility and the 
disposed waste in a permanent manner. At the 
time of the closure of the repository, the records of 
the disposed waste and the relevant information 
in the FSAR will be converted into a form for long-
term deposition approved by the national archive.
Institutional control
Two types of institutional control can be imple-
mented: restrictions in land use (passive control) 
and technical post-closure surveillance (active con-
trol).
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, Section 
63, STUK’s supervisory rights include issuing land 
use restrictions after the closure of the disposal fa-
cility when deemed necessary. Government Decree 
(736/2008) on nuclear waste disposal further stipu-
lates	 that	 an	 adequate	 protection	 zone	 shall	 be	
reserved around the disposal facility as a provi-
sion for the prohibitions of measures referred to in 
Section 63 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
According to Guide YVL D.5 it can be assumed 
that human activities, affecting the repository or 
the nearby host rock, are precluded for 200 years 
at the most by means of land use restrictions 
and other passive controls. YVL D.5 also requires 
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that before closure the facility operator submits 
to STUK a closure plan including a plan for pos-
sible institutional control measures and a proposal 
for	a	protection	zone.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	
the Finnish repositories for LILW are located at 
60–100 m depth in the bedrock and the spent fuel 
repository is planned to be located at least 400 m 
below the surface.
Potential intervention measures
After approval of the closure of a LILW or of a 
spent fuel repository, the State bears the responsi-
bility of the waste repository and all intervention 
measures that may be needed (the Nuclear Energy 
Act, Section 34). Such measures are unlikely be-
cause the repository concepts are based on passive 
safety; multiple engineered barriers ensuring effec-
tive long-term containment of the disposed waste.
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Article 27 Transboundary movement
Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary 
movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure 
that such movement is undertaken in a manner 
consistent with the provisions of this Convention 
and relevant binding international instruments.
In so doing:
(a) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin 
shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 
transboundary movement is authorized and 
takes place only with the prior notification and 
consent of the State of destination;
(b) transboundary movement through States of 
transit shall be subject to those international 
obligations which are relevant to the particu-
lar modes of transport utilized;
(c) a Contracting Party which is a State of desti-
nation shall consent to a transboundary move-
ment only if it has the administrative and 
technical capacity, as well as the regulatory 
structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or 
the radioactive waste in a manner consistent 
with this Convention;
(d) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin 
shall authorize a accordance with the consent 
of the State of destination that the require-
ments of subparagraph (c) are met prior to 
transboundary movement;
(e) a Contracting Party which is a State of ori-
gin shall take the appropriate steps to permit 
re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary 
movement is not or cannot be completed in con-
formity with this Article, unless an alternative 
safe arrangement can be made.
A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment 
of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destina-
tion south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage 
or disposal.
Nothing in this Convention prejudices or af-
fects:
(a) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, 
of maritime, river and air navigation rights 
and freedoms, as provided for in international 
law;
(b) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioac-
tive waste is exported for processing to return, 
or provide for the return of, the radioactive 
waste and other products after treatment to the 
State of origin;
(c) the right of a Contracting Party to export its 
spent fuel for reprocessing;
(d) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent 
fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or 
provide for the return of, radioactive waste and 
other products resulting from reprocessing op-
erations to the State of origin.
Regulatory approach
Regulations on transport of all kinds of danger-
ous goods are laid down in Act and modal Decrees 
on Transport of Dangerous Goods. As far as ra-
dioactive material is of concern, additional require-
ments are given in the Radiation Act and Decree 
as well as in the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree. 
Concerning the transboundary movement of radio-
active material, the Regulation 93/1493/Euratom 
on shipments of radioactive substances between 
Member States shall be applied. The requirements 
are also in accordance with the European Council 
Directive 2006/117/Euratom on the supervision 
and control of shipments of radioactive waste and 
spent fuel. Further guidance is given in regulatory 
guides YVL D.2 and ST 5.7 of STUK.
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With respect to illicit trafficking, regulatory and 
detection measures were taken in mid 1990’s to ad-
dress and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
other radioactive materials across Finland’s bor-
ders. It included installing fixed monitors for vehi-
cles and railway traffic to all major crossing points 
along the Finnish–Russian border and at Helsinki 
harbor, and portable monitors at all crossing 
points. In 2008 the Customs and STUK launched 
a joint project for revising radiation control at the 
borders, which will be implemented in 2009-2014. 
The project includes equipment procurements and 
upgrades at the Finnish border crossing points, in-
cluding upgrading all systems with neutron detec-
tion capability, allowing better detection of special 
nuclear materials. Also, integrating the capability 
of expert reach-back support is one key part of the 
project. As part of the improved expert support, 
an update of common operational methods and in-
structions is included in project. To ensure that the 
new methods are efficiently implemented at the 
border crossing points, a training plan and provi-
sion of training together with the Customs School 
are included the project.
Experiences
According to an agreement between Finland and 
the Soviet Union spent fuel was to be shipped from 
the VVER type Loviisa power plant to the Soviet 
Union/Russian Federation. Subsequent to the 
amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act approved by 
the Finnish Parliament in 1994, the transportation 
was ceased in 1996. During the years 1981–1996 
altogether about a total amount of 330 tU of spent 
fuel was returned to Russia. The spent fuel was 
transported by a special train in TK-6 transport 
casks under special safety arrangements.
Besides the shipments of spent fuel discussed 
above, there have been few cases of transbound-
ary movements. In 2008–2013 two spent fuel rods 
were shipped out of Finland for research purposes 
and some large metal components for scrapping. 
Radioactive waste was shipped back to Finland af-
ter the treatment.
Regarding illicit trafficking, the systematic bor-
der control for monitoring radioactive materials 
has produced substantial results over the years. In 
1997, the top year, 23 shipments were stopped at the 
border. After a number of turned-back shipments 
and enhanced cooperation with Russian counter-
parts, the number of cases has fallen drastically 
and altogether only three cases of illicit radioactive 
material were detected at the Finnish border con-
trol between 2001 and 2013. Radioactive alarms at 
the border are nowadays mostly caused by persons 
coming from therapy treatment or by raw material 
having naturally occurring radioactive materials.
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Article 28 Disused sealed sources
Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework 
of its national law, take the appropriate steps to 
ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or 
disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a 
safe manner.
A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry 
into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the 
framework of its national law, it has accepted that 
they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to re-
ceive and possess the disused sealed sources.
Regulatory control of sealed sources
Regulatory control of radioactive sources is based 
on the Radiation Act and regulations issued pur-
suant thereto, into which the provisions of the 
European Union radiation protection directives 
(Council Directive 96/42 Euratom, and Council 
Directive 97/43 EURATOM etc.) have been imple-
mented. Other EU regulations are applicable as 
well, e.g. the Council Regulation 1494/93/Euratom 
on shipments of radioactive substances between 
the Member States.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 16) 
prior	 authorization	 is	 required	 for	 all	 activities	
with radioactive sources, e.g. for the use, manu-
facture, trade in, holding and disposal of sources. 
A safety licence is granted by STUK upon written 
application. General conditions for granting a li-
cence are laid down in the Radiation Act and the 
licensing procedure is prescribed in more detail in 
the Radiation Decree (Sections 14-18). All prem-
ises where radioactive sources are employed are 
inspected by STUK regularly, every 1–8 years, de-
pending on the type and extent of the practice. For 
sealed sources the inspection frequency is normally 
once in 5 years. The main objective of an inspection 
is to validate that radioactive sources are used and 
stored safely and other conditions set in the safety 
licence preserve. The inspector shall identify each 
sealed source. However, in premises where several 
tens or more sources are employed (such as a large 
industrial facility) the licensee shall provide writ-
ten evidence on its own regular checks on all the 
sources and then the inspector shall randomly 
select about 10–20% of the sources for identifica-
tion. Any discrepancies to licensing information 
concerning placing of sources, new sources and 
sources taken out of use are recorded for amending 
the licence accordingly.
The Radiation Decree (Section 17) provides 
that STUK has to be notified immediately, if a 
radiation source has disappeared, been stolen, lost 
or otherwise ceased to be in the licensee’s posses-
sion. Licensing information is stored in a database 
maintained by STUK, including also source-specific 
information on each sealed source in the licensee’s 
possession. Source-specific information is updated 
continuously according to the licensees' notifica-
tions and observations made during the inspec-
tions. Some low-activity radioactive sources, such 
as calibration sources employed in laboratories as 
well as sources in the storages of dealers (e.g. im-
porters of radioactive sources) are not individually 
registered into STUK’s database. However, records 
of transfers of sources maintained by dealers are 
reported to STUK annually and they are also sub-
ject to inspection by STUK at any time.
Handling of disused sealed sources
The Radiation Act (Section 10) states that radio-
active sources which have no further use must 
be rendered harmless. Guide ST 5.1 dealing with 
sealed sources specifies that disused sources shall 
not be stored unnecessarily. In practice, howev-
er, it is sometimes difficult to define whether a 
stored source might have some use in the future. 
The annual fee for holding a licence depends on 
the number of sources in the licensee’s possession 
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and, therefore, there is some financial incentive to 
transfer disused sources back to the provider (and 
therefrom to the manufacturer) or to a recognised 
installation (a facility authorised for the han-
dling, long-term-storage, or disposal of sources). 
The number of devices containing unused sealed 
sources stored in the premises of various licensees 
is currently (24.4.2014) 285, i.e. less than 5% of the 
total number of such devices in use (total number 
is about 6330).
TVO has leased to the State a cavern in the 
LILW disposal facility at Olkiluoto for interim stor-
age of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The amount 
of stored waste cannot be more than 100 m³. Most 
of this waste, including sealed sources, can also 
be disposed of in the disposal facility based on 
the revised (in 2012) operation conditions of the 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. A few high activ-
ity sealed sources will need a different disposal 
route, which is not yet determined.
Disused sources are collected by a private 
entrepreneur, ‘Suomen Nukliditekniikka’, by 
whom they are repacked, as necessary, and then 
transferred to the storage at Olkiluoto. STUK’s 
Radiation Practices Regulation Department has 
issued an authorisation based on the Radiation Act 
to Suomen Nukliditekniikka for its operations as 
a recognised installation. The safety of the opera-
tions at the Olkiluoto storage is independently su-
pervised by STUK’s Department of Nuclear Waste 
and Materials Regulation.
When	 new	 sources	 are	 authorized	 for	 use,	
STUK requires the applicant to present a plan on 
measures to be taken when it becomes a disused 
source. Essentially there are two main options; ei-
ther to have an agreement with the provider on re-
turning the source or to transfer the source to the 
central storage facility at the cost of the licensee. 
The first option is preferred and it is foreseen that 
in the future an agreement on returning the source 
to the provider shall be required for all sources.
Sources manufactured in Finland can be re-
turned to Finland once they have become disused 
sources.
Orphan sources
According to the Radiation Act (Section 50) the li-
censee is required to take all the measures needed 
to render harmless radioactive wastes arising from 
its operations. If the origin of the waste is un-
known, like in the case of orphan sources, the State 
has the obligation to render the radioactive waste 
harmless (Section 51). In such case, the licensee – 
if identified later – shall compensate the State for 
the costs incurred in such an action.
With respect to the orphan sources and border 
controls, see Section I.
All important users of scrap metal have in-
stalled fixed radiation monitors at the gates of 
their installations. STUK co-operates with the 
Customs and the metal industry in questions such 
as measurement arrangements and training of 
personnel. STUK also provides expert help in cases 
where exceptional radiation is detected.
On an average, about 1–2 sealed radioactive 
sources have been found annually among imported 
scrap metal. Orphan sources, whose owner cannot 
be identified, are delivered to the State interim 
storage at Olkiluoto.
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Spent fuel disposal
The project to construct an encapsulation and dis-
posal facility for spent nuclear fuel in Olkiluoto can 
be seen as the most important activity for improve-
ment of nuclear waste safety in Finland. The pro-
ject has progressed as planned during the report-
ing period. The construction licence application for 
the facility was submitted at the end of 2012, and 
STUK started the review of the application with 
the	aim	of	being	able	to	finalize	the	safety	evalua-
tion by late 2014.
Both Posiva and STUK continue to develop 
their processes and resources to ensure that they 
are ready for the next steps in the program: imple-
mentation and oversight of the construction as well 
as the further development of equipment and the 
updating and completion of safety case during the 
review process.
STUK finalised the complete revision of the 
system of safety guides (YVL-guides) during the 
reporting period. After the construction licence re-
view STUK will incorporate the experience gained 
in developing the guidance further.
The disposal project requires continued re-
search and development programmes. As stipulat-
ed by the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the pro-
ducers of the waste are solely responsible for the 
safe handling, management and disposal of their 
wastes. This responsibility includes the planning 
and implementation of required research and de-
velopment efforts as well as bearing all costs there-
of. For regulating the safe management of nuclear 
wastes,	 independent	 R&D	 is	 necessary	 for	 MEE	
and	STUK.	The	three	main	R&D-programmes	con-
cerning spent nuclear fuel disposal are:
•	 The	R&D-programme	of	Posiva;	the	programme	
is mainly aimed at planning and implementing 
the spent fuel disposal project;
•	 The	R&D-programme	of	STUK;	the	regulatory	
R&D-programme	aims	at	supporting	the	regu-
latory decision making of STUK;
•	 The	KYT2014-programme,	and	its	planned	fol-
low-up programme KYT2018 for the years 2015 
2018, administrated by MEE; the program aims 
at supporting the creation and maintenance of 
the overall competence and the basic abilities 
needed regarding management and disposal 
of mainly spent fuel, and in addition at assess-
ing alternative solutions for long-term manage-
ment of spent fuel.
Posiva’s	R&D-programme	is	obviously	the	 largest	
and has had the major challenge to produce the 
results, which are related to the Olkiluoto-site, the 
engineered barrier system and the safety case and 
which were needed to justify the construction li-
cence application submitted at the end of 2012. 
Further	R&D	is	still	needed	for	the	next	licensing	
phase (operating licence) e.g. in decreasing uncer-
tainties in safety assessment.
Spent fuel storage
The extension of the spent fuel interim storage 
facility at Olkiluoto started in 2010 and the facility 
is expected to be operational in 2014. Protection 
against large airplane crash is included in the de-
sign of the extension and the protection of the 
existing part of the facility will also be improved. 
Enhancement in safety is also achieved through 
improved spent fuel pool cooling water systems 
that will enable water feed from outside and modi-
fications in instrumentation that will enable read-
ing of spent fuel pool water level gauges and tem-
perature gauges outside the pool area also under 
an accident situation.
LILW disposal
In Loviisa, the LILW repository was enlarged with 
a new room for waste handling and a tunnel facili-
tating disposal operations.
A modified licence to operate the Olkiluoto 
LILW repository, granted in 2012 allows disposal 
88
STUK-B 180
of Olkiluoto 3 low and intermediate operational 
waste	and	such	waste	from	the	centralized	storage	
of small user’s waste that can be disposed in the fa-
cility. The application contained an updated safety 
analysis of the facility.
A small quantity of small user waste consisting 
of nuclear material and a few high activity sources 
cannot be disposed of in the Olkiluoto facility. 
Actions have been started to find an alternative 
disposal route for these wastes.
Uranium mining
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ldt, a subsidiary of Talvivaara 
Mining Company Plc producing primarily nickel 
and	 zinc	 by	 bioheapleaching	 method,	 submitted	
an application to recover uranium from the leach-
ing solution in 2010. The process decreases the 
(small) concentration of uranium in the waste of 
the metal recovery facility and the company aims 
to produce about 350 to 500 tonnes or uranium per 
year. The environmental impact assessment proce-
dure was completed in March 2011. On March 1, 
2012, the Government granted licence to extract 
uranium from Talvivaara ore at the Sotkamo mine, 
as referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act. However, 
the Supreme Administrative Court (KHO) revoked 
in early December 2013 this license. The court 
ruled that so many changes had occurred within 
Talvivaara since then that the licence was no long-
er valid. Re-organisation of the company is ongo-
ing, so the court sent the licence back to the MEE 
for reconsideration. The company is also having 
financial, technical and environmental problems 
and it is not clear when uranium production could 
start.
STUK has developed its capabilities and inter-
nal guidance on safety related to uranium mining 
and milling. Before the uranium recovery could 
start STUK shall ascertain that the operation 
meets all the safety requirements laid down in 
Nuclear Energy Act.
Peer reviews
MEE requested an IAEA Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) review. The review, preced-
ed by a self assessment, took place in late 2012 
and covered also waste management. The review 
complemented the 2009 peer review by EU mem-
ber state regulators arranged by STUK. The IRRS 
follow-up mission is scheduled for June 2015.
Education and training
An important factor in achieving a high level of 
safety in waste management is competent person-
nel	 in	 the	pertinent	organizations.	A	pilot	project	
for enhanced education and training concerning 
spent fuel disposal was launched in 2010, with a 
short course arranged in December 2010 for new 
staff in several organisations. Subsequently, a con-
tinuing programme similar to that for the nuclear 
reactor safety was set up and is ongoing.
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L.1 Regulatory approach to the Olkiluoto 
spent fuel disposal project
From a regulatory viewpoint, the Olkiluoto spent 
fuel disposal project can be divided into the follow-
ing main phases (approximate years):
1. Research phase from the late 1970’s to the 
Decision-in-Principle licensing phase (DiP), 
(1978–2001)
2. Design, research and development phase in-
cluding construction of an underground rock 
characterization	facility	(from	DiP	to	Construc-
tion licence (CL) ), (2001–2014)
3. Construction and commissioning phase (from 
CL to operating licence (OL), (2015–2022)
4. Operating phase (2022–2120, if no new NPPs)
5. Decommissioning and closure phase (2120–
2125, assuming no new NPPs).
The first step in the licensing process was reached 
at the end of 1999 when Posiva Oy submitted the 
application for a DiP for an SNF disposal facility 
at Olkiluoto covering spent fuel arising from the 
four operating reactors. The DiP was given by the 
Finnish Government in late 2000, approved by the 
host municipality, Eurajoki, and ratified by the 
Finnish Parliament in early 2001. Later on the 
DiP was expanded in separate DiPs to cover also 
the spent fuel from reactor unit OL3 (approved in 
2002) and respectively from the planned reactor 
unit OL4 (approved in 2010). The initial DiP also 
authorized	Posiva	 to	 start	 the	 construction	 of	 an	
underground	rock	characterization	facility	(URCF)	
ONKALO, at the Olkiluoto site down to the depth 
of the planned underground disposal, as required 
by the regulation. STUK has developed a specific 
regulatory programme for ONKALO construction, 
which is described in more detail in the following 
section.
The DiP also called for the continuation of the 
research, development and design work to elabo-
rate further the safety justifications in the disposal 
project for the purposes of the construction licens-
ing stage. Posiva has followed the Government 
strategy and submitted the construction licence 
application and its supporting documentation to 
the authorities at the end of 2012.
Regulatory review and assessment 
of Construction Licence application 
for Olkiluoto spent nuclear fuel 
encapsulation and disposal facility
Posiva submitted the construction licence applica-
tion and its supporting documentation to the au-
thorities at the end of 2012. STUK started the re-
lated review and assessment in early 2013. At the 
end of 2013 STUK was performing a thorough re-
view and assessment against safety requirements 
and the outcome will be documented in STUK’s 
safety evaluation report. The planned duration for 
STUK’s review process is 1.5 to 2 years. After the 
construction licence step STUK will continue to 
have comprehensive regulatory control over the 
subsequent detailed design, construction, manufac-
turing and pre-operational testing which will then 
be followed by the review and assessment of the 
forthcoming operating licence application.
Planning for the review and assessment 
of construction licence application
The	review	process,	organization,	schedule	and	re-
sources are described in STUK’s internal project 
plan for the licence application review. The main 
element of the project is the review of the exten-
sive safety documentation. The assessment of the 
fulfilment of the safety requirements and of the im-
plementing	 organization’s	 readiness	 for	 construc-
tion activities is supported by STUK’s inspection 
programme for the pre-construction phase. The in-
spection programme is expanded later to include 
the construction inspection programme for the con-
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struction control of the encapsulation and disposal 
facilities.
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
required Posiva to submit preliminary (draft) li-
cence documentation by the end of 2009. The 
reasoning was to have a regulatory review of the 
status and maturity of construction licence ap-
plication development. STUK reviewed the draft 
safety case and the process was used as an exercise 
for the actual licence application review. STUK 
used this experience in developing the plan for the 
actual construction licence application review.
The regulatory assessment of safety is done 
against the regulatory safety requirements. 
STUK’s approach was previously a more safety 
issue oriented and from bottom to top assessment. 
In order to have a more regulatory requirement 
oriented and safety related review basis for the 
detailed review and assessment, STUK construed 
a review plan as a part of process development. 
This review plan contains a collection of earlier 
regulatory observations and expectations for the 
construction licence application that were derived 
from and linked to regulatory safety requirements. 
The review plan is used as guidance for all experts 
participating in STUK’s review. It is also intended 
to be used as the structure for STUK’s safety eval-
uation report.
As regards project resources, STUK has allo-
cated the necessary amount of its in-house waste 
management and nuclear facility expertise to the 
project. Important parts of the safety case focus 
on the post-closure safety and the related safety 
assessments are wide and need to be carefully as-
sessed in a timely manner. For this reason STUK 
has signed agreements with both VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland and several interna-
tional experts to support its review and to conduct 
independent modeling. The total number of ex-
perts involved in STUK’s review work during 2013 
ranged between 60 to 70 persons and the total vol-
ume of work by external experts was of the order of 
13 person-years.
Regulatory review of construction 
licence application
According to the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, 
when applying for a construction licence, the appli-
cant shall submit the following to STUK:
•	 The	 preliminary	 safety	 analysis	 report,	 which	
shall include the general design and safety 
principles of the nuclear facility, a detailed 
description of the site and the nuclear facility, 
a description of the operation of the facility, 
a description of the behaviour of the facility 
during accidents, a detailed description of the 
effects that the operation of the facility has on 
the environment, and any other information 
considered necessary by the authorities.
•	 A	 probabilistic	 risk	 assessment	 of	 the	 design	
stage.
•	 A	proposal	for	a	classification	document,	which	
shows the classification of structures, systems 
and components important to the safety of the 
nuclear facility on the basis of their significance 
with respect to safety.
•	 A	description	of	quality	management	during	the	
construction of the nuclear facility, showing the 
systematic	measures	 applied	 by	 the	 organiza-
tions that take part in the design and construc-
tion of the nuclear facility in their operations 
affecting quality.
•	 Preliminary	plans	for	the	arrangements	for	se-
curity and emergencies.
•	 A	 plan	 for	 arranging	 the	 safeguards	 control	
that is necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.
In addition to the documentation concentrat-
ing mostly on operational safety, the regulation 
for nuclear waste disposal requires the licensee to 
submit a safety case concentrating on post-closure 
safety. This is in practice the most extensive part 
of the construction licence application documents. 
STUK’s YVL Guides give more details for the re-
quired content of these documents.
STUK’s task in the construction licence appli-
cation process is to review and assess the fulfill-
ment of all the applicable radiation and nuclear 
safety requirements. STUK shall also prepare a 
statement and a safety evaluation report for the 
Government. In the appraisal STUK has the pos-
sibility to highlight issues that need further atten-
tion or to propose licence conditions.
During the first quarter of 2013 STUK per-
formed the first initial review phase. The aim of 
the initial phase, sometimes compared to dock-
eting, was to check that the licence application 
contained all the main elements requested in 
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STUK’s regulations (YVL Guides). The first STUK 
decision concentrated on the completeness of the 
operational safety documents. Based on the initial 
review, for most parts the review progressed to the 
detailed review phase. However, some application 
documents were not accepted for detailed review 
in the initial stage. The most important exceptions 
were related to safety classification where the 
basis of safety relevance were required to be re-
evaluated and when needed also the encapsulation 
system descriptions updated. The initial review 
for post-closure safety documentation was final-
ized	in	autumn	2013	and	STUK	accepted	Posiva’s	
TURVA-2012 safety case to provide the basis for 
detailed review.
The assessment of the fulfilment of the safety 
requirements	 and	 of	 the	 implementing	 organiza-
tion’s readiness for construction activities is sup-
ported by STUK’s inspection programme for the 
pre-construction phase. The inspection programme 
is expanded later to include the construction in-
spection programme for the encapsulation and 
disposal facility construction control.
After passing the construction licence step, 
STUK will have comprehensive regulatory control 
for the detailed design, construction, manufactur-
ing and pre-operational testing, which will then be 
followed by the review and assessment of the pend-
ing operating licence application.
The objective of the inspections performed by 
STUK during the pre-construction phase is to sup-
port the review and decision making process by 
verifying the licence applicant’s processes and pro-
cedures and also technical issues described in the 
licence application documentation. Through these 
inspections STUK will have a realistic view of the 
status of the applicant’s activities and progress of 
its development work. STUK focuses the inspec-
tions	on	the	licence	applicant	and	the	organizations	
responsible for the nuclear facility’s design, and 
also	 on	 any	 organizations	 involved	 in	 the	 project	
whose work can be deemed to have major implica-
tions on safety. The main topics for these inspections 
are	 the	 management	 system	 of	 the	 organization	
concerned,	 in	particular	the	organization	of	opera-
tions and the management of resources, competence 
management, management system processes and 
procedures, the management of non-conformances, 
interface management and reporting, and supply 
chain management as well as data security. STUK’s 
inspections will cover all the main processes and 
major parts of sub- processes defined in the licence 
applicant’s management system.
Regulatory approach to the 
construction of ONKALO
The Finnish regulation requires that the bedrock 
in	 the	 disposal	 site	 shall	 be	 characterized	 at	 the	
disposal depth before submitting the construction 
licence application. This requirement was further 
developed in the STUK safety regulation (Guide 
YVL	D.5),	which	defined	that	the	characterization	
involves	construction	of	a	research	or	characteriza-
tion facility on the site. ONKALO has functioned 
as	an	underground	rock	characterization	facility	to	
ensure the suitability of the Olkiluoto site for re-
pository purposes and has been proposed to be an 
access route to the actual repository. STUK has im-
plemented regulatory control of the ONKALO con-
struction and regulates it like it would be an access 
route to a nuclear facility. However, a construction 
licence is needed before starting construction of the 
encapsulation facility and the first disposal tun-
nels and disposal holes.
The construction of ONKALO to the planned 
disposal depth disturbs the geological environment 
and conditions in a variety of ways, as described 
below. The purpose of STUK’s regulatory control 
of the Onkalo construction is primarily to ensure 
that the design, location, orientation and construc-
tion are carried out in such a manner that the geo-
environment retains its favourable characteristics 
and conditions needed for the safety functions. In 
particular,	this	implies	the	minimization	of:
•	 Host	 rock	 responses	 to	 excavation,	 excavation	
disturbed	areas	and	zones,
•	 Groundwater	leakages	to	the	ONKALO	tunnels	
and shafts, and
•	 Introduction	of	foreign,	potentially	harmful	sub-
stances to ONKALO during construction (ce-
ment and other grouting materials, reinforce-
ment materials, explosives etc.).
•	 Pathways	from	surface	to	disposal	rooms.
The main elements of STUK’s regulatory control 
are:
•	 Review	and	assessment	of	design,	construction	
and as-built documents. The document submit-
tal is based on an approved document delivery 
plan and construction communication plan.
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•	 Inspection	 activities	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	
areas that are the Construction Inspection 
Programme (CIP), inspections concerning the 
readiness to begin excavation and other work 
phases and inspection concerning construction 
works on site.
•	 Review	of	as-built	documentation	related	to	the	
future commissioning of the facility.
Regulatory approach for 
Posiva’s RD&D activities
Posiva	publishes	an	RD&D	plan	for	nuclear	waste	
management every three years and submits it to 
MEE for regulatory review. STUK reviews the re-
port and gives a statement to the Ministry. The 
most recent report was submitted to the Ministry 
in September 2012. STUK is responsible for regu-
lating the safety related implementation of the 
RD&D	work.	During	the	period	after	the	DiP	and	
before the construction licence application, STUK’s 
regulatory	control	of	Posiva’s	RD&D	activities	was	
mainly directed to the evolving safety case mate-
rial.
The regulatory approach taken by STUK has 
been to closely follow Posiva’s safety case develop-
ment and to perform reviews of draft safety case 
documents. Another area of regulatory control has 
been	to	follow	Posiva’s	RD&D	activities	which	are	
described in the programmes submitted to regula-
tory review every three years. In practice this has 
been implemented through regular visits to re-
search laboratories, factories and workshops where 
safety related studies or demonstrations have been 
performed.
The focus of STUK’s regulatory control is chang-
ing from the overall safety case development to the 
demonstrations of the disposal system process and 
the emplacements. The review and assessment of 
Posiva’s safety case supporting the construction 
licence application will steer the future focus of 
the	RD&D	regulation.	In	addition	to	issues	which	
Posiva has raised in the safety case STUK’s review 
will	most	likely	reveal	areas	where	further	RD&D	
work is needed to decrease existing uncertainties.
Regulatory approach for Nuclear Safeguards
As ONKALO was foreseen to become a part of 
the future disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, 
STUK decided in 2003 to start implementing nu-
clear safeguards to ONKALO. Subsequently, Posiva 
was obliged to implement safeguards from the be-
ginning of ONKALO excavation to the closure of 
the disposal facility. In accordance with STUK’s 
regulations, Posiva has prepared and documented 
the necessary safeguards procedures and meas-
ures	in	a	quality	manual	called	“Nuclear	Materials	
Handbook”	which	was	 reviewed	 and	 approved	 by	
STUK in 2005. Since then Posiva has regularly up-
dated the handbook and submitted it to STUK for 
review and approval.
In 2013 Posiva submitted the preliminary Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) of the geologi-
cal repository and the encapsulation plant to the 
European Commission (EC) as requested from new 
nuclear facility operators. The Commission has as-
signed Material Balance Area (MBA) codes W0LF 
for the geological repository and W0LE for the 
encapsulation plant. The facility constitutes a site 
according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva 
site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the 
buildings supporting the construction of the facili-
ties. Based on the declarations, the IAEA and the 
EC perform regular inspections to the Posiva site 
and facilities.
STUK’s safeguards activities consist of inspect-
ing and assessing Posiva’s safeguards implementa-
tion, reviewing Posiva’s reports and verifying by 
on-site inspections that ONKALO is in compliance 
with Posiva’s as-built documentation presented 
also in the BTC. STUK also verifies that the infor-
mation in Posiva’s declaration on the site is correct 
before the declaration will be submitted to IAEA 
and the EC.
Presently STUK is reviewing Posiva’s con-
struction licence application submitted to the 
Government at the end of 2012. The plan for ar-
ranging the safeguards control is necessary to pre-
vent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the 
review of the licence application STUK has to pay 
attention to the international agreements and also 
to the European Commission regulations. The safe-
guards long-term challenge is a good coordination 
with the IAEA and the EC to develop the concepts 
for the new types of facilities, and to carry out the 
needed safeguards activities in an efficient way for 
a period of a hundred years. The current task is to 
accommodate the safeguards measures to be im-
plemented at the encapsulation plant in the design 
of the facility.
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STUK’s safeguards activities and findings 
are published annually in the safeguards re-
port	 “Implementing	 nuclear	 non-proliferation	 in	
Finland. Regulatory control, international coop-
eration and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty”.
L.2 Programme for spent fuel disposal
General
According to the Government Decision-in-
Principle, ratified by the Parliament in 2001, the 
spent fuel from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants will be disposed of in a KBS-3 type 
geological repository on the Olkiluoto island in the 
municipality of Eurajoki. At the end of 2012 Posiva 
Oy, the company responsible for the implementa-
tion of the disposal, submitted an application to the 
Government for a licence to construct the facilities 
needed for that purpose. The facilities consist of an 
encapsulation plant for packaging the spent fuel 
elements and the actual geological repository, both 
on	the	same	site.	A	full	safety	case	“TURVA-2012”	
was produced to support the licence application.
The reference repository design is based on 
the idea of emplacing the spent fuel canisters in 
vertical position in floors of the repository tunnels 
(“KBS-3V”),	 but	 work	 has	 also	 continued	 on	 the	
alternative	of	horizontal	deposition	of	the	canisters	
in tunnels ("KBS-3H"). The focus of the technical 
development work is now shifting to the under-
ground	rock	characterization	facility,	ONKALO,	in	
which an extensive program of testing and demon-
strations has been started. An important part of 
the work carried out in ONKALO is the testing of 
the rock classification methodology for identifying 
the suitable locations for the deposition tunnels 
and holes.
ONKALO Rock Characterization Facility
The	first	overall	 site	 characterization	programme	
for a nuclear spent fuel repository in Finland was 
launched in 1982. This programme already sug-
gested that the final stage of site investigations, 
called the site confirmation stage according to the 
IAEA vocabulary then, should include characteri-
zation	of	the	bedrock	performed	in	an	underground	
rock	 characterization	 facility.	 International	 opin-
ions have also emphasised the importance of un-
derground	 rock	 characterization	 before	 the	 deci-
sion to construct the repository is taken. Generic 
underground laboratories are operating in several 
countries (Stripa, Grimsel, URL, Äspö, Bure). The 
development and full-scale testing of the dispos-
al concept conducted at these laboratories have 
shown the significance of site-specific properties in 
the design of the disposal systems.
The excavation of the underground rock char-
Figure A. ONKALO layout in 2011 Figure by Esa Parviainen/Saanio & Riekkola Oy.
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acterization	 facility,	 ONKALO,	 is	 now	 nearing	
completion at Olkiluoto. Unlike the generic rock 
laboratories, ONKALO has been constructed at the 
actual repository site and it should be possible to 
use ONKALO in the future as an access route to 
the repository. For these reasons the construction 
of the facility has been subject to the rules and 
requirements applicable to nuclear facilities in 
general, and, in particular, to those addressing the 
construction of nuclear waste repositories. It is also 
regulated by STUK and international safeguards.
The original design and plans for the under-
ground facility were reported at the level of detail 
needed for a conventional construction permit 
granted by the municipality of Eurajoki in 2003. 
Since then a number of changes have been made 
in the layout of ONKALO access tunnel, and the 
number of access shafts has been increased from 
one to three. Also the layout and the depth of 
the	 auxiliary	 rooms	 at	 the	main	 characterization	
level have been updated to match with the current 
needs.	The	ONKALO	layout,	as	realized,	is	shown	
in Figure A.
The	 main	 characterization	 level	 is	 located	 at	
the depth of –420 metres, but some of the auxiliary 
rooms are deeper down at the depth of –437 me-
tres. Most of the excavation work was completed 
by early 2013 and the rest of the construction 
work should be ready during 2015 - 2016. The 
total underground volume of ONKALO will be ap-
proximately 365 000 m³, the combined length of 
tunnels and shafts being 9.8 km. The access tunnel 
from the surface to the repository level consists of 
approximately 5 km of tunnelling with an inclina-
tion of 1:10. The shafts are excavated to the level 
of the auxiliary rooms and in addition the person-
nel shaft and one of the ventilation shafts to the 
maintenance level of –455 metres. The personnel 
shaft will be equipped with a man-cage for person-
nel transport and some maintenance purposes. The 
connecting tunnels from the access tunnel to the 
personnel shaft at every 1 to 1.5 km will make it 
easier to ventilate and evacuate the ONKALO fa-
cility. Furthermore, for testing and demonstration 
purposes Posiva has designed and constructed two 
additional demonstration tunnels (lengths of 35 
and 21 metres) in 2013.
An extensive programme of testing and ex-
perimentation has been launched in ONKALO, 
including various studies into the geochemical and 
transport properties of the bedrock, and various 
tests of the technology to be used in the disposal 
operations (Figure B). Once the construction li-
cence has been granted the construction work will 
continue to the first panels and deposition tunnels 
of the repository.
Site investigations
During the last years, the site investigation activi-
ties at Olkiluoto have been concentrated on confir-
mation of the site suitability, increase in the over-
all understanding of the site, and demonstrating 
a practicable methodology for selecting suitable 
rock volumes for the repository panels, tunnels and 
deposition holes. Multidisciplinary studies have 
been carried out both in the ONKALO facility and 
on surface. The main data sources were the 57 
deep cored drillholes with lengths varying from 
300 to 1200 meters, and the approximately 5 km 
long ONKALO access tunnel and the other under-
ground facilities. The Olkiluoto Site Description 
 
Figure B. Testing the equipment for boring of the depo-
sition holes in ONKALO.
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(Posiva 2011) is one of the supporting reports for 
the construction licence application
Two deep surface-based drillholes, OL-KR57 
being the deepest in Olkiluoto with the length of 
1200  m, were drilled in 2011. The latest investi-
gation trench OL-TK19 was excavated in 2012. 
However, the data collection from previous data 
sources has continued, e.g., with ground water 
sampling, hydraulic measurements mainly for 
monitoring purposes, an extensive charge potential 
measurement campaign and a large interference 
test in drillholes of the eastern area of Olkiluoto. 
All the available data was used for the Olkiluoto 
Site Description 2011, but the models will still be 
updated in the future with new observations.
In ONKALO, data acquisition has continued by 
detailed and systematic geological mapping and 
other studies of the tunnel surfaces, by drilling and 
measurements	of	pilot	holes,	characterization	holes	
and other holes, and by specific projects in the in-
vestigation and demonstration facilities. During 
the construction of ONKALO in 2003–2013, a total 
of 25 pilot holes (with an average length of 125 m) 
have	been	drilled,	as	well	as	characterization	holes	
and groundwater stations and other shallow holes. 
Pilot holes were drilled mainly for checking the 
rock quality and the exact location of modelled 
faults	 and	 hydrological	 zones	 in	 advance	 of	 the	
excavation. Pilot hole drillings and related studies 
are important also for testing and demonstration 
of rock suitability classification (RSC). In all drill-
holes, extensive geophysical, geological and hydro-
logical loggings were carried out.
Recent geophysical surveys have been concen-
trated on pilot holes in the vicinity of demonstra-
tion tunnels and in investigation niche 3 excavated 
for	rock	mechanics	and	excavation	damage	(EDZ)	
studies. In the investigation niche 3, also specific 
charge potential, GPR and tomographic measure-
ment campaigns were carried out in 2013 for 
purposes of Posiva Spalling Experiment (POSE). 
In the demonstration area, an extensive tunnel 
seismic experiment (Figure C) was done mainly for 
the needs of the local detailed scale 3D fault and 
fracture modelling and for rock suitability clas-
sification.
The interpretation of the POSE experiment 
will continue for several years. The last phase of 
POSE, carried out during 2013, involved heating 
of one of the three test canister holes in the niche 
Figure C. Tunnel seismics (geophone installation) in the demonstration facilities on the level ca. 420 m.b.s.l.
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in order to cause a symmetrical thermal stress 
increase around the hole due to the thermal expan-
sion of rock. The results of the test were inconclu-
sive: spalling type damage may not be a factor in 
Olkiluoto because of the heterogeneous and ani-
sotropic nature of the Olkiluoto rock, and further 
studies are needed.
A detailed hydrogeological investigation project 
(HYDCO) started in 2010 and has continued in 
the investigation niche 4. The aim of the project is 
to obtain better understanding of the detailed hy-
draulic characteristics of the bedrock. Interesting 
issues are, for instance, the connections between 
water conductive fractures. The last phase of the 
project included a detailed hydraulic interference 
test.
New flow log equipment (PFL Lite) has been 
tested in the pilot holes drilled in planned loca-
tions of test canister holes in demonstration tunnel 
2. The new device is better than the traditional 
PFL DIFF equipment for measuring this type of 
pilot holes. New hydraulic data was collected also 
by flow log measurements in pilot holes, grouting 
holes and other holes around the facilities. Inflow 
mapping and measurements of the tunnel surfaces 
are carried out systematically.
In the REPRO project (investigation niche 5) 
rock matrix retention properties are investigated 
under in-situ conditions. The first experiment in 
2012 included the injection of tracers (I-125, Na-22, 
HTO and Cl-36) and related modelling work. The 
preliminary results were used in the second re-
tention experiment. The second experiment was 
started in 2013 in the same fracture but with 
smaller flow rate and different combination of 
tracers (Na-22, Sr-85, Cl-36, HTO and Ba-133). 
Both of these experiments were single-hole meas-
urements, but in the future, REPRO will continue 
with a three-year cross-hole experiment. Drill core 
samples from the REPRO niche have been ana-
lysed in the laboratory to test diffusion properties, 
permeability, sorption, porosity, pore structure and 
density. Breakthrough curves based on two first 
REPRO experiment results are shown in Figure D.
The microbial reduction of sulphate and en-
ergy sources for the microbes are studied in the 
Sulphate Reduction Experiment (SURE). The first 
phase, SURE 1, was reported in 2013. The experi-
ment was carried out in SO4 rich groundwater con-
ditions, activating the microbes with CH4 and H2 
gases. SURE 2, which was carried out in CH4 rich 
conditions, and SURE 3 phases will be reported 
during 2014.
The INEX experiment was established to in-
vestigate the potential changes in pH and redox 
conditions, and in the buffering capacity and hy-
drogeochemical processes related to groundwater 
infiltration. The first phase of the experiment was 
started in 2008 and completed in summer 2012, 
and it will be reported in 2014. The buffering ca-
pacity was so high in the INEX area that the redox 
conditions remained anaerobic and no hydrogeo-
chemical changes were observed during Phase I. In 
Phase	II	the	experimental	set	up	will	be	more	“ag-
gressive”	and	oxygenated	water	will	be	injected	to	
bedrock with a conservative tracer to observe the 
processes effected.
After the publication of the Olkiluoto Site 
Description 2011 (Posiva 2011), the modelling 
tasks have aimed at the production of updated 
discipline-specific reports and an integrated site 
description update for the purpose of the applica-
tion for the operating licence. A new version of the 
geological model, including conceptual submodels 
of deformation, petrology and alteration, has been 
prepared and will be published in 2014. The new 
version will show improved understanding of the 
deformation history and migmatite structures of 
the Olkiluoto bedrock. Detailed scale modeling, 
developed mainly for rock suitability classifica-
tion purposes, integrates the geological, geophys-
ical and hydrogeological interpretations of the 
ONKALO demonstration area (Figure E).
The updating of the hydrogeological structure 
model started in 2013 with collecting, preparing 
and reporting the background data. The hydraulic 
and geophysical investigation campaigns in deep 
drillholes in the eastern area of Olkiluoto during 
2013–2014 are important data sources for the hy-
drogeological interpretation. The modeling report 
will be published in 2014. One goal for the recent 
geological and hydrogeological model updates has 
been to extend the site understanding to cover the 
eastern area of Olkiluoto.
New versions of the geological and hydrogeo-
logical discrete fracture network (DFN) model 
were developed for background information of the 
flow and transport modeling. The DFN models 
were	summarized	in	the	Olkiluoto	Site	Description	
2011. One of the most important tasks in the fu-
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Figure E. Horizontal intersection of the detailed scale model in the 
demonstration facilities: modelled large fractures (black), brittle 
deformation zones (red), their influence zones (yellow), transmis-
sive fractures measured in pilot holes (blue) and pilot holes ONK-
PH21 – 23 (green).
Figure D. Breakthrough curves for different flow rates and tracers from REPRO experiments
ture will be the preparation of a new database for 
DFN purposes including a large set of new geologi-
cal and hydrogeological data especially from the 
repository level. The new modeling work is planned 
to integrate the hydrogeological and geological 
modeling.
After the Olkiluoto Site Description 2011, the 
rock mechanics modeling work has concentrated 
on predictions and back-calculations for the POSE 
experiments and the further updates of the site 
scale model. Currently the model is being updated 
with new investigation data, modeling methods 
and	 visualizations.	 One	 purpose	 of	 the	 rock	 me-
chanics model is to observe the effect of brittle 
fault	zones	on	the	local	stress	field.
The Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme was orig-
inally launched in 2004 when the construction of 
ONKALO started. The programme was updated 
in 2012 for the purpose of the construction licence 
application. It includes rock mechanics, hydrologi-
cal, hydrogeochemical, and surface environment 
studies to monitor natural changes within the 
geosphere and biosphere of Olkiluoto as well as 
changes caused by the ONKALO construction and 
other human activities. In addition, controlling 
the use of foreign materials in the construction 
of ONKALO has been a part of the programme. A 
particular objective of the monitoring programme 
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Figure F. A disposal tunnel with canisters surrounded 
by the bentonite buffer.
is to observe such possible changes in the host rock 
and surface environment that may affect the long-
term safety of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
The next update of the programme is planned to be 
published in 2018 and will describe the monitoring 
during the operational phase.
The Rock Suitability Classification (RSC) pro-
gramme produced its main report in 2012 as part 
of the reporting for the construction licence. The 
main purpose of the RSC methodology is to locate 
suitable volumes for disposal facilities in four stag-
es: repository, deposition panel, single deposition 
tunnel, and canister hole stage. The classification 
is based on a set of observable criteria connected 
to the long-term safety based target properties for 
the host rock.
Development of the engineered 
barrier system
At the moment the spent fuel is being stored in 
water pools in interim storage facilities at Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto. After a few decades of cooling it 
will be transferred to the encapsulation facility at 
Olkiluoto where it will be encapsulated in copper-
iron canisters each containing 12 BWR or PWR 
fuel assemblies from currently operating power 
plants or 4 PWR fuel assemblies from the Olkiluoto 
3 unit, which is currently under construction. The 
canister design consists of a cast iron insert as a 
load-bearing element and an outer container of 
oxygen-free copper to provide a shield against cor-
rosion. The canisters will be emplaced in a network 
of tunnels, which will be constructed at the depth 
of 420 to 450 m in crystalline bedrock. The an-
nulus between the canister and the rock wall will 
be filled with compacted bentonite. A schematic 
picture of canisters in deposition tunnels is shown 
in Figure F.
The work on canister development includes 
the design, canister manufacturing, canister seal-
ing and canister inspection. The canister design 
work has been focused on gathering up all factors 
affecting the design, the design requirements and 
the studies addressing the fulfilment of the design 
requirements. The design has been described in the 
report Design of Disposal Canister (Raiko 2012a). 
The report compiles studies on natural phenom-
ena, theoretical models and analyses, measure-
ments, practical tests, manufacturing trials and 
material studies that have been done for several 
years.	The	“canister	production	line”	report	(Raiko	
2012b) describes the production and installation 
chain of the canister from the design requirements 
until the time it has been installed in the deposi-
tion hole. The description is used as the starting 
point (initial state) for the long-term safety assess-
ment.
The copper overpack of the canister, which var-
ies for different fuel types only in length, can be 
manufactured with several methods. The present 
methods under development are extrusion and 
pierce	 &	 draw.	 With	 these	 methods	 Posiva,	 to-
gether with SKB, has during the past three years 
manufactured	seven	full-size	copper	canisters.	The	
properties of the manufactured canisters have 
been studied by non-destructive tests and it has 
been shown that canisters meeting the require-
ments can be manufactured by these methods. 
Similarly, eight nodular cast iron inserts for the 
disposal canisters have been cast in foundries in 
Finland and Germany, three of which were made 
for Posiva and SKB jointly. The manufacturing 
methods, requirements for manufacturing and re-
sults of manufacturing trials are described in 
the Canister Production Line 2012 report (Raiko 
2012b).
The reference sealing method for the Posiva 
canister has been the high-power electron beam 
welding. The method is an industrial welding 
method for steel and copper components but the 
wall thickness of the disposal canister creates an 
extra challenge. As an alternative method for seal-
ing the friction stir welding (FSW) method has 
been studied. The method is based on hot forming, 
for which the required temperature is achieved 
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through friction of a tool rotating with high speed 
in the material to be welded. In 2013, Posiva made 
an evaluation of the two methods and announced 
in March 2014 its decision to select the FSW as 
the welding method for the encapsulation plant, 
which will be built in Olkiluoto. The advantages 
of the FSW are the smaller and more even grain 
size,	isotropic	grain	structure	and	good	mechanical	
properties. In other words, the properties of FSW 
weld are closer to the mechanical properties and 
grain structure of the copper components. In very 
aggressive conditions, the FSW weld has proven 
to have better properties compared to EBW. The 
same applies for stress corrosion and creep proper-
ties of the welds, on which better results have been 
gained with FSW.
To prove that the canister to be disposed is ini-
tially intact, non-destructive testing of the canister 
components and the lid weld has been developed 
focusing mainly on the radiography for volumetric 
inspection, and on phased-array ultrasonic method 
for	more	detailed	detection	and	sizing	of	possible	
defects. In addition, eddy current has been devel-
oped to detect surface or near-surface defects and 
visual testing for surface defects. The reliability 
of the NDT methods has been studied jointly with 
SKB by verifying them with metallographic exami-
nations. The non-destructive testing methods, their 
requirements and experience gained with them are 
described in three reports (Pitkänen 2010, 2013, 
Kanzler	2013).
The bentonite buffer that surrounds the can-
ister is emplaced in the deposition hole in form 
of compacted blocks. The buffer design has been 
published in 2012 (Juvankoski 2012)). The gap 
between the buffer and the host rock will be filled 
with bentonite pellets. A small scale buffer test has 
been performed in ONKALO focusing on the test 
set-up to gain experience on building a buffer test.
For the buffer block manufacturing the isostatic 
compaction technique has been developed. The 
focus of the work has been on the production of 
blocks with the target density out of MX-80 type 
sodium bentonite. The results of this work will 
be applied for manufacturing of full scale blocks. 
Part of the work consists of modelling the pressing 
process.
As a part of the 7th Framework Programme 
of the European Commission a project named 
“LUCOEX”	has	been	 started	by	a	 consortium	be-
tween SKB, Posiva, ANDRA and NAGRA. The 
project includes a work package led by Posiva that 
focuses on developing solutions to the buffer em-
placement issues.
After all the canisters and buffer components 
within a deposition tunnel have been emplaced, 
the deposition tunnel will be backfilled and sealed 
with a plug. Posiva's plan is to backfill the tunnels 
with pre-compacted clay blocks using bentonite 
pellets for the voids between the blocks and the 
host rock. The tunnels will be sealed with a con-
crete plug at the mouth of the tunnel. During the 
last years several laboratory and field tests have 
been performed to study geotechnical properties 
such as hydraulic conductivity and swelling pres-
sure of various backfill materials. For assessing the 
mechanical interaction between the buffer and the 
backfill, a mechanical model is being developed. 
The main conclusions of testing and laboratory 
work are described in the backfill design report 
(Autio 2012) and the backfill production line report 
(Keto 2012).
The manufacturing of backfill blocks by uni-
axial pressing has been developed and blocks with 
required properties have been produced. The plug 
is now being constructed for testing in ONKALO as 
part of the European Commission 7th Framework 
Programme	project	named	“DOPAS”.
The closure of the access tunnels and shafts is 
based on a compartment solution: the access routes 
are divided into parts according to depth and pre-
vailing hydraulic conditions, and different plugs 
and backfill materials are used for each part ac-
cording to its characteristics. The design of under-
ground disposal facility closure design is described 
in the closure design report (Dixon 2012).
Facility design
The design work for the encapsulation plant and 
disposal	 facility	continues	 (Palomäki	&	Ristimäki	
2012). Main drawings for both facilities have been 
produced and sent to STUK as part of other licens-
ing documentation in the construction licence ap-
plication. All main process systems have also been 
pre-designed in order to produce the PSAR system 
descriptions. In the encapsulation plant (Figure G) 
the spent fuel elements are transferred from the 
transport containers to disposal canisters, a lid is 
friction-stir welded to the canister body and the 
weld is machined and inspected, after which the 
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canisters are ready for disposal. The encapsulation 
facility is located at the repository site, and, there-
fore, the disposal canisters can be transferred by 
lift to the disposal facility.
The layout designs of the disposal facility are 
based on the outcome of the rock suitability and 
classification work that indicates the suitable rock 
volumes for the deposition tunnels in the Olkiluoto 
area. However, the final decisions on the locations 
of tunnels and deposition holes will be made on 
the basis of detailed geological and geophysical 
information that will become available only after 
the central tunnels have been excavated. A sche-
matic picture of how the repository could look like 
is shown in Figure H.
Figure H. A schematic presentation of the layout of the Disposal facility.
Figure G. Cross section of Encapsulation plant.
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Figure I. Prototype of the canister installation machine.
In parallel with the technical design work and 
the planning of the operational practices of the fa-
cility, work has been done to assess the operational 
safety	of	the	facilities.	The	safety	analyses	(Rossi	&	
Suolanen 2013) have been reported in the context 
of the application for the construction licence.
As part of the work on encapsulation and dis-
posal processes prototype systems of a few essen-
tial systems have been developed. These systems 
are the canister transfer trolley and canister mover 
in the encapsulation process and the buffer, can-
ister and backfill material installation machines 
for the repository. The designs of these prototype 
systems have been completed and the manufac-
turing is ongoing. Prototype testing will start in 
spring 2014 and continue to the end of 2015. The 
prototype of the canister installation machine is 
presented in Figure I.
Assessment of long-term safety
For the purpose of the construction licence appli-
cation a safety case has been produced showing 
that the repository will satisfy the requirements 
for long-term safety. The main components of the 
safety case consist of an assessment of the perfor-
mance of the repository system in different future 
scenarios and an analysis of the probability and 
consequences of any releases of radioactive sub-
stances from the repository. The assessment starts 
from the initial state of the repository as described 
in	 the	“production	 line	 reports”	of	 the	engineered	
barrier system and the near-field host rock, and 
then goes on to studying the possible courses of 
development that the repository system can be 
subject to in the future. The assessment of the fu-
ture evolution is based on scientific knowledge and 
data gathered both from Olkiluoto and from dif-
ferent laboratory experiments and technical tests 
through more than 25 years. For the quantitative 
assessment, models based on scientific theories are 
used.
The safety case consists of a portfolio of reports 
as shown in Figure J. Its main components can be 
described as follows:
The initial state of the geosphere and biosphere, 
as well as ongoing evolutionary processes, such 
as land uplift, groundwater flow and mixing of 
groundwater types, are determined by site investi-
gations and compiled in the site descriptive models 
of the geosphere and the biosphere. These have 
been presented in the Olkiluoto Site Description 
(Posiva 2011) and in the Olkiluoto Biosphere 
Description (Posiva 2012b).
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The Description of the Disposal System Report 
(Posiva 2012c) summarises the information on the 
waste form, the engineered barrier system and 
the Olkiluoto site. More detailed descriptions are 
given in technical and scientific reports on various 
components of the disposal system, including the 
site descriptive model of Olkiluoto and the descrip-
tion of biosphere conditions. Background analy-
ses related to future climatic conditions are also 
performed and reported (Pimenoff et al. 2011a,b, 
Pimenoff 2012).
In the new safety case portfolio, the earlier 
Biosphere Assessment Portfolio has been fully 
integrated. However, the expression Biosphere as-
sessment will be retained. It (Posiva. 2012d) refers 
to the description of the current biosphere and its 
evolution, landscape modelling, and the assess-
ment of radiological consequences.
Figure J. Posiva's Safety Case Portfolio in 2012 (Posiva 2012a).
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The Design Basis Report (Posiva 2012e) fo-
cuses on the long-term safety aspects of the design, 
leaving the plant design basis to be discussed 
elsewhere. The aim of this report is to gather all 
relevant loads and interactions which the disposal 
plant designers need to take into account when 
designing the disposal systems and layouts for the 
construction and operating licence applications. 
The fulfilment of the requirements, the perfor-
mance	assessment,	is	analyzed	in	the	Performance	
Assessment Report (Posiva 2012f) for each en-
gineered barrier system (EBS) component. The 
design basis in the context of this report concerns 
the specification of the loads that the barriers must 
withstand, material restrictions and acceptance 
criteria which are relevant in the Base Scenario 
and its extensions (corresponding to the most like-
ly lines of future development of the repository) in 
the Posiva Safety Case. The design basis presented 
in	this	report	represents	a	data-freeze	of	Posiva's	
requirements management system VAHA.
The features, events and processes affecting 
the evolution of the repository are described in 
the Feature, Events and Processes Report (Posiva 
2012g). The evolution of the repository and the 
scenarios, for analysis in the safety assessment, is 
described in the Formulations of Scenarios Report 
(Posiva 2012h).
The Models and Data Report (Posiva 2012i) 
documenting the data and their interpretation 
(including modeling) in the context of the safety 
case has a key role for ensuring the overall quality 
of the assessment. The Models and Data Report 
is the main link between the safety case and the 
EBS design and development as well as between 
the safety case and the Olkiluoto site investiga-
tions. The report explains the most significant 
data used in the actual assessment. It consists of a 
discussion of those parameters, data and underly-
ing assumptions that are considered important for 
the results of the safety assessment calculations 
and the conclusions of the safety case as a whole. 
The data used in the biosphere assessment and 
the summary of biosphere models are described in 
Data Basis for the Biosphere Assessment report 
(Posiva 2012j).
The	scenarios	analyzed	quantitatively	address	
both the expected evolution of the repository and 
disruptive events, as required by YVL D.5. The 
assessment of the releases of radionuclides and 
the radiological consequences of these releases are 
presented in the Analysis of Radionuclide Release 
Scenarios Report (Posiva 2012k).
The Complementary Considerations Report 
(Posiva 2012l) provides additional evidence for the 
long-term safety of disposal according to the KBS-3 
method at the Olkiluoto site. Finally, the whole 
safety case, including the main results, is described 
in the Synthesis Report (Posiva 2012c).
The engineered barriers constitute an impor-
tant factor in ensuring the long-term safety in 
Posiva’s safety concept. Posiva's safety concept 
states that long-term safety is primarily based on 
the long-term containment of radionuclides by the 
engineered barrier system consisting of a canister 
and a buffer designed to protect the canister. The 
performance studies have therefore been focused 
on establishing the behaviour of the copper can-
ister and its protective bentonite buffer and on 
examining the harmful processes.
Many of these studies have been conducted as 
international joint projects and bilateral studies 
with SKB. Studies on the clay barriers include 
LOT (Long-Term Test of Buffer Material), ABM 
(Alternative Buffer Materials), FEBEX (Full-scale 
Engineered Barriers Experiment) LASGIT (Large 
Scale Gas Injection Test), EBS Task Force, FORGE 
(Fate Of Repository GasEs), BELBAR (Bentonite 
Erosion: effects on the Long term performance of 
the engineered Barrier and Radionuclide trans-
port), and CFM (Colloid Formation and Migration). 
Studies on UO2 dissolution and solubility have 
continued in the 7th Framework Programme of 
the European Commission in the projects named 
REDUPP (Reducing Uncertainty in Performance 
Prediction) and FIRST Nuclides (Fast / Instant 
Release of Safety Relevant Radionuclides from 
Spent Nuclear Fuel).
Studies into migration phenomena have con-
tinued in both domestic and international projects, 
such as in the Task Force for Groundwater Flow 
and Solute Transport arranged by Äspö Hard 
Rock Laboratory. Posiva has also taken part in the 
work	 of	 the	 NEA’s	 “Sorption	 Forum”	 project	 and	
in the TDB (Thermodynamic Data Base) project. 
A	 new	 code	 (“MARFA”)	 has	 been	 developed	 for	
the radionuclide transport in far-field together 
with SKB. The aim is to obtain the state-of-the-
art computer code for use in the safety assess-
ment projects. The work is carried out at the 
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Southwest Research Institute. Posiva has also par-
ticipated in the 7th Framework Programme of the 
European Commission in a project called CROCK 
(Crystalline rock retention processes), in which the 
main objective was to improve the safety state-
ment for the crystalline rock far-field as a radionu-
clide migration barrier. The effects of permafrost 
and glaciation on the long-term safety of the dis-
posal system have been studied in cooperation with 
SKB and NWMO in the GAP project (Greenland 
Analogue Project). The project will last until 2014, 
but some preliminary results have been published 
as Posiva working reports (Harper et al. 2012).
Development of the horizontal 
disposal solution
In parallel with the vertical disposal design 
(KBS-3V) now constituting the reference solution 
for Posiva and SKB, the development work for the 
horizontal	disposal	design	(KBS-3H)	has	continued	
with SKB, concentrating on the specific charac-
teristics	 of	 the	 horizontal	 design.	 A	 joint	 project	
entitled	“KBS-3H	System	Design	2011–2016”	was	
established in 2011 for further development work 
on	the	horizontal	solution.	Alongside	the	joint	pro-
ject, Posiva has taken into account even the space 
needs and requirements set by the 3H solution in 
its plant design work.
The main objective of the joint project is to de-
velop the technical engineering of the 3H alterna-
tive and the understanding of its systems to a level 
where a Preliminary Safety Assessment Report 
(PSAR) can be produced for the 3H alternative and 
used for a comparison between the 3V and 3H al-
ternatives. The comparison of the two alternatives 
also includes environmental issues, costs and safe-
ty issues (long-term, operational and occupational 
safety). The objective regarding long-term safety 
is to demonstrate that 3H is at least as safe an 
alternative as 3V. The DAWE (Drainage, Artificial 
Watering and air Evacuation) design solution cho-
sen	as	the	reference	design	for	the	horizontal	solu-
tion is presented in more details in Posiva 2012m, 
Posiva 2012n and Posiva 2013.
A full-scale demonstration of the DAWE design 
solution chosen as the reference design in 2010, 
entitled the Multipurpose Test (MPT), is being 
carried out in the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory 
(Figure K). The MPT is part of the four-year inter-
national LUCOEX project, initiated in 2011 and 
scheduled to end at the end of 2014. The purpose 
of the MPT is to test the manufacture, transport 
and installation of main components, as well as the 
techniques compliant with the DAWE design solu-
tion, such as artificial wetting of the clay material. 
The	installation	work	for	the	MPT	was	finalized	at	
the end of 2013 and the monitoring phase initiated. 
The duration of the field phase is under evaluation 
since it will continue beyond the LUCOEX project. 
The joint performance of the components and the 
behaviour of clay material will be tested; samples 
will be taken for the latter purpose after the dis-
mantling at the end of the test.
Close to the earlier excavated KBS-3H deposi-
tion niche at Äspö HRL at level -420 m, test drill-
ing using the directional core drilling technique 
has been initiated. A 300 m long artificial test 
hole	 “Borehole	 Deviation	 Facility”	 has	 been	 con-
structed on the surface for testing and calibrating 
the inclination and deviation tools. The work aims 
at developing readiness for the pilot hole drilling/
boring from the deposition niche into the eventual 
KBS-3H demonstration drift. The first 100 m of the 
pilot hole is planned to be reamed to the full drift 
size	of	1850	mm.
Big	Bertha	 tests	BB2	&	BB3	have	been	final-
ized	and	the	documentation	will	be	concluded	early	
2014. The objective of the BB2 test was to study 
the swelling pressure development of the buffer 
through the perforated shell, the protective cyl-
inder around the Super container. The bentonite 
blocks and the gap between the perforated shell 
and	the	“drift	wall”	were	compliant	with	the	con-
cept design. Consequently the early evolution of 
the swelling pressure corresponds to the real swell-
ing evolution in MPT. The objective of the BB3 test 
was to study the swelling development within the 
distance block during the 6 month long test dura-
tion. The gap and the bentonite block were also 
compliant with the concept design.
In both tests the artificial water filling was 
performed in accordance with the DAWE design 
solution. The objective was to fill the gap with 
water. The test results indicated a slower swelling 
pressure development in both tests than expected.
The two production line reports entitled 
“Design,	 Construction	 and	 Initial	 State	 of	 the	
KBS-3H	Underground	Openings	and	“Buffer	ben-
tonite	and	filling	components”	are	currently	being	
produced. In addition to these, other production 
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line reports to be initiated in 2014, describing the 
specific characteristics of the 3H design, include 
“Super	container”	and	“Plugs”.
An updated description of the repository lay-
out and stepwise implementation of the KBS-3H 
concept in the Olkiluoto bedrock for the amount of 
9000 tU of spent nuclear fuel, using the same basis 
as for the 3V layout, will be made in 2014.
Currently scoping analyses regarding the 
Olkiluoto site are being performed related to the 
canister failure models of several canisters due to 
the erosion of bentonite caused by dilute glacial 
water after an ice age and followed by enhanced 
canister corrosion, as well as to canister failures 
due to shear movements in the bedrock. These are 
the key areas for investigation identified in the 
preliminary KBS-3H safety analysis (Posiva 2007). 
The work will be performed using the chosen 
DAWE reference solution.
A study on the long-term interaction between 
buffer bentonite and titanium, the material se-
lected for the Super container shell, i.e. a protec-
tive cylinder, and for the plugs was continued. 
The study is scheduled to end in 2014. The work 
is based on earlier research regarding the interac-
tion between titanium and bentonite. The study 
focuses on chemical processes which may have a 
deteriorating effect on the safety performance of 
the buffer.
The Design Basis – KBS-3H memorandum has 
been compiled in compliance with the structure of 
the Design Basis report for KBS-3V (Posiva 2012e). 
The Design Basis report for KBS-3H is scheduled 
to be compiled at the end of 2014.
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L.3 List of spent fuel storages and inventory of spent fuel
Loviisa NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)/ storage capacity
Mass* (tHM) Fuel assemblies
Pool storage in Loviisa 1 reactor building 30.3/57 252/481
Pool storage in Loviisa 2 reactor building 10.7/58 89/485
Basket type pool storage at the NPP 57.7/57 480/480
Rack type pool storage at the NPP 461.5/582 3836/4842
Total inventory/storage capacity (gross) 560/756 4657/6288
Total effective** storage capacity 620 5157
Olkiluoto NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)/ storage capacity
Mass* (tHM) Fuel assemblies
Pool storage in, Olkiluoto 1 reactor building 86.4/267 524/1520
Pool storage in Olkiluoto 2 reactor building 94.6/274 568/1560
Separate storage facility at the NPP site 960.8/1257 5658/7146
Total inventory/storage capacity (gross) 1187.3/1799 6750/10226
Total effective** storage capacity 1623 9226
FiR 1 research reactor
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)
Mass (kgU) Fuel elements
Wet storage 2.04 11
Dry storage 2.41 13
Total inventory 4.45 24
* tHM means that the spent fuel inventory is presented in tonnes of heavy metals. 
** In the effective capacity the reserve capacity for exceptional unloading of the entire reactor core to storage pool,  
for storage pool repairs and space for dummy elements are excluded (cf. Table 1 in Section D).
L.4 List of radioactive waste management facilities 
and inventory of radioactive waste
Loviisa NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Storage room for LLW inside the NPP 209.0 0.18
Storage room for ILW inside the NPP 38.13 0,16
Tank storage for wet LILW*** 1230 16.7
Storages for activated metal waste 39.5 high (not measured)
On-site storage hall for VLLW 96.0 low
Olkiluoto NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Buffer storage rooms inside the NPP 194 22.1
On-site storages for operational waste 176 low
Storages for activated metal waste 53 high
Spent oil candidate for clearance 11 low
Interim storage for state owned waste 56 51.4
FiR 1 research reactor
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Waste storage in the laboratory building 6 0.001
STUK’s waste storage
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Storage room in STUK’s building 2 3.8
Storage for small user waste containing nuclear material
Storage Inventory (end of 2013) Volume (m³)
Storage room in STUK’s building HEU 0.8 g, LEU 536 g, UNat 574 g, DU 369 kg, Th 199 g
Storage for state owned waste
Storage
Inventory (end of 2013)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Rock cavern attached to the Olkiluoto disposal 
facility
56 50.14
*** Tank storage for wet LILW includes sediment matter on the bottom of the tanks estimated to be about 60 m³.
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L.5 List of main regulations
Most of the regulations can be found in English at 
http://plus.edilex.fi/stuklex/en/.
Legislation (as of 30.7.2014)
•	 Nuclear	Energy	Act	(990/1987)
•	 Nuclear	Energy	Decree	(161/1988)
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	State	Nuclear	Waste	
Management Fund (161/2004)
•	 Act	on	Third	Party	Liability	(484/1972)
•	 Decree	 on	 the	 Implementation	 of	Third	 Party	
Liability (486/1972)
•	 Radiation	Act	(592/1991)
•	 Radiation	Decree	(1512/1991)
•	 Act	 on	 the	 Finnish	 Centre	 for	 Radiation	 and	
Nuclear Safety (1069/1983)
•	 Decree	 on	 the	 Radiation	 and	 Nuclear	 Safety	
Authority (618/1997)
•	 Decree	 on	 Advisory	 Commission	 on	 Nuclear	
Safety (164/1988)
•	 Act	 on	 the	Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	
Procedure (468/1994)
•	 Government	Decree	 on	Environmental	 Impact	
Assessment Procedure (713/2006)
•	 Act	on	the	Openness	of	Government	Activities	
(621/1999)
•	 Policy	Decision	of	10th	November	1983	by	 the	
Government on the Objectives to be Observed in 
Carrying out Research, Surveys and Planning 
in the Field of Nuclear Waste Management, Nu-
clear Law Bulletin, No 33 (1984) pp.42-44
•	 Decision	of	the	Government	on	Financial	Provi-
sion for the Costs of Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment (165/1988)
•	 Government	 Decree	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	
Power Plants (717/2013) (replacing earlier Gov-
ernment Decree 733/2008)
•	 Government	Decree	on	the	Security	in	the	Use	
of Nuclear Energy (734/2008) (revised in 2012)
•	 Government	 Decree	 on	 Emergency	 Response	
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(716/2013) (replacing earlier Government De-
cree 735/2008)
•	 Government	Decree	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Disposal	
of Nuclear Waste (736/2008) (replacing ear-
lier Decisions of the Government 398/1991 and 
478/1999)
Relevant EU Directives, 
Regulations and Decisions
•	 Council	 Regulation	 93/1493/EURATOM	 of	 8	
June 1993 on shipments of radioactive sub-
stances between Member States
•	 Council	Directive	 96/29/EURATOM	of	 13	May	
1996 on the protection of the health of workers 
and general public against the dangers arising 
from	ionizing	radiation
•	 Council	Directive	97/43/EURATOM	of	30	June	
1997 on health protection of individuals against 
dangers	 of	 ionizing	 radiation	 in	 relation	 of	
medical exposure, and repealing Directive 
84/466EURATOM
•	 Council	 Directive	 2003/122/EURATOM	 of	 22	
December 2003 on the control of high-activity 
sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources
•	 Council	 Directive	 2006/117/EURATOM	 of	 20	
November 2006 on the supervision and control 
of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel
•	 Commission	 Decision	 of	 5	 march	 2008	 estab-
lishing the standard document for the super-
vision and control of shipments of radioactive 
waste and spent fuel referred to in the Council 
Directive 2006/117/Euratom
•	 Council	 Directive	 2009/71/EURATOM	 of	 25	
June 2009 on the nuclear safety of nuclear in-
stallations
•	 Council	Directive	2011/70EURATOM	of	19	July	
2011 establishing a Community framework for 
the responsible and safe management of spent 
fuel and radioactive waste
•	 Council	 Decision	 87/600/EURATOM	 of	 14	De-
cember 1987 on Community arrangements for 
the early exchange of information in the event 
of a radiological emergency
Guides issued by STUK (as of 30.7.2014, only 
Guides relevant to this report included)
•	 Guide	YVL	A.1	Regulatory	control	of	safety	 in	
the use of nuclear energy, 22 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.2	Site	for	nuclear	facility,	15	No-
vember 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.3	Management	 systems	of	a	nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.4	Organisation	and	personnel	of	a	
nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
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•	 Guide	YVL	A.5	Construction	 and	 commission-
ing of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	 YVL	A.8	 Ageing	 management	 of	 a	 nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 YVL	 1.5	 Reporting	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 op-
eration to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, 8 September 2003 (replaced by YVL 
A.9)
•	 YVL	A.9	Regular	reporting	on	the	operation	of	a	
nuclear facility, , 15 August 2014
•	 Guide	YVL	A.10	Operating	experience	feedback	
of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.11	Security	of	a	nuclear	facility,	15	
November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	A.12	 Information	security	of	a	nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	B.1	Safety	design	of	a	nuclear	power	
plant, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	B.2	Classification	of	systems,	struc-
tures and components of a nuclear facility, 15 
November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	C.1	Structural	radiation	safety	at	a	
nuclear facility,15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	C.2	Radiation	protection	and	expo-
sure monitoring of nuclear power plant work-
ers, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	 YVL	 C.3	 Limitation	 and	 monitoring	 of	
radioactive releases from a nuclear facility, 15 
November 2013
•	 YVL	 C.4	 Radiological	 monitoring	 of	 the	 envi-
ronment of a nuclear facility (in publication 
process)
•	 Guide	YVL	 C.5	 Emergency	 preparedness	 of	 a	
nuclear power plant 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	C.6	Radiation	monitoring	at	 a	nu-
clear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	 YVL	 D.1	 Regulatory	 control	 of	 nuclear	
safeguards, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	D.2	Transport	 of	 nuclear	material	
and nuclear waste, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	D.3	Handling	and	storage	of	nuclear	
fuel, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	D.4	Predisposal	management	of	low	
and intermediate level waste and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
•	 Guide	YVL	 D.5	 Disposal	 of	 nuclear	 waste,	 15	
November 2013
•	 Guide	ST	1.1	Safety	fundamentals	in	radiation	
practices, 23 May 2013
•	 Guide	 ST	 1.4	 Radiation	 user’s	 organization,	 2	
November 2011
•	 Guide	ST	1.5	Exemption	of	the	use	of	radiation	
from the safety licence, 12 September 2013
•	 Guide	ST	1.8.	Qualifications	and	radiation	pro-
tection training of persons working in radiation 
user’s	organization,	17	February	2012
•	 Guide	ST	5.1	Radiation	safety	of	sealed	sources	
and equipment containing them, 7 November 
2007
•	 Guide	 ST	 5.7	 Shipments	 of	 radioactive	 waste	
and spent fuel, 6 June 2011
•	 Guide	ST	6.2	Radioactive	wastes	and	discharg-
es, 1 July 1999
•	 Guide	ST	12.2	Radioactivity	of	building	materi-
als and ash, 17 December 2010
•	 Guide	 VAL	 1	 Protective	 measures	 in	 Early	
Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency
•	 Guide	VAL	2	Protective	measures	in	Intermedi-
ate Phase of a Nuclear or Radiological Emer-
gency
L.6 References to official 
national and international 
reports related to safety
•	 The	Final	Disposal	 Facility	 for	 Spent	Nuclear	
Fuel, Environmental Impact Assessment Re-
port, Posiva Oy, 1999
•	 Vieno,	 T.,	 Nordman,	 H.,	 Safety	 Assessment	 of	
Spent Fuel Disposal in Hästholmen, Kivetty, 
Olkiluoto and Romuvaara, TILA-99, POSIVA 
99-07, March 1999
•	 Ruokola	E	(ed.).	Posiva’s	Application	for	a	Deci-
sion-in-Principle Concerning a Disposal Facility 
for Spent Nuclear Fuel. STUK’s Statement and 
Preliminary Safety Appraisal, STUK-B-YTO 
198, March 2000.
•	 Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	 Report	 on	
Expanding the Capacity of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Repository, Posiva Oy, 2008.
•	 Posiva’s	 Application	 for	 a	 Decision	 in	 Princi-
ple on Spent Fuel from the Olkiluoto 4 Unit, 
STUK’s Statement and Preliminary Safety Ap-
praisal, May 2009.
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•	 Posiva’s	Application	for	a	Decision	in	Principle	
on Spent Fuel from the Loviisa 3 Unit, STUK’s 
Statement and Preliminary Safety Appraisal, 
October 2009.
•	 Finnish	Report	on	the	Safety	of	Spent	Fuel	and	
Radioactive Waste Management, Finnish na-
tional Report as Referred to in Article 32 of the 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
and Radioactive Waste Management, STUK-B-
YTO 223, Helsinki 2003.
•	 Joint	 Convention	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Spent	 Fuel	
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management. 2nd Finnish National Re-
port as referred to in Article 32 of the Conven-
tion. STUK-B-YTO 243. STUK, Helsinki 2005.
•	 Joint	 Convention	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Spent	 Fuel	
Management and on the Safety of Radioac-
tive Waste Management. 3rd Finnish National 
Report as referred to in Article 32 of the Con-
vention. STUK-B 96. Helsinki: Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority; 2008
•	 Joint	 Convention	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Spent	 Fuel	
Management and on the Safety of Radioac-
tive Waste Management. 4th Finnish National 
Report as referred to in Article 32 of the Con-
vention. STUK-B 138. Helsinki: Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority; 2011
•	 Finnish	 report	 on	 nuclear	 safety.	 Finnish	 6th	
national report as referred to in Article 5 of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. STUK-B 164. 
Helsinki: Radiation and Nuclear Safety Author-
ity; 2013
•	 Erja	Kainulainen	(Ed.).	Regulatory	oversight	of	
nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2013. 
STUK-B 176. Helsinki: Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority; 2014
•	 The	Government	Resolution	and	Safety	Strat-
egy for Society 2010
•	 European	Stress	Tests	for	Nuclear	Power	Plants,	
National Action Plan FINLAND, December 2012 
(http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/fi_FI/fuku-
shima-selvitykset/_files/88946073696944417/
default/European_Stress_Test_-_National_Ac-
tion_Plan_-_Finland.pdf)
•	 Report	 of	 the	 Committee	 for	 Nuclear	 Energy	
Competence in Finland, 2012 (http://www.tem.
fi/files/33099/TEMjul_14_2012_web.pdf)
•	 Nuclear	Energy	Research	Strategy	Group	(YES)	
Ydinenergia-alan tutkimusstrategia, Energia ja 
ilmasto 16/2014 (in Finnish)
•	 Fennovoima’s	Application	 for	 a	Supplement	 to	
Government Decision-In-Principle M 4/2010 vp 
pursuant toSection 11 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (990/1987), granted on May 6, 2010 http://
www.fennovoima.fi/userData/fennovoima/doc/
pap/PAP2014_EN_DIGI_LOW.pdf
•	 Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	 Report	 for	
a Nuclear Power Plant, February 2014, by Fen-
novoima http://www.fennovoima.fi/userData/
fennovoima/doc/yva/yva2013/EIAreport2014.
pdf; STUK’s assessment of it only in Finn-
ish http://www.stuk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/
fi_FI/news_903/_files/91805571943118302/de-
fault/4_J42211_2014Saatekirje-alustava-tur-
vallisuusarvio-fennovoima.pdf
•	 TVO’s	 Application	 for	 a	 Decision-in-Principle	
concerning the Construction of a Nuclear Power 
Plant Unit – Olkiluoto 4 https://www.tem.fi/
files/23613/OL4_PAP_en_lukittu.pdf
•	 TVO’s	 Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	 Re-
port, Extension of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power 
Plant by a Fourth Unit, http://www.tvo.fi/up-
loads/files/YVA_selostusraportti_EN_Secured_
pien.pdf
L.7 References to reports of 
international review missions 
performed at the request of 
the Contracting Party
•	 STUK’s	Action	 Plan	 based	 on	 STUK’s	 self-as-
sessment and IRRS findings, 2013 (http://www.
stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/fi_FI/fukushima-selvi-
tykset/_files/88946073696944417/default/Euro-
pean_Stress_Test_-_National_Action_Plan_-_
Finland.pdf)
•	 Integrated	 Regulatory	 Review	 Service	 (IRRS)	
mission to Finland, Helsinki, 15–26 October 
2012.
•	 EU	Waste	Peer	Review	2009	 to	STUK’s	Waste	
Management (http://www.stuk.fi/stuk/fi_FI/kan-
sainvaliset-arviot/_files/89760656094724105/
default/stuk-action-plan-eu-27-peer-plan.pdf)
•	 Operational	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	 Power	 Plant,	
Finland (Loviisa), OSART Mission (Opera-
tional Safety Review Team), IAEA-NSNI/OS-
ART/07/139, 5-21 March 2007.
•	 Regulatory	 Review	 Team	 (IRRT),	 Follow-Up	
Mission to Finland, 31 August– 9 September 
2003, IAEA/NSNI/IRRT/03/03, IAEA, Vienna, 
2003
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•	 Technical	Notes	of	the	International	Regulatory	
Review Team (IRRT) Mission to Finland, 12–13 
March 2000, IAEA, Vienna, 2000
•	 Integrated	Safety	Assessment	 of	Research	Re-
actors (INSARR), Report to the Government of 
Finland, NSNI/INSARR/1999-2, IAEA, Vienna, 
August 1999
•	 Evaluation	of	the	Finnish	Nuclear	Waste	Man-
agement Programme, Report of the WATRP 
Review Team / International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Waste Management Assessment and 
Review Programme, Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, Helsinki, 1994
•	 Operational	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	 Installations,	
Finland (Loviisa), OSART Mission (Operational 
Safety Review Team) 5-23. November 1990
•	 Operational	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	 Installations,	
Finland (Olkiluoto), OSART Mission (Opera-
tional Safety Review Team), IAEA-NENS-86/2, 
IAEA, Vienna, September 1986
L.8 Spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management policy
General
The principles of the nuclear waste management 
were originally set in the Finnish Government’s 
policy decision of 1983 and later in the decisions 
by the MEE. These decisions also set a long-term 
schedule for the implementation of nuclear waste 
management including the site selection and start 
of the operation of the spent fuel disposal facility.
Responsibilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) prescribes that 
the generators of nuclear waste are responsible 
for all nuclear waste management measures and 
their appropriate preparation, as well as for their 
cost. The state has the secondary responsibility in 
case any producer of nuclear waste is incapable 
of fulfilling its nuclear waste management obliga-
tion (the Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32). 
When the licensee’s waste management obligation 
has ceased because the disposal of nuclear waste 
has been carried out in an approved manner, the 
ownership right to the nuclear waste is transferred 
to the State, which shall be responsible thereafter 
for the nuclear waste (the Nuclear Energy Act, 
Sections 32–34).
The Radiation Act (Section 50) provides that the 
organization	engaged	in	a	radiation	practice	shall	
take the measures necessary to render harmless 
any radioactive waste arising from its operations. 
Rendering radioactive waste harmless means any 
measure needed to treat, isolate or dispose of the 
waste, or to restrict its use so that it does not en-
danger human health or the environment. Also, the 
responsible	party	utilizing	natural	 resources	 con-
taining radioactive substances shall ensure that 
radioactive	waste	poses	no	hazard	to	health	or	to	
the environment, both during the operations and 
at their conclusion. The state has the secondary re-
sponsibility in case a producer of radioactive waste 
is incapable of fulfilling its management obligation 
(the Radiation Act, Section 51).
Political decision-making and 
public consultation
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 11), 
the construction of a nuclear facility of considerable 
general significance shall require a Government’s 
Decision-in-Principle (DiP) on that the construc-
tion project is in accordance with the overall good 
of the society. Such facilities include major nuclear 
waste management facilities. Before making the 
DiP referred to in Section 11, the Government shall 
ascertain that the municipality where the nuclear 
facility is planned to be located, is in favour of the 
facility (Section 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act). The 
Government DiP shall be forwarded, without de-
lay, to the Parliament for perusal. The Parliament 
may reverse the DiP as such or may decide that it 
remains in force as such (Section 15 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act).
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 24) pro-
vides that an application for a DiP shall be ap-
pended by an assessment report drawn up ac-
cording to the Act on the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Procedure and a statement from the 
coordinating authority (Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, MEE) as well as a description 
on the design criteria that will be observed by the 
applicant to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden on the environment. The envi-
ronmental impact assessment procedure is a con-
sultative process facilitating public involvement 
and information transfer to the people affected. It 
considers a wide scope of potential impacts, such as 
human health and comfort, natural environment 
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and biodiversity, municipal structures and the use 
of natural resources.
Spent fuel and nuclear waste 
management principles
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 27a) 
the amount of nuclear waste generated in the use 
of nuclear energy must be kept as small as is rea-
sonably possible with practical measures, both re-
garding volume and activity, without compromis-
ing the general principles set forth in Sections 5–7 
of the Act.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act 
(Section  6a) nuclear waste generated in Finland 
shall be handled, stored and permanently disposed 
of in Finland. Respectively, nuclear waste gener-
ated elsewhere than in Finland, shall not be han-
dled, stored or permanently disposed of in Finland. 
There are only minor exemptions to these princi-
ples, notably the nuclear waste arising from the 
use of a research reactor in Finland (Section 6a of 
the Nuclear Energy Act). As stipulated in Section 
7b of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the spent fuel 
from a research reactor in Finland can be handled, 
stored and disposed of outside Finland, if justified 
on grounds of safety or due to a significant eco-
nomic or other weighty reason.
Principles for decommissioning 
of nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7g) requires that 
provisions for the decommissioning of a nuclear 
facility shall be taken into account in its design. 
The decommissioning plan shall be updated as pre-
scribed in the Act (Section 28). After the perma-
nent shut-down of the facility, it shall be decom-
missioned in accordance with a plan approved by 
STUK. The dismantling of the facility and other 
actions related to decommissioning shall not be 
unjustifiably postponed.
Management principles for 
other radioactive waste
According to the Radiation Act (Section 31b), when 
requesting a safety licence for the use of a high-
activity sealed source, the request must include a 
plan of rendering harmless of any disused sources, 
including the arrangements for their return to the 
manufacturer or supplier, or their surrender to 
a recognised installation. The Radiation Decree 
(Section 24b) specifies that STUK shall discharge 
the function of rendering radioactive waste harm-
less where there is no recognised facility of the 
kind referred in the Radiation Act. STUK may 
agree with the custodian of the waste that custody 
of the waste will be permanently assigned to the 
government in return for a non-recurrent compen-
sation charge.
Safety principles and control
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7a) prescribes 
that the safety of the use of nuclear energy (in-
cluding waste management activities) shall be as 
high as reasonable achievable. To further enhance 
safety, all actions justified by operational experi-
ences, safety research and the progress in science 
and technology shall be taken. Additionally, nu-
clear waste shall be managed so that no radia-
tion exposure will occur after disposal that would 
exceed the levels considered acceptable during the 
implementation of disposal. The disposal of nuclear 
waste in a manner intended as permanent shall be 
planned giving priority to safety and so that ensur-
ing long-term safety does not require the monitor-
ing of the disposal site (Section 7h of the Nuclear 
Energy Act).
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55) designates 
STUK as the regulatory body for the control of 
the safe use of nuclear energy. STUK’s regulatory 
tasks	include	assessment	of	safety	in	authorization	
processes, issuance of detailed safety requirements 
and control of compliance with the safety require-
ments and licence conditions. Respectively, the 
Radiation Act (Section 6) states that compliance 
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with the Act and with the provisions and regula-
tions issued pursuant thereto shall be supervised 
by STUK. The Act (Section 16) states that safety li-
cences shall be granted by STUK upon application.
Costs and funding
The Nuclear Energy Act (Chapter 7) addresses the 
financial provision for nuclear waste management. 
The basic goal of the financing system for radioac-
tive waste management and decommissioning is to 
ensure that funds for future waste management 
are collected so that assets are available even in 
case of insolvency of the waste generator. The NPP 
operators include the costs of waste management, 
even those arising from the decommissioning of the 
NPPs, in the price of nuclear electricity. Initially, 
the nuclear power companies had internal funds 
for that purpose, but by virtue of entry into force of 
the Nuclear Energy Act, the State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund was established under the for-
mer Ministry of Trade and Industry (now Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy) in 1988. To en-
sure that the financial liability is covered, every 
third year the nuclear power companies and the 
operator of the research reactor are obliged to pre-
sent cost estimates for the future management of 
nuclear wastes and take care that the required 
amount of money is set aside to the State Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund. In order to provide for 
the insolvency of the nuclear utilities, they shall 
provide securities to the State for that part of fi-
nancial liability which is not covered by the Fund. 
Also in case of the research reactor, the operator 
is responsible for the planning and implementa-
tion for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste man-
agement. In the case of the research reactor the 
State initially funded the necessary provision to 
the State Fund.
The Radiation Act (Section 19) provides for fur-
nishing the financial security of radioactive waste 
management for non-nuclear practices as follows: 
to ensure that the licensee meets the costs incurred 
in rendering radioactive waste harmless and in 
carrying out any decontamination measures that 
may be needed in the environment, the licensee 
shall furnish securities if the operations produce or 
are liable to produce radioactive waste that cannot 
be rendered harmless without substantial cost.
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